new POLITICS

CURRENTS IN JAPANESE SOCIALIST THOUGHT

Introduction ■ Lewis Feuer
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Latin America:
The Middle Class Revolution ■ Victor Alba
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Anton Pannekoek (1873-1960) ■ Paul Mattick
Mass Film Criticism ■ Parker Tyler

ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO WAGE EARNER: RITUAL AND REALITY ■ Herbert Hill
THE 22nd CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY ■ Tony Cliff

NOTES FROM ABROAD ■ CORRESPONDENCE ■ BOOKNOTES

WINTER 1962 **90 cents**

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Editors' Corner

Our first issue has sold out.

The press run was a dozen less than five thousand and we are now hunting for unsold copies to meet continuing requests, to make up an adequate file and for binding, possibly, at the end of the publishing year. NEW POLITICS has found a substantial market in the universities and has sold extraordinarily well in bookstores.

The enthusiastic response elicited by the first issue has been most heartwarming. A party held in New York to greet the appearance of the magazine produced an attendance of almost three hundred. Letters have been coming from individuals in various parts of the country offering to solicit subscriptions and distribute NEW POLITICS to newsstands and bookstores.

●

An indication of reader reaction is the mail we have been receiving commenting on the first issue: "Your first issue of NEW POLITICS was certainly worth waiting for! It's very good. I'm reading it like a book—starting with the first article and continuing right through." Another reader writes: "The first four articles on Cuba actually manage to cast new light on that much discussed subject. Sidney Lens' piece is a real masterpiece, both in the information it supplies and the future program it suggests. Tom Kahn's article . . . illuminates certain trends of thought among American Negroes most wonderfully. And what makes all the pieces that I have read appealing is their concern with concrete fact and the way such fact can contribute to general theory. Most socialist journals reverse this necessary relationship."

A Michigan subscriber writes: "This reader was especially interested in articles such as Sid Lens', Hal Draper's, Tom Kahn's and the 'two views' of Russia. No doubt you will have more such in the future."

From a Kansas subscriber, an offer of assistance: "I would like to inquire into the possibilities of becoming a subscription agent for NEW POLITICS. I have recently become a subscriber to NEW POLITICS and many of my friends and acquaintances have expressed interest in your fine magazine."

●

Our feeling that there was both an audience and a market for NEW POLITICS has certainly been borne out by the reception accorded the first issue. It must be said, however, that we cannot hope for commercial success. Publication costs are enormous and are not covered by the selling

Continued inside back cover

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Organized Labor and the Negro Wage Earner: Ritual and Reality

Herbert Hill

IN THE LATE NINETEEN THIRTIES AND EARLY FORTIES during the phenomenal rise of the Congress of Industrial Organizations there was a great hope for Negroes within organized labor.

With the rapid growth of industrial unions in the basic mass production sectors of the economy where tens of thousands of colored workers in steel, automobile, rubber and packinghouse plants joined CIO unions on the basis of equality, there was reason to hope that the "old line" AFL craft union tradition of racial exclusion and segregation would be thrust aside in the forward surge of the new industrial unions.

But, unfortunately, the course of events in the past decade, and especially since the merger, clearly indicates that the social consciousness of the industrial unions with their sensitivity to the problems of the Negro wage earner have now all but totally vanished. Instead, trade unions are responding like other conservative institutions in American society to the new demands of the Negro for full equality and recognition of individual ability.

In the early years of the 1940's the leadership of the CIO repeatedly joined with the Negro community in publicly condemning the vicious racism of several major AFL unions when they abused Negro workers. This occurred, for example, when the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, upon becoming the collective bargaining agent at the Bauer Electric Company in Hartford, Connecticut, demanded that all Negro electricians be dismissed from their jobs, as Negroes could not be admitted into membership;[1] when the Boilermakers Union forced Negro

[1] International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers vs. Commission on Civil Rights, 140 Connecticut 537 (1953). In this case the Supreme Court of Connecticut protected the job rights of the Negro workers by sustaining a cease and desist order against the IBEW.

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workers out of their jobs in several shipyards, and the similar action of the International Association of Machinists at the Boeing Aircraft Company plant in Seattle.

In its time the National CIO filed *amicus curiae* briefs in support of litigation initiated by Negroes and assisted in a variety of ways the protests of colored workers against the operating railroad brotherhoods and other discriminatory labor organizations.

But this has long since come to an end. The industrial union bloc in the AFL-CIO hardly differentiates itself from Meany and the Building Trades Council on racial issues. The leadership of the Industrial Union Department remained silent when Randolph, as the spokesman for Negro trade unionists, was repeatedly attacked by Meany and they voted with the rest of the AFL-CIO Executive Council in denouncing Randolph and in rejecting proposals to eliminate discrimination and segregation in affiliated unions.[2] In addition, many of the former CIO unions have themselves compromised, especially in the South, with anti-Negro practices.

It appears that on racial issues the industrial unions have made their peace with the narrow and bigoted AFL craft tradition. There was a time when they challenged that tradition, but today, they remain silent and acquiesce as organized labor becomes more conservative and rigid, unable to organize vast new industries and basing itself upon an increasingly small and limited section of the work force in the United States. The AFL-CIO has greatly compromised the social objectives declared at the time of the merger in 1955 and in addition has not realized the basic collective bargaining goals it set for itself at that time.

Thus, today, the militant Negro worker is confronted not with a trade union movement that is a force for social change but on the contrary, with a national labor organization that has become a very conservative and highly bureaucratized institution, closely allied in many cities and states to reactionary political forces and defending that status quo which is now directly attacked by the Negro in virtually every area of American life.

A SIGNIFICANT MANIFESTATION OF ORGANIZED LABOR'S conservatism on non-economic issues is the rigidity of anti-Negro practices in many important unions. The refusal to yield on racial matters, to bitterly resist change in the status of Negroes, is responsible for the fact that today many trade unions lag behind the progress made by other institutions in the community. In East St. Louis, Illinois, and Tulsa, Oklahoma, for example, Negro children attend integrated schools during the day but their parents attend segregated union meetings at night, if they are admitted into labor unions

[2] At the 2nd Annual Convention of the Negro American Labor Council, Chicago, Illinois, November 10-12, 1961, Richard Parrish, national treasurer of the Council, voiced the sentiment of the delegates on the Federation's rebuke of Randolph as follows. 'Where was David Dubinsky, where was Walter Reuther, where was Joe Curran, where was Jim Carey?"
"Where were all these liberals on the council when the vote was taken? This was a show of power to demonstrate to Negro union members that they represent nothing when it comes to setting policies in the labor movement, even though they pay dues."

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at all. Recently, A. Phillip Randolph called "for a crusade to desegregate the Southern AFL-CIO State Conventions and City Central bodies," and stated that, "this is a problem probably not less significant or difficult than the desegregation of public schools in the South."

There is a deep distrust among many Negro wage earners and others within the Negro community toward trade unions. It is a distrust well founded on experience. For today, as in the past, there is a profound disparity between the public image presented by the national AFL-CIO and the day-to-day realities as experienced by many Negro workers. This is true in the North as well as in the South. There are some few exceptions, especially in the mass production industries where, historically, there has been a large concentration of Negro workers, and in some unions such as the United Automobile Workers (UAW) and the United Packinghouse Workers (UPW) where there is an ideological sensitivity to the "Negro question."

But for the Negro in major areas of the economy, in the building and construction trades, the railroad industry, among the boilermakers, oil and chemical workers and machinists, in pulp, tobacco and paper manufacturing, in metal working, in the printing trades and in many other industries highly unionized for a long period of time, trade union practices, are characterized by a broad pattern of discrimination and segregation.

THE PATTERN OF UNION RESPONSIBILITY for job discrimination against Negroes is not limited to any one area of the country or to some few industries or union jurisdictions but involves many unions in a wide variety of occupations in manufacturing industries, skilled crafts, railroads, and in maritime trades as, for example, the Seafarers International Union which operates union controlled hiring halls on Great Lakes ports such as Duluth, Chicago, Detroit, Buffalo and Cleveland. Over the years, Negro members of the Seafarers International Union have repeatedly protested the systematic practice of dispatching Negroes for menial jobs only, as mess boys in the galley, but to no avail, as the union continues discriminatory job assignments in its hiring halls.

On occasion, after much protest, one or two Negroes have been admitted into an all-white local union as token compliance with a state or municipal fair employment practices law as with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in Cleveland, the Bricklayers in Milwaukee, the Railway Clerks in Minneapolis. But this is essentially a limited and strategic adjustment to community pressure and represents very dubious progress. After six years of protest and the threat of legal action by the Attorney General, IBEW Local 26 in Washington, D. C., gave one Negro a temporary work permit. The IBEW in most cases excludes Negroes from membership in the key local unions having jurisdiction in construction installation. Thus, because IBEW Local 26 in Washington refuses membership to non-white persons, Negroes were prevented from working on the construction of the

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AFL-CIO national headquarters building, the new House of Representatives office building and other public and private construction in the nation's capital. Local 26 remains a "lily-white" union.

There are also many instances where unions have removed the "lily-white" exclusion clause from their constitution as a public relations gesture but continue to exclude Negroes from membership by tacit consent.

As long as union membership remains a condition of employment in many trades and crafts and qualified Negroes are barred from union membership solely because of their color, then trade union discrimination is the decisive factor in determining whether Negro workers in a given industry shall have an opportunityto earn a living for themselves and their families. This is especially true in the construction industry where AFL-CIO building trades unions exercise a high degree of control over access to employment.

In the South, and especially in Alabama and Georgia, this situation is further compounded by the fact that White Citizens Councils and the Ku Klux Klan began taking control of some important AFL-CIO affiliates soon after the Supreme Court school segregation decision in 1954. Following the Federation's practice of avoiding internal conflict on racial issues, these local unions have been permitted to become virtual extensions of segregationist organizations.

White Citizens Councils, KKK and other racist organizations make no secret of their recruitment activities among union members. Negro members have only to read the local newspapers. In Montgomery and Savannah, the Ku Klux Klan advertises its meetings in the Carpenters' Union hall and in these two cities, as well as in others, officials of several building trades unions are known Klansmen. Newspapers have also printed reports and pictures of union officials speaking at White Citizens Councils and Klan meetings and the point has hardly been lost on the Negro worker.

During the year-long Negro bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, leaders of the Montgomery Building Trades Council and of the Montgomery Bus Drivers Union repeatedly led the attacks against the Negro community and on several occasions were identified as Klansmen.

In Macon, Georgia, the Klan meets in a local union hall and has repeatedly intervened on behalf of white workers where there have been grievances filed by Negroes alleging violation of seniority and other rights by white workers. In Savannah, the Carpenters' Union hall is the central headquarters for the White Citizens Council and is so listed in newspaper ads placed by the Council. The same situation obtains in Lithonia, Georgia, where the KKK and the Stonecutters Union share the same meeting hall.

No wonder, then, that Negro workers throughout the South feel increasingly alienated from organized labor. Recently, they have shown this by voting against union certification in several significant elections conducted by the National Labor Relations Board.

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AFL-CIO AFFILIATED UNIONS engage in four categories of discriminatory racial practices. These are: outright exclusion of Negroes; segregated locals; separate racial seniority lines in collective bargaining agreements; exclusion of Negroes from apprenticeship training programs controlled by unions.

The Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks which operates many segregated local lodges in Northern as well as Southern cities is among the important international unions responsible for a broad national pattern of segregation. In the Brotherhood the existence of more than 150 segregated all-Negro locals with separate racial seniority rosters limits job mobility and violates the seniority rights of thousands of Negro union members.

This union has persisted in its racist practices despite repeated protests from Negro workers and community organizations. On April 30, 1957, the New York State Commission Against Discrimination ordered the merger of the "lily-white" George M. Harrison Lodge (783) and the all-Negro Friendship Lodge (6118). The white union refused to comply and the local lodges remain segregated to this day. Similar situations exist in Chicago where Negro workers are in segregated local Lodge 6132 and in Tulsa, Oklahoma, where they are in local Lodge 6257. In East St. Louis and St. Louis, there are 14 all-colored lodges and 14 all-white lodges which function through segregated joint councils. Ironically, the president of the Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, George M. Harrison, is a member of the Civil Rights Committee of the AFL-CIO and a Federation Vice President.

Gunnar Myrdal in the *American Dilemma* makes the following comment, which has as much validity today as it did in 1942.

> The discriminatory attitude of the organized building crafts is the more significant at the present time, since they dominate the American Federation of Labor—a circumstance which is behind the reluctance of this organization to take any definite action against the exclusionist and segregational practices. (Gunnar Myrdal's *American Dilemma*, p. 1102.)

IN THE COURSE OF ADDRESSING a trade union conference in Detroit on February 7, 1959, A. Philip Randolph stated: "It is fair to state that racial discrimination is practiced by building trades unions in practically every community of the country, varying in intensity from community to community, and local to local . . ."

Because the building trade craft unions control the hiring process and in most cities refuse membership to Negroes or limit them to "Jim Crow" locals, colored workers are denied employment in a great many major industrial and residential construction projects throughout the nation. The unions responsible include the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the Operating Engineers, Iron and Structural Steel Workers, Plumbers and Pipe Fitters Union, Plasterers and Lathers, the Sheet Metal Workers Union, the Roofers and the Boilermakers. The National Labor Relations Board has done little to enforce the anti-closed shop provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act. Thus building trades unions affiliated to the AFL-CIO, in most instances, are closed unions operating closed shops.

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

Because white locals control the union hiring hall, they can often do the hiring for major public as well as private construction projects, in collusion with municipal and county political machines. The white locals will frequently go so far as to import white workers from other cities rather than hire members of the Negro local for "white men's jobs." Typical in this respect is the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners. This Brotherhood, for half-a-century one of the most important of all the building trades unions, organizes Negroes and whites into separate locals—insofar as it permits Negro membership at all. In Memphis, for example, Negro carpenters in a segregated local union find that members of the white local refuse to work on the same jobs with them. Repeated protests to the international union and to the AFL-CIO have been to no avail.

Quite frequently, Negroes are excluded altogether from work in white neighborhoods. This means that Negro carpenters are restricted to marginal maintenance and repair work within the Negro community and that they seldom are permitted to work on the larger construction projects. The same practices are true for other building trades unions in many cities throughout the country.

The Hod Carriers, Building and Common Laborers Union is currently defendant in a suit brought by Negro construction workers in Chicago, charging that the Hod Carriers Union bars them from desirable jobs within this Union's jurisdiction. In other cities across the country, such as Washington, D. C., East St. Louis, Illinois and Terre Haute, Indiana, Negro workers charge that white locals controlling job assignments in federal construction projects refuse to accept "travelling cards" issued by colored locals.

SOON AFTER THE MERGER OF THE AFL AND CIO IN 1955, two international unions were admitted into the Federation with "lily-white" exclusion clauses in their constitutions although this action was clearly in violation of the policies announced at the time of the merger agreement. They were the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen which later removed the clause and the International Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen which did not.

In November, 1958, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen successfully defended its exclusion of Negroes from union membership in a suit brought by Negro firemen against the union in the Federal District Court in Cincinnati, Ohio (Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen). Despite many appeals the National AFL-CIO refused to intervene or make any public comment and this union continues to exclude all Negroes from membership.

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On October 10, 1961, Negro workers in St. Petersburg, Florida and Memphis, Tennessee, filed affidavits with the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity against the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen (AFL-CIO). In these complaints it was charged that the Trainmen's Union conspired with the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad and with the St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Company, as well as with other railroads to have all Negro brakemen classified as "Porters," that competent Negro railway workers are consistently denied opportunities for promotion and advancement, that because of improper job classification they are discriminated against in wages and that "The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, a union that is authorized and recognized by the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad is a 'lily-white' union and that said union accepts only white employees as members."

Obviously, when the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen removed the "Caucasian Only" clause from its Constitution in 1959, this was done mainly for public relations purposes since the union continues in most cities to exclude qualified Negro railroad employees.

SEPARATE LINES OF SENIORITY PROMOTION constitute yet another injustice to the Negro worker. These are negotiated into collective bargaining agreements, effectively denying Negroes equal seniority rights with white workers, and preventing them from developing skills. The result is that Negroes are unable to rise from unskilled and menial jobs into more desirable classifications.

Negro workers employed at the Sheffield Steel Company in Houston, Texas, were forced to initiate litigation against the United Steelworkers of America and the Company and as a result succeeded in eliminating the most extreme features of the separate seniority lines in the union contract. Very slow and isolated progress has been made in a few other instances as a result of protest by Negro workers and action by the NAACP.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the pattern of such discrimination remains practically intact in Southern industrial operations where trade unions hold collective bargaining agreements. Many thousands of Negro workers who are members of AFL-CIO unions in Southern paper mills, chemical plants, pulp works, oil refineries, steel plants, and in tobacco factories, suffer the acute disadvantage of separate lines of progression. In

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Lake Charles, Louisiana, for example, the Metal Trades Department of the AFL-CIO is directly responsible for negotiating such clauses in its union contracts with several major oil and chemical refineries.

Collusion with management in regard to unequal seniority rights is common. Typical offenders in the rapidly growing paper manufacturing and pulp and sulphite industry in the South are to be found at the huge Union Bag-Camp Paper Corporation, Savannah, Georgia, where all the Negro workers are limited to membership in two segregated locals, Local 601 and 615, affiliated to the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers. All white workers hold membership in Local 388 and 435 of the same union and Local 408 of the United Papermakers and Paperworkers Union. Similar conditions exist at and in virtually every plant organized in the South by the United Papermakers and Paperworkers Union[3] and the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers.

In these and many other paper mills throughout the South these two unions hold joint collective bargaining agreements and maintain a rigid pattern of racially segregated local unions with separate seniority lines limiting Negro employment to laborer classifications.

THE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES OF RAPID TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE and automation upon the unskilled Negro wage earner is compounded by the exclusion of Negroes from apprenticeship training programs. Because there exists a disproportionate number of Negroes in the unskilled labor force, a disproportionate number of Negroes are being permanently dismissed from jobs as a result of automation and other technological change. It follows that the plight of these unskilled Negroes can become an economic disaster for the entire Negro community where these workers are not permitted to learn new skills, i.e., where they are excluded from apprenticeship programs and other forms of technical training. Such exclusion is widespread in the North as well as in the South. According to recent studies no significant breakthrough has been made by Negroes in those craft unions in the building trades or in the Railroad Operating Brotherhood, which have traditionally excluded non-whites.[4]

In the ten-year period from 1950-1960, in the State of New York, the increase of Negro participation in building trades apprenticeship training programs rose only from 1.5% to 2%. In most of these programs the role of the labor union is decisive because the trade union usually determines who is admitted into the training programs and, therefore, who is admitted into the union.

[3] Paul Phillips, president of the United Papermakers and Paperworkers Union (AFL-CIO) recently protested to Walter Reuther against the decision of the Industrial Union Deparment to give a contribution in defense of the Freedom Riders.

[4] *Apprentices, Skilled Craftsmen and the Negro,* New York State Commission Against Discrimination, 1960. *The Negro Wage-Earner and Apprenticeship Training Programs,* NAACP, 1960.

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Almost equally exclusive are the printing trades unions with exceptions being found in some areas of the Assistant Printing Pressmen's Union and the Lithographers Union. Open access to plumbing and pipe fitting apprenticeships controlled by the Plumbers Union is a rare experience for a young Negro in the North as well as in the South. Similarly, Negro youth are almost completely excluded from apprenticeship programs operated by the Sheet Metal Workers Union, the Ornamental and Structural Iron Workers, the Glass Workers, the Tile Setters, the Machinists and the Bricklayers Union.

The exclusion of Negroes from apprenticeship programs, controlled by AFL-CIO craft unions, prevents thousands of young people from realizing their full potential and dooms them and their families to a marginal existence. It is in this area of apprenticeship training that the disparity between the public relations pronouncements of the AFL-CIO on civil rights and the day-to-day reality for Negro workers is most sharply delineated.

Many traditional sources of Negro employment (the nation's railroads and mass-production industries, for example) are rapidly disappearing as a result of automation and other technological changes in the economy. Today the status of the Negro wage earner is characterized by drastic change and crisis. Thus, the virtual exclusion of Negroes from apprenticeship and other training programs forces them to remain as marginal employees in the economy. They are the ones who are hired last and who can be dispensed with easily with the added advantage that their displacement can be rationalized in terms of lower attainments in craft skills.

The concentration of unskilled, low-paying jobs with a lack of employment stability, together with other income limitations such as denial of access to union hiring halls in the building trades, and separate racial lines of seniority promotion in collective bargaining agreements, all contribute to an explanation of why Negroes constitute a permanently depressed economic group in American society.

DURING THE AFL-CIO CONVENTION IN SEPTEMBER, 1959 in San Francisco, A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and, conspicuously, the only Negro on the AFL-CIO Executive Council, criticized the lack of progress in eliminating discrimination and segregation in organized labor. He called upon President George Meany and the Federation to take concrete action against racial exclusion practices, segregated locals and against the discriminatory railway unions with their long history of abuses against colored workers. After a rather heated exchange, Meany virtually lost all control of himself and, pounding the rostrum on the convention platform, roared at Randolph: "Who the hell appointed you as guardian of all the Negroes in America?" Since then, Randolph has been busily organizing the Negro American Labor Council (NALC) which aims to embrace the million-and-a-quarter Negro members of the AFL-CIO. Despite the opposition of Meany and other Federation leaders to the organization of the Negro American Labor Council, chapters of Randolph's group have been organized and are growing from New York to the Pacific Coast.

At a conference of the Jewish Labor Committee at Unity House, the summer resort of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union,

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Meany argued that the NALC and other Negro organizations, in making charges of trade union discrimination, are taking an anti-labor position.

Meany was quoted in the New York *Herald Tribune* of May 27, 1961 as follows: "The fact that labor has been unable to organize white collar workers and technicians, has lost the support of liberals and is generally looked on askance, is attributable to the attacks of the Negro organizations." He called the Negro charges ". . . unnecessary and ill-advised. There is no doubt that this sort of thing weakens the prestige of the labor movement and darkens our public image," Mr. Meany said.

In January, 1961, the NAACP released a documented study, entitled *"Racism Within Organized Labor:* A Report of Five Years of the AFL-CIO." This report concluded that during the five years which have passed since the AFL-CIO merger, there has been no systematic or coordinated effort by the Executive Council to eliminate racism within local unions—especially in the building and construction trades, the railway unions, and in other skilled crafts jurisdictions where anti-Negro practices are traditional. The NAACP report gave detailed examples of a wide variety of anti-Negro practices and indicated the urgent need for action by the Federation's leadership.[5]

The NAACP report received widespread public attention and was immediately attacked by spokesmen for the AFL-CIO, but strongly defended by Negro trade unionists and by Randolph who stated that the NAACP survey was "factual and accurate . . . and unquestionably a significant and useful document for those concerned with making organized labor the democratic force it should be." Randolph told a conference of Negro trade unionists that, "We in the Negro American Labor Council can without reservation state that the basic statements are true and sound; the delegates of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters have presented these facts to convention after convention of the AFL for a quarter of a century."

Randolph later presented to the Executive Council of the Federation detailed charges of anti-Negro practices together with specific recommendations to eliminate discrimination and segregation within affiliated international and local unions. The Federation's leadership repeatedly postponed action on Randolph's proposals and then, at its Executive Council meeting in New York City on October 12, 1961, not only completely rejected his recommendations but officially censured him because, as Meany explained, Randolph was responsible for "the gap that has developed between organized labor and the Negro community," and because Randolph had "gotten close to those militant groups." Thus, instead of responding to the demands of Negro trade unionists for decisive action, the AFL-CIO Executive Council publicly blamed the acknowledged spokesman for Negro workers within the labor movement for their dilemma!

Meany released a 20-page subcommittee report sharply criticizing Randolph and, by clear implication, other Negro trade unionists and Negro civil rights agencies. Meany went out of his way to state that he gave the report his personal endorsement and that all of the Executive Council mem-

[5] The conclusions reached in the Association's study were later confirmed when the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights published *THE 50 STATES REPORT*, based upon reports from the State Advisory Committees to the Commission on the status of non-white citizens. In these reports there are frequent references to discriminatory practices by trade unions.

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bers, with the exception of Mr. Randolph himself, had voted to censure Randolph and to accept the report. Meany "explained" his position during a press conference by stating, "I do not equate problems of racial discrimination with the problems of corruption any more than I equate Hungary with Little Rock." Randolph described the report as "innocuous, sterile and barren," and warned that it would "create a sense of frustration and anger among Negro trade unionists, and in the Negro community as a whole."

Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary of the NAACP, issued the following statement:

> The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People believes that the AFL-CIO's 'censure' of A. Philip Randolph is an incredible cover-up. The so-called report made to the Federation's Executive Council by a three-man Subcommittee is simply a refusal to recognize the unassailable facts of racial discrimination and segregation inside organized labor, as well as an evasion on the part of the AFL-CIO leadership of its own responsibility in fighting racism within affiliated unions.
>
> We reject the Federation's statement that A. Philip Randolph caused 'the gap which has developed between organized labor and the Negro community.' If such a 'gap' exists it is because Mr. Meany and the AFL-CIO Executive Council have not taken the required action to eliminate the broad national pattern of anti-Negro practices that continues to exist in many significant sections of the American labor movement, even after five-and-a-half years of the merger and the endless promises to banish Jim Crow.

Mr. Wilkins noted that "the spokesman for the Executive Council's Subcommittee which rebuked Randolph was George M. Harrison, president of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, an international union which, for over half-a-century, has 'jim crowed' Negro railway workers into segregated locals."

The NAACP statement concluded by commenting that "the attack upon A. Philip Randolph can only be regarded as a further indication of the moral bankruptcy of the AFL-CIO leadership."

Many other groups protested the Federation's rebuke of Randolph, including Dr. Martin Luther King on behalf of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

Exactly twenty-four hours after the Federation's censure of Randolph and its rejection of his recommendations, the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights issued an exhaustive report on employment inequities and documented the extent of discrimination and segregation within organized labor.[6] The report stated flatly that "the efforts of the AFL-CIO have proved to be largely ineffective" in curbing discrimination and that the impact of discrimination by trade unions, especially in the skilled craft occupations, was a basic factor in contributing to the concentration of Negroes in menial, unskilled jobs in industry and their virtual exclusion from the construction and machinist crafts and for the vulnerability of Negro labor to unemployment crises. The report by the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights concluded by calling for federal legislation to prohibit racial discrimination by organized labor and stressed the inability of the American labor movement to take action on its own initiative against racist practices.

IT IS COMMONPLACE THESE DAYS for sophomoric "experts" on race re-

[6] United States Commission on Civil Rights, *Report on Employment*, Washington, D.C., 1961.

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lations to lament the "disruption" of the so-called "Negro-labor alliance." But what relevance does this cliche have to the events of the past five years —only partially demonstrated above—except to make very clear that in such an "alliance" the Negro was at best a very junior partner, that he was expected to accept unquestionably the decisions of his white "liberal friends" regarding civil rights demands and, above all, not raise questions about the internal racial practices of organized labor.

As Roy Wilkins recently stated: "We of the NAACP certainly believe in cooperation between the Negro community and organized labor but such cooperation cannot be based upon Negroes remaining silent regarding racist practices within trade unions."

In the dramatic and historic conflicts in Little Rock, in Front Royal, Virginia, in Tuscaloosa, in Montgomery, and elsewhere, organized labor did not meaningfully intervene on the side of the embattled Negroes. All too often, local labor groups were involved with the White Citizens Council or the Ku Klux Klan. This fact has not been overlooked by the Negro leadership and by the entire Negro community whose views on organized labor are not based on any theoretical assumptions about a mythical trade union movement but are rooted in the painful realities of day-to-day trade union practices.

Of course, pious resolutions proclaiming "shock and dismay" were adopted at labor gatherings in Washington, Miami and New York, but no action of any consequence was taken where it really mattered. Instead, when confronted with their conservative and do-nothing record by Negroes, the labor leadership invariably responds with hostility or crass paternalism as they privately explain that "these Negroes are going too fast" and "after all they should appreciate what we are doing for them."

The Negro is now making the same demands upon organized labor that are being made upon all other institutions and it is certain that the attacks upon racism within trade unions will proceed with the same intensity as against other groups in the community.

THE NEGRO STRUGGLE IS EMERGING as the really important and decisive issue of conflict and confrontation throughout the United States and it may well be that the fight of Negroes for equal treatment and leadership responsibility within trade unions will become the basis of a renewed effort for internal union democracy and for a halt to further stagnation and decay. The protest against racism within organized labor may become the rallying point for the regeneration of the American labor movement. If this is to occur it will be the responsibility of the best elements among white trade unionists to join with Negroes and vigorously support their demands.

But, for the moment, it is evident that the AFL-CIO, and all other institutions, will be judged by the Negro on the basis of their actual day-to-day performance and not on the exercise of empty ritual.

HERBERT HILL *is National Labor Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Mr. Hill has lectured at many schools in the U. S. and Europe on race relations and he is co-author of the book,* The Citizen's Guide to Desegregation. *His articles have appeared in* Commentary, New Statesman and Nation, New Leader, Journal of Negro Education, Phylon, Midstream, *and other publications. In 1962 Grove Press will publish his study of abolitionism.*

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Mr. Tyler's article is the first in a series dealing with the relationship—what it is and what it should be—between the labor movement and political action. A number of other trade unionists and socialists have already agreed to participate in subsequent issues.

■

Gus Tyler

Toward Party Realignment



THE ROLE OF ORGANIZED LABOR in American politics must flow from three considerations:

1. The nature of our American economic system;

2. The nature of the American working class;

3. The nature of American political parties.

Traditionally, the American radical has used all three (or any one) of these pivotal considerations to conclude that the nation requires a "class party" directed at Socialism:

1. The "capitalist" system is faulty, self-contradictory, and ultimately self-destructive: ergo, the inevitable imperative for a socialist transformation.

2. The working class, to realize this objective, must have a self-conscious power: ergo, a labor party.

3. A political party, to realize a basic reform of our society, must be a disciplined unit and not a loose fusion of social forces: ergo, a new party that will challenge the Republicans and Democrats in our national politics.

If these three traditional conclusions are checked out against either the realities of our culture or against pure logic, they now appear to be invalid.

1. Capitalist society may be beset with evils, may generate anti-capitalist forces, and may compulsively undermine the props of its existence, yet it does not follow that a socialist society, in the classic sense, is either preferable or inevitable. The welfare state, with all of its implications for a mixed economy, may offer a dynamic that allows for action along new frontiers without accepting socialism.

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2. The working class should develop a cohesive political power but it does not follow that a "class party" of labor is either the most desirable or even the possible instrument for doing so in the United States. An independent political *force,* rather than a *party,* has thus far proven to be more feasible and effective.

3. A political party, with a coherent program and an ideologically coherent leadership, is undoubtedly desirable but it does not follow that the way to attain this is by the organization of a national third party. The trend appears to be toward a realignment of political forces in America through the impact of pressure groups on our two major existing parties.

THE PECULIAR BEHAVIOR OF LABOR in American politics flows at present from the fact that we live in a capitalist society that is not "capitalist," that we have a working class that does not think of itself as a "class," and that we have political parties that are not "parties" in the classic European sense. What makes this behavior "peculiar" is the fact that it is non-imitative, autochthonous, and deeply rooted in our culture. To American labor, the behavior appears natural; but it appears unnatural to those who would instruct labor from the texts of pre-World War II Europe, who believe that great masses learn from the poignant phrase and not from the searing experience, and who believe that the roots of human behavior spring from the insightless ratiocinations of those intellectuals who know what the masses *should* do.

Let's look at our economy, our working class and our political parties.

Our economy is not running on Marxist schedule. The middle class is not disappearing. As an economic entity it is holding its own and as a socio-psychologic self-image it is growing almost disgustingly. The polarization of working class and capitalist class can only be proven by a semantic twist that defines poverty as "relative poverty" and defines wealth, not as ownership, but as "control." But defined common-sensically, the mounting poverty that was to drive the great mass to revolt against the handful who own the nation is not mounting at all. In short, the economic evolution that was to provide the socio-political dynamic for social revolution seems to be operating in reverse.

This has been the objective of the welfare state—and thus far, it has worked within limits. It has failed in those areas where political power has been lacking to apply the welfare idea more fully. The combined economic and political impact has been the development of a system that is neither capitalist, nor socialist, but a vacillating in-between that escapes classic radical categories because it was not envisioned in classic radical thought.

In fact, the inapplicability of the classic categories is presently almost universal. When Castro insisted that his was the first socialist state in the Western Hemisphere (is it socialist?) he was challenged by Trujillo who claimed the credit for the Dominican Republic (anathema to both socialists and communists). The Soviet Union and Soviet China both claim to be socialist (to the annoyance and discredit of socialists) and find themselves joined by the United Arab Republic. If these societies, all closed and

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orderly, defy classic definition, how much more elusive is the character of the open and disorderly societies, such as the United States, Great Britain, Sweden and Mexico.

In the closed societies, the labor movements cannot make any operational adjustments to their circumstances: they are told that they are enjoying "socialism" and that if they do not like it neither can they lump it. They are the prisoners of cliches and commissars. In the open societies, especially where the welfare state is a functioning factor, the political movements of labor tend to adjust to reality, by modifying their definitions of socialism, by seeking alliances with other classes, by seeking to establish a national (not necessarily chauvinist) party in place of a class party. This even applies to the great socialist parties of England and Germany!

In America, where the labor movement was never deeply involved with socialist tradition, despite the tremendous contributions of individual socialist leaders, of socialist critique, and of socialist legislation, the labor movement as a political force moved easily into developing a program for the real society in which it lives and which it seeks to change.

The reluctance of American labor to accept a socialist orientation has been attributed, by some, to a certain *backwardness* on the part of the American worker. The assumption was that as American labor would become more educated and sophisticated it would move toward class party and socialism. In other words, as American labor grew up it would look more European.

Actually, the reverse seems to be the case. European socialists appear more American, deemphasizing the class nature of their social-democratic parties and moving toward mixed rather than purely nationalized economies.

Attempts to measure the "backwardness" or "sophistication" of American labor with, let us say, British labor, is rather a futile and meaningless exercise, like adding apple pies and Yorkshire puddings. The difference is more a matter of cultural taste than level of development. The American workers, for instance, were the first in the world to have their Workies' Parties, way back in the 1830's. Repeatedly, the American laborites reverted to class parties: Greenback, Labor, Populist, Socialist, Farmer-Labor, Communist. Ultimately, American workers—who had never accepted these ideas by majority support—abandoned the concept of a national third party, not because of stupidity or sin but because such parties did not jibe with their concepts of their society or themselves—and because they did not work!

THE DISTINCTIVE QUALITY OF AMERICAN LABOR is its mobility—a trait common to our total culture: an upward economic mobility, a horizontal geographic mobility, and a diagonal ethnic mobility that is reflected in greater earnings and in movement into new neighborhoods. This mobility smudges, blurs and sometimes even obliterates class lines.

To expect the average American worker, viewed not at a moment but over three or more generations, to be class conscious is to expect him to substitute an epigram for experience. And without class-consciousness, there can be no lasting class parties.

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All this does not mean that there are no group or class conflicts in the United States. There are. But where American labor has moved into politics, as an expression of its class aspirations, it has done so for specific programs rather than for class power. And, to accomplish this, labor has found it more productive to work within and through the established political mores.

Under our mores, a political party is something vastly different from a European political party. A European political party starts as an ideology; it spells out a program that flows from its philosophy; it sets up a membership organization to back this program; this membership is *the party* legally, naming its candidate usually by convention action. An American political party does *not* start as an ideology; it writes a program that reflects the fused aspirations of all the elements primarily wooed by the party; the political clubs are *not legally the party;* candidates are named in *primaries* in which people participate who have never been in or near a club or who do not even consider themselves members of the party.



The European party is generally the expression of a fairly definable social grouping: economic, ethnic or religious. The American party is generally the expression of a fusion and mixture of social groupings. The European political party is a national entity; there is no legal national political party in America since all parties operate under state law and enjoy title according to state regulations. A European political party can, by convention, generally deny renomination to a non-conformist member of parliament; in the United States, a non-conformist can return to Congress for decades so long as the people who vote in the primary in *his district* stand behind him.

Whether the American system is better or worse than the European is of less relevance than the cold fact that the U. S. method is here, is deeply rooted, is the consequence of our social circumstances: geographic diversity, economic mobility, ethnic fractionalization.

The mechanical device that distinguishes the American system from the European is our primary. In the South, the struggle between liberals and reactionaries is fought out not through the organization of any liberal party but through the Democratic *primary*. In Wisconsin, LaFollette battled the Old Guard GOP through the *primary*. The primary is a mechanism that gives added flexibility to our highly flexible major parties. Farmer, labor, capital, Catholic, Baptist, Negro, prohibitionist—these and many others have used the primary as a way of turning a national party, a program, or a local candidate in their direction.

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For all of these reasons, American labor is unlikely to move in the direction of a national third party of labor. (The fact that the blue collar worker, the backbone of the trade union, becomes increasingly a smaller part of the total population is a most realistic deterrent to launching any party with a trade union label on it—even if all the other deep-seated socio-historic reasons were absent.)

A *realignment* of the major parties is far more desirable—and even possible. Its desirability arises from the fact that an integrated governmental program requires a guiding intelligence and such an "intelligence" is most fittingly a national party with a purpose and with internal cohesiveness. The possibility arises from the fact that our national party system has been moving in the direction of purpose and cohesion.

THE BIG TREND TOWARD PARTY REALIGNMENT begins with the New Deal. With FDR as standard bearer of social legislation, the Democratic Party—by and large—began to develop a New-Dealish complexion. The Republican Party—as opponent of FDR and New Deal—fixed upon itself the image of conservatism. This evolution of Democrats as New Deal and Republicans as the Old Order has continued for nearly a generation.

This process has not run off to its ultimate and natural conclusion primarily because of the North-South division in the Democratic Party. This schism in the Congressional delegation of the Democrats has created a Three Party system on Capital Hill. There are the liberal Democrats, a reasonably cohesive formation, a large bloc but not a numerical majority; there are the Republicans who represent the hard steady core of conservatism (with about two dozen of them occasionally swinging to a liberal position); and, finally, there are the Southern Democrats, some of whom are liberal on economic matters and virtually all of whom are conservative on civil rights.

The great legislative obstacle of the labor and liberal forces in the United States is the simple fact that it is much easier for the Southern Democrats and Republicans to unite on an over-all program than it is for the Liberal Democrats to unite with their Southern party colleagues.

The conservative coalition in Congress is a "party" without a label. Since 1938, it has been the majority party in Congress. The struggle between the "coalition" and the "liberals" is the contest between the realigning elements in our national government.

To reduce the "coalition" to minority status is the first and most immediate mission of the liberal-labor forces in America. This can be done through two major pushes:

1. To get a system of fair districting in the House of Representatives, so that each representative comes from a district that is compact, contiguous and equal in population with other districts. As matters now stand, Congress is "gerrymandered" to favor Republicans over Democrats in the North and rural over urban in the South. The end result is an advantage of several dozen seats enjoyed by the "coalition" even before the election begins.

2. To continue and improve the efforts of labor and liberals to do the double job of ousting conservative Northern Republicans and entering primaries where a liberal Democrat or a liberal Republican can oust a conservative of either party.

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The second project is well under way and accounts for the sizeable liberal delegations now in Congress that, at this moment, come close to a majority though still falling somewhat short. The first project will require extended education and action and constitutional reform within the states alongside of appropriate legislation in D. C.

In the push for a liberal majority, the strategy must shift from North to South. In the North, this is a matter generally settled in interparty struggle on Election Day. In the South, this is a matter generally settled in intraparty struggle on primary day. This last campaign is the more difficult of the two for labor and liberalism, but it can never be surrendered. The forces of progress must sooner or later emerge in the Southland, manned by native elements, reacting to on-the-spot issues and pressures. As such forces do emerge — and they are most apt to do so as part of the industrialization of the South and in line with trade union growth — a genuine realignment of liberalism "on the Hill" will be inevitable.

The realignment of forces should logically include liberal Republicans. This readiness of "liberal" Republicans to join with a Democratic Party that is solidly liberal in the North and sporadically liberal in the South is dependent on the direction of the GOP. So long as some urban and industrial Republicans feel that they can rescue their party for operation in the Twentieth Century, they are not apt to leave their party in chunks and they certainly must, for reasons of inner party strategy, deny any intent to break. But if the right wing of the GOP becomes the militant spokesman of the "new right" in America, a national party of liberalism will be able to form a liberal coalition "on the Hill" to include elements of the GOP—ultimately perhaps to include them in a national "liberal" party.

TO BE AN EFFECTIVE PART of such an evolution toward meaningful realignment, the labor movement must pursue a double strategy:

1. It must, as a political expression, win the confidence and loyalty of of its rank and file. And to do this, labor must inescapably emphasize the economic aspects of politics, because it is the bread-and-butter appeal that ties dues payer to leadership in unions.

2. It must, to maintain firm coalition with other segments of American society in a political realignment, shape a program of progress that is "good" for all America and for all its democratic ideals.

The above strategy will not appeal to the impatient. Nor will it appeal to the gimmick-minded who seek solutions in mechanical decisions and devices. The above perspective assumes a mature labor movement, able to keep a long range social objective in mind while sweating its way from election to election to reach its goal.

GUS TYLER *is the Director of Politics, Education and Training of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union.* Part of the above article was delivered as a speech at a conference of the Union Academy in November 1960.

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St. Clair Drake and
Elizabeth Drake



The African Revolution and its Image in America

TEN YEARS AGO, there were only four sovereign states on the vast continent of Africa with some 220,000,000 people. In only one of these, Egypt, did the people have the sense of being a "nation." Ethiopia and Liberia were ruled by small élite groups struggling to integrate a welter of tribes. The Union of South Africa was divided by race, tribe, and caste and held together by intimidation and violence. The rapid growth of nationalist movements in the colonial areas brought four more independent states into existence by 1958. Then, within a two year period, an additional twenty states came into being in Africa south of the Sahara, each of which duly took its place in that would-be World Parliament, the United Nations. As the unifying force of the anti-colonialist struggle diminished, each new state faced the problem of welding together a multiplicity of ethnic groups into one "nation." The drama of new nations in the making (and the renovation of old ones) is the aspect of African life with which American reporters, columnists, and editors are preoccupied. The implication of the whole process for American foreign policy and for the persistence and extension of Western values lies beneath this preoccupation.

The "public," no doubt, shares some of the serious interest of the opinion-molders, but the sheer spectacle of new nations springing up across the face of "The Dark Continent" like meteors being transformed into permanent stars, provides sufficient explanation for the extensive new popular

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interest in Africa. The events, involving as they do armed conflict, riots, and colorful personalities, contain news appeal and human interest, especially when considered against the myths with which the American public confronts the New Africa. These myths present a confused picture of Africa as a vast expanse of jungle populated with lions, elephants, giraffes, giant snakes, pygmies, Watussis, and dancing and drumming heathen Negroes, many of whom may still be devoted to cannibalism and human sacrifice.

As the stereotypes of the past are recast, new social types must be assimilated into the configuration—African students and diplomats alongside "savages," urban agglomerations counterposed to jungles, and a host of new facts about the geography and demography of the continent.

Public interest, as distinct from *specialist* interest in Africa is focused upon the political significance of the continent, particularly its role in the Cold War. The "wild people" are, overnight, emerging as nations, forming parliaments, and sending representatives to the world assembly where they debate the fate of all of us and sometimes have the decisive votes. There is drama in the African scene and publishers know a story when they see one. Five years ago, only the *New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor,* among American newspapers, had permanent correspondents in Africa (along with *Time*). The American publishers are still not inclined to spend money for sustained African coverage, preferring to rely on "stringers" and foreign wire services for the basic day-by-day news. But they have been willing to support "quickie" tours by their best reporters and on-the-spot coverage for the big events. A few American reporters and columnists are emerging as "experts" on Africa, and for some time to come they will play an important role in shaping the newly emerging image of Africa for the "general public."

TWO OF THE VOLUMES* under review in this article are by American journalists who have made Africa their specialty, and who now feel familiar enough with their "beat" to synthesize their impressions, reinforced by diligent homework. Smith Hempstone, correspondent for the *Washington Daily Star* and the *Chicago Daily News,* was lucky enough to find an anonymous donor to finance thirty months of travel in Africa and now lives in Kenya from which he reports the news for the entire continent. He has written *Africa: Angry Young Giant.* John Hughes, the Africa correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor,* has produced *The New Face of Africa South of the Sahara,* and states that "most of the material was gathered during six years of African travel and reporting . . ." A third volume, *The African Revolution,* has been written by an English reporter,

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John Cameron, who was ". . . for many years chief foreign correspondent of the London *News Chronicle*" and ". . . knows Africa from Tripoli to Cape Town." With the African drama unfolding so rapidly, it was inevitable that, at some point, somebody would try his hand at a series of profiles of the main actors–the leaders. This, Rolf Italiaander, a Dutch explorer, lecturer and author, has done while serving temporarily as "Professor of African History and Civilization" at Hope College in Holland, Michigan. Prentice-Hall has given him his chance to speak to a wider American audience in *The New Leaders of Africa*. A few African leaders have found the time to write for a non-African audience, usually in autobiographical form. An English publisher recently encouraged Kwame Nkrumah, the President of Ghana, to try another form–excerpts from his speeches strung together with interpretative comment. Praeger has now made the results available to American readers.

It is this group of five books which provides material for this article.

Cameron, explaining the choice of title for his book states: "The African revolution is more than immense; it is organic, changing, developing before our eyes; even during the preparation of these short chapters it has burst its bonds a dozen times, and eluded a final definition." Hughes, by coincidence, echoes Cameron, in the title of his first chapter, "Africa: Bursting the Bonds." He reminds us that "Swiftly and suddenly, a dramatic revolution has swept across their continent . . . This revolution is a many-sided one." Hughes isolates three dimensions of the revolution– economic, social, and political, but, like all of the other authors, he concentrates upon the political. Hempstone doesn't use the term "revolution," but does speak of "great forces which have been unleashed on this ancient and ageless continent." Italiaander is concerned with "a small number of determined men" who, he feels, "brought the masses to revolt against their foreign conquerors," in an Africa where: "There is no such thing as organic evolution . . . only revolution." Nkrumah speaks as one of that "small number," and refers to a political revolution won and an economic revolution just beginning in Ghana. The problem of new nations in the making is the central problem for these authors.

The three journalists are, in many respects, exceptionally good reporters. Hughes and Hempstone both present lively and interesting accounts of the new Africa. Hempstone relies largely upon a selection of facts, incidents, anecdotes and rumors calculated to amuse or shock the reader, and which are often snide, unfair, inaccurate or false. Cameron makes no attempt to be "lively," but is sober, thoughtful, and skillful in integrating his material into a coherent discussion. All use the same technique of presentation: a brief statement of why they feel Africa is significant, a description of events within a group of African political units, and a concluding chapter purporting to present generalizations derived from this "inductive" approach, as well as reflections upon Africa's present and future impact upon world affairs.

Cameron covers the most territory–the whole continent, including both North Africa and the Union of South Africa where the revolution ". . . has not yet come to pass, where the revolt so long and so fearfully awaited has

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not been fully born, though already the country is tormented by the pangs of its arrival." Hughes confines himself to Africa south of the Sahara, for he feels that the desert "separates the continent into two distinct worlds," and that the most significant changes are occurring in "Black Africa." Hempstone restricts himself to ". . . the emergent states south of the Sahara and north of the Congo," the "New Africa" which "produces new nations in litters."

Each author asserts by the very fact that he has written a book his own belief that the events are of more than transitory significance; each interprets them in terms of an ongoing revolution, and they all end up with conclusions which are disconcertingly similar. We are continuously reminded that a Cold War is going on and that, despite the stubborn insistence upon "non-alignment" by the African states (perhaps a necessary stand for them to take at the moment), it is likely that, sooner or later, they will have to line up with one side or the other and that it is important that they eventually choose the side of the West.

There is a superficiality of treatment of areas where the authors have not done on-the-spot reporting but still feel impelled to say something. (One notes this, particularly, in Cameron's book.) Hempstone's irresponsibility causes him to perpetuate and compound error, and to reinforce many derogatory stereotypes about Africans, but, on the other hand, his concluding chapter shows an insight and understanding of the dynamics of Pan Africanism to which American readers need to be exposed.

Perhaps the perspective from which the three reporters' books should be evaluated is that of their success as "liberal" propagandists. They have seen and sensed the relevant realities from the standpoint of Western liberalism and have stated the problems from this point of view persuasively, and in Hughes' and Hempstone's case, sometimes eloquently. They know Africans not only as "different" human beings with an exotic past that hangs over into the future, but also as human beings like themselves, and ourselves. They like Africans. They sympathize with their aspirations. Cameron and Hughes try hard to be fair, even to authoritarian leaders whose activities they deplore. But liberalistic biases prevent all of them from grasping some of the more fundamental realities of the African Revolution, just as their lack of anthropological training and of an understanding of the ethos of specific cultures leads them into erroneous interpretations of much of what they see. Hempstone, on the other hand, is often maliciously unfair, and his biases are revealed in inconsistencies of treatment of one African area as compared with another.

HEMPSTONE'S *Angry Young Giant* IS LIKELY to be the one of the three books by newspapermen which will find the greatest popularity with the American public. Unfortunately, it will function to delay the formation of a more accurate image of the African reality. The ordinary reader is going to be impressed by the facade of scholarship which Hempstone erects, and by the fact that he ought to be a "real expert" having covered 70,000 miles by car, visiting forty nations and dependencies. Furthermore, he *is* a good journalist—with good news sense and the ability to exploit the exotic and

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the sensational. His descriptions of scenes, people, and events are vivid and colorful. He captures the contrasts and ironies of modern African life.

The popular reaction will be favorable, too, because the book is full of "facts," including figures gleaned from what *must* have been learned from reliable sources as well as data drawn from historians. What the unsuspecting reader will never know is how dubious the validity of many of these "facts" really is. Hempstone states that he did not include any footnotes because they interrupt the flow of the narrative. The interests of truth would have been better served, however, had it been frequently interrupted, sometimes two or three times per page, so that its readers could have some control over the reliability of his sources and over the degree of honesty which he employed in weaving the data into his text.

If his reporting on other areas is as irresponsible as his treatment of Ghana and Nigeria, the level of reliability is very low, indeed. His population figures are off by three million for Ghana. He overestimates the number of Christians. He hands us a juicy morsel about Ghana's major port without any clue as to how he knows what he is talking about: "Takoradi . . . has a population of 1000 whites and twice as many prostitutes . . ." (He loves to estimate the number of whores in African cities.) He generalizes about the whole of Northern Ghana when, in fact, what he is talking abouts exists in a very restricted area where ". . . . women wear leaves fore and aft and more advanced southerners are shamefacedly . . . attempting to insert them in clothes donated by generous Americans." He states that the average daily wage is six shillings, sixpence, but this happens to be the *minimum* wage. From somewhere he picked up the absurd story that snails are the main source of protein in the African diet. He states that the country "cannot feed itself" and must import $50 million of food annually without taking into account the fact that a large proportion of expensive imported food is for the benefit of resident Europeans. "White settlement" in Ghana is *not* forbidden by law, although ownership of land is (though not long leases). There have *never* been 21 newspapers in the country, and when he visited, there were *not* five dailies. "Most" of Ghana's important tribes do not stretch into adjoining territories, although some do. His story that Ghanaians don't like the American Embassy in Accra because it resembles a type of house built by "palm oil ruffians" indicates that he has his signals mixed. It is modeled on the traditional palace architecture of



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Northern chiefs. There are no "grass huts" in the center of Accra near the Seaview Hotel where he stayed. There are no palms lining the avenue at the University of Ghana. *Not* all students wear indigo gowns (some wear scarlet, others green). The Law School was not established in Accra rather than at the University "so that Nkrumah could keep fledgling attorneys under his thumb." In fact, there is a Law School at the University for those who wish to take a bachelor's degree and one in town for those who do not. It is quite inaccurate to say that a hundred students at the University have cars. It would be closer to the truth to say less than ten! Even with respect to the physical features of people being described he is off. Nkrumah is not "stocky" and Geoffrey Bing is not "gap toothed."

One could draw up a similar bill of particulars for Nigeria, but a few examples will suffice. The Yorubas do not believe that their homeland is Mecca. They think they originated in a town in Nigeria named Oyo. Hempstone is perpetuating a slander on the Ibos which is prevalent among their tribal enemies when he states as a fact that ". . . so prevalent is cannibalism in some areas that meat must be sold with part of the hide attached." (Hempstone is almost as preoccupied with cannibalism as he is with prostitution, reporting it from a number of spots in Africa where its existence is at least doubtful.) Hempstone misses the whole point when he says that the Nigerian leader, Azikiwe, was looked down upon by fellow students at Lincoln University because his skin was darker than theirs. If he was looked down upon, it was because he was a foreign-born Negro and black American Negroes might have been equally culpable with light ones. (His ignorance of American Negro life leads him into several errors of fact and judgment, as when he makes a sneering remark about a quite reputable Southern Negro school which was aiding Liberia in an educational project.) To say that "child-stealing for slavery or human sacrifice is a popular sport" in Nigeria is neither the truth nor an expression of the kind of attitude one expects from a serious journalist.

It is the whole matter of "attitude" which makes the Hempstone volume offensive to African readers and will result in a pernicious influence upon Americans readers. He wears his likes and dislikes openly, but wraps them up in ideology. He describes both Kwame Nkrumah and President Tubman as "dictatorial" rulers. As to the former he wishes for his overthrow and picks out the cabinet member he would like to see succeed him, saying ". . . he could fill Nkrumah's shoes very well . . . his brand of realistic thinking is just what Ghana needs . . ." As to the Liberian head of state, however; "Tubman's weaknesses are human ones . . . Both for Liberia and for the West, Tubman has been and is the best man for the job." These appraisals of African leaders seem to be made in terms of whether or not they support "free enterprise." (Of Liberia he says it is ". . . the only country in Africa which is giving free enterprise a chance . . . Liberia, with all its past faults and present weaknesses is the one spot in Africa where the United States cannot afford to fail.") This attitude of pontificating about what is best for Africans is in sharp contrast to Hughes' detached and temperate views.

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Hempstone reserves his sharpest barbs and choicest words of abuse for Nkrumah—not because he thinks he is a Communist, for he says: "Communism even in its most warped and rudimentary form requires a degree of self-discipline and sacrifice which does not appear in Nkrumah's make-up. He worships at his own shrine and there is no room there for any ideology which might diminish his personal stature by one jot." At another point he says ". . . the one vice of this man . . . is the love of power and acclaim . . . What Nkrumah yearns for like all vain men is political success in his own lifetime and a favorable judgement from history . . ." As to the origins of Nkrumah's alleged vanity, he states "The boy was his mother's only child and she spoiled him rotten." To prove Nkrumah's grasping nature, he charges that "Ghana is his personal real estate." He lets his animus lead him into an outright falsehood when he says, "The President is, in fact, [sic] worshipped as a Messiah." Party zealots do often refer to Nkrumah as "The Messiah" but in a quite secular sense. The idea of "worshipping" Nkrumah would be repulsive to any African.

This attitude toward Nkrumah reveals the unreliability of Hempstone's criteria of judgment. He is very indulgent toward Abbe Youlou of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) who, he avers, is ". . . not above blessing the ball point pens of primary students, thus guaranteeing them a pass in their examinations," whose constituents are alleged to "jam his office and clamour to kiss his bishop-sized ring," and who decimated his opposition. Yet, he launches severe strictures at Nkrumah for his alleged crushing of the Opposition and quotes attacks from Opposition leaders at length without critical analysis. (Hughes gives a balanced assessment of this issue.)

One is forced to conclude that it is Nkrumah's radical Pan Africanism which Hempstone does not like, for not only does he defend the rough tactics of a number of conservative African leaders, but he calls the Sardauno of Sokoto "one of the New Africa's most able statesmen" while at the same time detailing the brutal treatment of opponents. He refers to the coup by the generals in the Sudan approvingly: "In countries in which the trappings of democracy are sometimes more in evidence than the essence, the army can—as happened in the Sudan—become the last bulwark of real liberty as opposed to political license." He would seem to prefer military dictatorship to "proletarian" dictatorship, for Nkrumah polled over 1,000,000 votes in 1960 to 124,000 for his opponent, and Hughes, after assessing the extent to which "despotism" was involved, says: "If this be despotism, however, it appears to be despotism with the consent of the majority of the populace rather than by force." (Hempstone also defends Tubman's one man rule and what he calls the near-deification of Haille Selassie.)

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HEMPSTONE DISLIKES KWAME NKRUMAH as a person and as a politician. Rolf Italiaander (whose book will be discussed later) likes Nkrumah as a person, but is apprehensive about the trend of his politics. Hughes does not react on the personal level, but simply ends his chapter on Ghana with the statement: "Nkrumah's dynamism and imagination have carved out a remarkable niche for Ghana . . . 'Showboy,' 'Osagyefo,' Mr.President, call him what you will, Kwame Nkrumah is no man to write off as a future influence in Africa." Cameron expresses concern over what he feels is a growing "cult of personality" in Ghana and the erosion of civil liberties, but stresses "the great influence of Dr. Nkrumah's Ghana on the whole African scene."

I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology gives the American public a chance to hear what Dr. Nkrumah has to say for himself. The volume consists of excerpts from speeches made by Nkrumah between the time of his return from Europe and America in 1947 through 1960. They are linked together by Nkrumah's own narrative which in the earlier parts makes use of newspaper source material. The first speeches quoted were delivered in January and February of 1948 to the United Gold Coast Convention. The last item is a speech quoted in full—an address delivered before the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 23, 1960. It is required reading for anyone who wishes to understand African thinking in relation to issues currently before the United Nations, for this speech which dealt with the Congo crisis expresses a very widespread point of view, not just Nkrumah's.

Most of the document however is intimately personal. It is Nkrumah's account, in retrospect, of how he acted and felt upon numerous occasions, and of why he took certain positions at certain specific times, including arrests of Opposition leaders. For readers who enjoy the game of parlor psychoanalysis, it will furnish interesting data. One can try to judge the charges of "vanity," "fanaticism," "statesmanship," etc. by the tone of the speeches and the commentary. One can search for the "slips," and juxtaposed names and ideas which might reveal the "true" Nkrumah with respect to his attitudes toward Communism, the United Nations, white people, American Negroes, other African leaders, etc., etc.

Such sleuthing is fun, but it is perhaps more rewarding to try to assess the total impact of Nkrumah's personality as mediated by the book. One can agree with his own assessment of why he has been successful, "My mind is clear and my policy decided." The Nkrumah who emerges from the book is a man convinced that he has a mission, devoted to a few simple ideas to which he has clung tenaciously for many years, and with a great capacity for tacking, maneuvering, and compromising in the pursuit of them with-

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out abandoning them. The basic ideas are summed up in a slogan, "Independence and Unity," that is, political independence for every part of Africa and then some kind of regrouping looking toward a United States of Africa. The means for achieving the ends have been varied, but the conquest of political power must, in his view, precede all else in the struggle for independence.

Nkrumah's basic conceptions of Pan Africanism are summarized succinctly in the preface:

> **The movement for independence in Africa which gained momentum after the Second World War has spread like a prairie fire throughout the length and breadth of Africa.**
> **The 'wind of change' has become a raging hurricane, sweeping away the old colonialist Africa. The year 1960 was Africa's year . . . Now the ultimate freedom of the whole of Africa can no more be in doubt.**
> **. . . the U.N. is just as reliable an instrument of world order and peace as the great powers are prepared to allow it to be . . . It is clear that we must find an African solution to our problems and this can only be found in African unity. Divided we are weak; united Africa could become one of the greatest forces for good in the world.**
> **Individually, the independent states of Africa, some of them potentially rich, others poor, can do little for their people . . . A loose confederation designed only for economic co-operation would not provide the necessary unity of purpose. Only strong political union can bring about full and effective development of our natural resources for the benefit of our people . . . The example of South America, which has much wealth, if not more than North America, and yet remains weak and dependent on outside interests, is one which every African would do well to study.**
> **A union of African states will project more effectively the African personality. It will command respect from a world that has regard for only size and influence . . . [a union of African states] should be regarded not only as the shadowy dream of a visionary, but as a practical proposition which the peoples of Africa can, and should, translate into reality.**

The gospel of a United States of Africa is one which Nkrumah preaches in season and out, but which, to date, has made few converts. It is the cornerstone of what members of his Convention Peoples Party (C.P.P.) call "Nkrumahism." (There is no self-consciousness among most Africans about the use of such a term which has its correlates in Tubmanism, Zikism, Bourguibism, and Nasserism. As a school boy once remarked: "People don't laugh at Marxism, Maoism, Titoism. Why do they laugh when black people have 'isms'?")

The other ideas embraced under the term "Nkrumahism" are shared by Sekou Toure of Guinea and other radical African leaders. They are (a) the concept of the unitary state as preferable to the federal state for African nations, in order to combat tribalism; (b) positive non-alignment in the East-West conflict; (c) the reality of neo-colonialism ("The new African nations need economic help but in seeking outside aid they lay themselves open to a grave new danger . . . It would be a tragedy if the initial weakness of the emergent African nations should lead to a new foreign domination of Africa brought about by economic forces."); (d) the reality of "the African Personality"—a uniquely African way of grappling with economic, political and social problems; (e) the desirability of "African Socialism" as a form of economic organization; (f) the need for a dominant party to guide

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economic development as well as the fight for independence; (g) vigorous assistance to African colonial territories in their fight for independence.

The implications of "Nkrumahism" for the internal organization of the nation are laid out in full in the chapter on "The Tenth Anniversary of the C.P.P." The recent shift "to the left" in Ghana represents the working out in practice of this theoretical line laid down in 1959 as necessary because ". . . now that we stand on the threshold of the second revolution (i.e., the economic as opposed to the political) it becomes necessary for us to regroup our forces and plan our strategy and tactics for the future . . ." The average American reader will, undoubtedly, be alienated by a political philosophy which states that: "Our Party must be disciplined and well led and fortified with an African socialist ideology . . ." and which called for a party purge because ". . . there is danger that our socialist objective may be clouded by opportunistic accomodations and adjustments to petit bourgeois elements in our ranks who are unsympathetic and sometimes even hostile to the social aims to which the Party is dedicated."

It is talk like this which has led some people to write Nkrumah off as a "Communist." On the other hand a study of his speeches on economic planning emphasizes the role which a "private sector" is allotted in the socialist economy.

If read along with the *Autobiography* and George Padmore's two books, *The Gold Coast Revolution* and *Pan Africanism or Communism?, I Speak For Freedom* will provide the key to understanding the day-by-day news about Ghana. A study of these books is also likely to leave a liberal (or even a democratic socialist) disturbed, and to lead him to question the accuracy of the title of Nkrumah's book. It is likely, however, that most Ghanaians would agree with what Hempstone had to say about Somalia.

> **It is debatable . . . if the average Somali needs the ideals of political democracy as much as food to eat, reasonably good health, work to do, a home where he can raise his children, to associate with friends and to worship his god without intrusion.**

Some C.P.P. adherents would go farther and say that there is need for a "cult" of the Osagyefo ("Victorious Leader") to attain these goals in Ghana, given the high rates of illiteracy and the dispersive influences of tribalism. Nkrumah does not make this point in *I Speak for Freedom,* but he does, by implication, support the C.P.P. slogan that "The Party is Supreme."

ROLF ITALIAANDER, IN *The New Leaders of Africa,* is forced to react to Nkrumah as a most important facet of the African Reality. His highly subjective reaction to the 25 African leaders whom he discusses in detail, and his naive theories of social change, will contribute little toward helping Americans to develop a coherent image of Africa. For him the masses are always "passive." In taking this position, he demonstrates his ignorance of the forces which have shaped the nationalist movements of Africa.

Working with a few interviews that he has had with leaders during the past thirty years of travel in Africa, a great deal of reading, and some gossip, he manages to present moderately interesting profiles of a wide range of leaders. For those who know little of the leaders, the book can provide

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a useful introduction. (Ronald Segal's *Political Africa*: *A Who's Who of Personalities and Parties,* published by Praeger this year, provides a much more satisfactory, but far more expensive introduction–$12.50.) Like Hempstone's book, Italiaander's volume is full of factual errors and contains occasional opinionated judgments such as the following: "Although Azikiwe (the Governor General of Nigeria) is a hothead and frequently goes too far, he is extremely intelligent and perhaps even a genius." Italiaander, too, is one of those outsiders who thinks he knows what is good for Africans and who is shocked and hurt when they do not act as he thinks they should act. But his heart is in the right place. His "crusade" is primarily against racialism because it is "unChristian", and he feels that: "The whites must make peace with the colored peoples not only for humanist and Christian reasons but because wisdom, self preservation, demands it." And he wants Africans to like Europeans and the West and Rolf Italiaander.

ALL FOUR BOOKS WRITTEN BY NON-AFRICANS fail to give us a thorough understanding of the African Revolution. A discussion in terms of Cold War politics limits our insight into the political aspect of that revolution, and a country-by-country survey never allows us to see the play of Pan African politics which, rather than the Cold War, provides the framework of African thought and action.

London and Paris were the intellectual centers where the outstanding political leaders came to maturity. Between 1945 and 1950, many future leaders of French Africa were deriving parliamentary experience in the Assembly of the Fourth Republic. The most significant event among British African intellectuals during this period was the Fifth Pan African Congress which met in England in 1945. Present were George Padmore, a West Indian ex-Communist, and Kwame Nkrumah, a recently graduated African student, as political secretaries, and Jomo Kenyatta as chairman. The French African intellectuals in Paris, and this London group, agreed that if their African homelands ever became independent they would work toward some kind of political unity. While these intellectuals discussed the future, a groundswell of discontent was rising among the masses throughout the continent. Post-war inflation brought to a boil hostilities accumulated during a century of Western economic, political and cultural dominance. At the mass level, too, messianic movements, and "prophet movements" expressed occasional social and economic discontent. The return of ex-soldiers and students from abroad injected a radical component to situations where local leadership was made up largely of moderates among the African business and professional groups, and some chiefs or traditional leaders.

The colonial powers responded to the evidence of restlessness in the colonies by increasing investment in social and economic development and, except in Belgian and Portuguese areas, by widening the sphere of political participation. The fact that "left" governments were in power in France and Britain immediately after the War made such an adjustment easier.

Leaders like Kenyatta and Nkrumah went home between 1945 and 1950 to place themselves at the head of these mass movements, while French-African leaders kept one foot in Africa and one in Paris. A long and bitter

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struggle occurred wherever white settlers lived in Africa. By 1953, for instance, Kenyatta was in jail, though Nkrumah had become a Prime Minister in a government rapidly evolving toward independence. While the revolutionary forces were maturing in Africa south of the Sahara, they burst the bonds, with violence, in North Africa.

The fact that North Africa had been a battleground during the war accelerated the drive for political independence and made early concessions inevitable. Libya received the reward for her faithfulness to the Allied cause with a promise of independence in 1952 after a period of U.N. tutelage. Tunisia and Morocco were not prepared to remain French protectorates in the face of an independent Libya. After a quick but bloody struggle, France gave in in 1956. As part of the Arab-African resurgence, young army zealots in Egypt swept Farouk and his corrupt hangers-on into the casinos across the Mediterranean and then proceeded to reform the country and seize the Suez canal. The Sudan slipped the condominium's leash and unilaterally declared its independence in 1956. By 1957, there were five independent Arab and quasi-Arab states in northern Africa with a total population of 49,000,000. Settler-dominated Algeria resisted the revolutionary wave and posed a moral and political crisis for France—still unresolved.

While this violent drama was being played out north and east of the Sahara, the Gold Coast under the leadership of Nkrumah managed, by "non-violent positive action," to become the first colony to win its independence—in 1957. In April 1958, the five North African states, along with Ghana, and the two old and essentially conservative nations, Liberia and Ethiopia, met in Accra in the First Conference of Independent African States. They pledged assistance to Algeria, set up a caucus at the U.N., and authorized calling a conference in Accra of nationalist leaders throughout the continent.

The concept of a French Union began to collapse during the late Fifties. After DeGaulle came to power as a result of the Algerian crisis, the repercussions were felt in West Africa when he agreed to a referendum for the constitution of a Franco-African Community. Guinea voted herself out in September 1958, and joined in a Ghana-Guinea union which breached the French-English barrier in West Africa.

The All-African Peoples Conference which met in Ghana in December 1958 contained only nine independent states, but they financed this gathering of "agitators" from throughout the continent. The next phase of the African political revolution began in earnest. Pressures outside the French orbit resulted in a demand from Senegal and the Sudan for independence which, when granted, set off a chain reaction that resulted in 12 independent states by the summer of 1960. With Ghana free, the independence of Nigeria could not be long delayed and, by October of 1960, it, too, was independent. Meanwhile, the Congo had secured its sovereignty in June 1960. With over half of the continent independent by 1961, the battle lines began to draw tight for the final assault upon the settler bastions in the Rhodesias, South Africa, and the Portuguese territories. The storm signals for the inevitable explosions have appeared, with practically all of the

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independent states determined to press the political revolution through to its conclusion.

The disintegration of the Congo split the 28 African states along ideological lines, and contemporary African politics can only be understood in terms of these divisions. On the "left" are the five Casablanca Powers—Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and Egypt, with their not-yet-independent ally, the Provisional Government of Algeria. They stand for an aggressive anti-colonialist, anti-settler policy, a struggle against "neo-colonialism" (of which the Common Market is considered one manifestation), against "client-states" (those formed from French West and Equatorial Africa), and for a policy of strict non-alignment in the Cold War. The leaders of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali have their own Union of African States within the Casablanca group based on neo-Marxist socialist internal policies, while Egypt professes to be experimenting with "Arab Socialism." The U. S. wire services and most newspapers and weekly magazines label this group Communist or pro-Communist despite the protests of all their leaders that they are only Africanizing Marx and have no ties with the Eastern bloc. It is this group which has supported Lumumba and Gizenga in the Congo.

On the extreme "right" are the states sometimes referred to as "The Brazzaville Twelve," favorable to membership in the Common Market, inclined to support DeGaulle on many issues, and supporting Kasavubu rather than Gizenga. Within this group are two federations—the *Conseil d'Entente* and the union of Central African states as well as Senghor's Senegal with its theory of African Socialism. The Casablanca Powers consider them all client-states and the Trojan Horses of neo-colonialism.

Between the two extremes are eleven uncommitted states or moderates, some of which lean toward the "left" and some toward the "right," but which unite with the other two groups in their opposition to the Union of South Africa and Portugal.

All of the African states except the Casablanca group met in Monrovia in 1961 and co-ordinated their policies on a number of issues. They also obliquely warned the Casablanca powers against trying to subvert them. American policy tends to favor the moderation of the Monrovia group as opposed to the radicalism of the Casablanca group. The nationalists in areas not yet independent, however, tend to see the Casablanca Powers as their champions, and Sekou Toure and Nkrumah as their heroes rather than Balewa or Tubman or Senghor. Within many of the states of the Monrovia group, too, there are opposition elements who favor the radical Pan Africanism of the Casablanca powers. Yet, African states tend to close ranks on "anti-colonial" issues and on such issues in the U.N. as declaring the continent a nuclear free zone. There is also a growing tendency to take the position that if the U.N. does not serve as an effective instrument in the completion of the African political revolution, it may be the responsibility of the independent states to render moral and financial aid and perhaps military support to rebels in southern Africa.

A "good" book about Africa would be one which widens and deepens our understanding of the forces which have resulted in the political picture

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just sketched above. If it tends to blur this picture it results in confusion rather than enlightenment. If it ignores it we are left with unconnected episodes that do not make sense.

HOWEVER, CONCENTRATION UPON the political revolution to the exclusion of other aspects of the African Revolution does not carry us far. This is a weakness of the four books by non-Africans. The emphasis upon political events and upon the personal qualities or motives of leaders as though these phenomena existed in a vacuum obscures the underlying economic factors which have led to the revolution and which will shape it in the future. (It also ignores the function of ideology in the process.) To speak of illiteracy and tribalism as important factors in understanding African political events is legitimate. They have much to do with the form, but not the content of African political events. In Ghana, for instance, Ashanti unrest has some relation to tribalism, but the stormy events of 1954-1957 were set off by a government decision to alter the price of cocoa. Events in Ashanti are much more likely to be related to the price of cocoa than to attitudes toward the Golden Stool.

Current unrest in Ghana is to be understood primarily in terms of dissatisfaction with new measures to raise revenue. Events in the Congo which are usually interpreted in terms of "tribalism" are made much more meaningful if we cut through to an analysis of the economic interests which control the copper mines and which finance Tshombe. The whole conflict in settler occupied areas has at its center the struggle for control of a cheap labor supply and for the maintenance of a monopoly on high wages by the white aristocrats of labor organized into powerful unions and political parties. Recent shifts in the Ghana government represent the victory of a younger, ideologically oriented group and its power seeking allies over those who grew up with the Party, profited by it and are allied with non-Party business interests. To interpret these events in terms of a power grab by a vain and ambitious Nkrumah simply obfuscates the matter.

If we are to understand fully the African Revolution we will need a neo-Marxian analysis, combining Marxian concepts, a sophisticated sociology and a functional anthropology which utilizes modern social psychology. Whether any American Africanist has the skill to write such a book for the layman is problematical, although there are younger scholars who use such an approach in their specialized work. Whether the intelligent layman will "swallow" it if it is written is even more problematical. But such a book should be written for an audience that can appreciate it.

ST. CLAIR DRAKE *has recently returned from an extended stay in Ghana. He teaches at Roosevelt University and is co-author of the study,* Black Metropolis.

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Totalitarianism and Despotism

The author argues that totalitarianism as distinct from despotism has a fundamental purpose which makes it unique in the history of tyranny

Paul Barton

SOCIAL SCIENCE IS OBVIOUSLY reluctant to enter upon the study of the totalitarian system. In the midst of a literary overproduction which threatens to stifle thought under its weight, the number of writings dealing with totalitarianism is extraordinarily small. The main difficulty lies in the novelty of the phenomenon. The emergence of Fascist Italy, of pseudo-Soviet Russia and of Hitler's Germany caught everybody unawares, sociologists, economists and historians, no less than politicians and laymen. And yet this new system is not without precedent. Its resemblance, for example, to Napoleonic France has often been noticed and indeed exaggerated. But it is the so-called Oriental despotism which, of all the systems that history has known, most nearly resembles the totalitarianism of our own day; this affinity between them appears particularly clear in the cases where—as in Russia and China—one followed immediately upon the other.

In view of the despotic tradition in Russia, it seems hardly credible that the most important theoretical writings on the modern totalitarian system do not even raise the question of its connection with traditional despotism. Hannah Arendt, for instance, in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), links it only with anti-semitism, imperialism and the decline of class society. In the discussion on totalitarianism which took place at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in March 1953 (*Totalitarianism*, Cambridge, Mass.), despotism was again passed over in silence. Professor Friedrich, too, states in passing, without proof or analysis, that totalitarian dictatorship bears no more resemblance to Asiatic despotism than to the Greek tyranny (*Totalitaere Diktatur*, 1957).

On the other hand, though a theoretical confrontation of the two social systems can help to remove the aura of mystery at present surrounding totalitarianism, it must obviously avoid the simple argument by analogy, which is all too common in work of this kind. Professor Sorokin's statements in the third volume of his *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (1937) are a typical example. According to him, totalitarianism and laissez-faire are two extreme poles between which the whole of human society per-

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manently oscillates. He claims that it is a question of "the number of social relationships which serve as the fibers' of any given network." The vacillation between totalitarianism and laissez-faire, "this fluctuation of the controlling and regulatory functions of a social group and its government," is thus reduced to the "condensation" and "rarefaction" of its "network of social relationships." To illustrate these statements, the author makes a long list of past "totalitarian" states, in which the despotic empires, Sparta and the medieval revolutionary sects are all mixed up together.

But much less superficial authors also reason in a similar way. Thus Ygael Gluckstein, in *Mao's China,* declares that the bureaucracy of the old Chinese Empire "was an archetype of totalitarianism long before the term was coined," and speaks of "the totalitarianism inherent in Oriental society." Karl A. Wittfogel's important work *Oriental Despotism* is subtitled *A Comparative Study of Total Power.* The system created by Stalin appears to him to be a new and more complete form of despotism, "industrial despotism" as opposed to the "agrarian despotism" of the past; he also speaks of "agrarian and industrial forms of total statism." Moreover, Wittfogel frequently attributes to Oriental societies totalitarian features which appear to be rather alien to them. In the discussion at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, N. S. Timasheff said, with greater circumspection, that "Paraguay under the Jesuits was close to totalitarianism."

If it is not to slip into an argument by analogy, a comparative study must of course take the differences as well as the similarities into account.

THE MAIN FEATURE COMMON TO DESPOTISM and totalitarianism is the domination of society by an apparatus; in both cases society is governed by an institution which holds the monopoly of power and is endowed with the cohesion and continuity in time which, in other societies, distinguish the social classes and particularly the ruling classes. Moreover, the principles determining the structures of this apparatus and its *modus faciendi* are in many ways the same in both systems.

In the first place, the apparatus is exempt from all social control and, within it, decision making is strictly centralized; this was tersely formulated in Hitler's slogan: "Every leader's authority downwards and responsibility upwards." The Communist apparatus does claim to be guided in this respect by the special principle of "democratic centralism." But there is in fact nothing democratic about it. Roughly, it comes to this: the more decision making is centralized, the more the carrying out of the decisions must be decentralized. In this sense the pseudo-democratic centralism is inherent in every apparatus, whether totalitarian or despotic; for in every apparatus properly so called, the men in command strive as much to keep the lower bodies on their toes as to make sure that they conform.

The very sense of hierarchy which an organization of this kind inevitably brings about, is subordinated to the requirements of an all-pervading control from the summit. "In order to obtain the greatest possible centralization of the Party's activities," proclaimed the Third Congress of the Comintern, "it is not expedient to dissect the leadership of the Party

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into a schematic hierarchy with numerous grades completely subordinated to each other." With regard to Hitler's experiment, Hannah Arendt made the pertinent observation that a hierarchically arranged transmission of orders means that the power of the one who commands depends on the hierarchy of authority of which he forms a part; any hierarchy, even if conducted in the most authoritarian way, and any intermediate communication of orders, even if they were lavished with an extreme dictatorial autocracy, would stabilize, and hence limit, the power of the totalitarian leader.

Thus while the National Socialists relied to a large extent on the traditional civil service in their rule, they continually introduced new measures and innovations which contradicted the meticulous grading of competences without which this civil service could not keep its proverbial efficiency. A typical example is the nomination, on September 1st, 1939, of national defense commissioners for the eighteen provincial commands of the armed forces of the Reich.

Each of these commissioners was to coordinate, under the direct command of the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Realm, all the activities connected with the war, even including the economy. He was entitled to give orders to nearly all the civil service bodies in his region. For carrying out his task he utilized the administrative agency of the town where he resided, taking the chief of this agency as his deputy. Since the commissioners were quartered in the same town as the provincial commands of the armed forces, and since these commands were not always stationed in the chief town of the district, a commissioner often used a subordinate authority to direct other authorities on higher rungs of the ladder of administrative hierarchy. The deputy he appointed automatically became the boss of his own hierarchical superiors (Franz Neumann, *Behemoth,* 1942).

Again, though the Italian Fascists attached enormous importance to the hierarchical ordering of their apparatus—a fascist review even called itself *Gerarchia*—yet they twisted and strained it whenever it suited them. For instance, in spite of the statutes which had given absolute power over the party apparatus to the national secretary, Giovanni Marinelli managed to retain a considerable degree of autonomy for his position as administrative secretary. An open conflict with him even brought about the downfall of one of the successive national secretaries. This was certainly not accidental. While the supreme post of national secretary changed hands quite often, Marinelli retained his post from 1922 on; and his is among the few names of outstanding fascists whom Benito Mussolini mentioned at the end of *My Autobiography* (1928) as his most valued helpers.

Similarly, though the provincial secretaries were, in the interests of the hierarchy, strictly forbidden to go and see the Duce or any other important official unless the interview had been arranged by the national party office, Mussolini kept directly in touch with several provincial secretaries whom he trusted (Dante L. Germino, *The Italian Fascist Party in Power,* 1959). When he appointed a man such as Roberto Farinacci—one of the regime's top dignitaries, who sat on the Great Council and had been made national secretary at a crucial moment—to the relatively hum-

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ble post of provincial secretary, it was probably precisely because he wanted to be able to keep himself directly informed about the real situation in the country and about the state of mind of the population.

The central authority is always ready to discard middle-men who do not prove indispensable; it always reserves the right to interfere directly in the working of any part of the apparatus. In the 1930s, according to Alexander Weissberg (*Conspiracy of Silence,* 1951), there were never more than three middlemen between Stalin and the humblest Soviet citizen: the worker generally knew the manager of the factory, the manager knew the head of the central administration of his industry, this head knew the minister and he, in turn, was in direct contact with Stalin. This was true for the articulation of the party also. The same question preoccupied the National Socialists, for whom, as Hannah Ahrendt says, the supreme law is the "will of the Führer," and not his specific orders, the authority of which could be delimited, or, as Franz Neumann put it: "The law is what the leader wants, and the legislation is an emanation of his power."

In *The Fascist Dictatorship in Italy* (1928), where he analyzes the terror practised under Mussolini's reign by Fascist gangs throughout the country, the historian Salvemini has shown that by the side of his official activity, and often in flagrant contradiction with it, the Duce carried on an intense and absolutely secret activity, in which he used officials of every grade and even paid criminals, according to the needs of the moment. In the Argentine, Maria Eva Duarte de Peron ("Evita") played an extremely important part in the Peronist dictatorship, by establishing direct contacts between El Líder and various bodies, institutions, and social groups with whom he could not otherwise have communicated without a series of intermediaries.

The masters of despotic regimes, too, by-pass the whole hierarchical set-up every time they come up against a situation which requires the supreme power to act promptly and energetically. This is shown in a particularly striking way by their wonderful systems of swift locomotion and communication, which they use to spy not only on the population but also —and perhaps chiefly—on their own officials (cf. Wittfogel).

THE SECOND FEATURE COMMON to despotic and totalitarian apparatuses is their complexity and the inextricable intertwining of their various branches. The apparatus always has many and far-reaching ramifications. In totalitarian states it embraces the party, the executive, the legislative and the judiciary powers in the traditional sense, the secret police, various para-military groups, the army, the economic administration, industrial management, the press and other instruments of propaganda, trade unions, youth and other "mass-organizations," etc. All these branches overlap, intertwine and compete with each other within the apparatus. The extent of jurisdiction attributed to the various branches is nowhere clearly specified; the directives concerning the relations between them are deliberately equivocal. In his speech to the Party Congress in

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1935, Hitler produced a masterpiece of its kind. He said that the task of the state "is to continue, within the existing framework, legally to administer the state organization which has historically developed." The party's task he defined thus: "first, to direct the efforts of its entire organization toward the establishment of a stable-perpetuating and eternal cell for the National Socialist doctrine; second, to educate the whole people to this idea; and third, to hand over the people, thus educated, to the state for its leadership." He added: "As to the rest, the principle of mutual respect must be observed by both jurisdictions."

Not all the definitions of course, come up to this level of confusion. They are, in any case, constantly being changed. For instance, Mussolini first reduced the Prefectoral Administration to chaos by harassing it through the newly created high-flying commissioners. Then, early in 1927, he decreed that the prefect would be the highest authority of the Fascist regime in the provinces, and ordered party members to "collaborate in a subordinate way with him so as to render his task easier." Scarcely two years later a law was passed, making a representative of the party a member of the provincial advisory council to the prefect. In 1934, the number of these party representatives was raised to four active members and two inactive members. Finally, in 1939, a semi-official manual asserted that the party and the state officials had equal authority (cf. Germino).

The branches of the apparatus overlap and intertwine in such a number of ways that only the most important can be mentioned here.

The differentiation of functions is never consistent. The same branch is often allotted a number of quite diverse and even totally incompatible responsibilities; conversely, the same function is assigned to several different branches. An extreme example of the first of these principles is the working of the totalitarian pseudo-unions of all kinds; they are supposed to look after the welfare of the workers, to see to their docility and subjection, to represent the personnel before the plant-management, to act as aids to the management, and to denounce its faults, mistakes and weaknesses to the higher authorities, all at the same time. The second principle was taken to an extreme by the National Socialist regime, which set up within the Party various bodies doubling the ministries and other authorities. The upkeep of military formations more or less independent of the regular army—the SS, the Fascist militia, the MVD troops—is another example of the same practice.

Practically all the servants of the apparatus are bound by a number of conflicting loyalties, since one man is subject to the discipline of two or more distinct, and more or less rival, bodies. The party, which is only one branch of the apparatus among others, has many members and even responsible officials in nearly all the other branches. When the Minister for the Interior of the Third Reich said that a state official should accept orders only from his superior in the state hierarchy, he was violently attacked. There are very few exceptions to the infiltration by party-men. The most important is certainly that of the army and labor-service in Hitler's Germany: party members were suspended for the duration of their military service, and during their labor-service they were required to ab-

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stain from all party activity (cf. Franz Neumann). But these formal rules did not prevent the party from infiltrating the army staff.

It has often been said that in Fascist Italy the aim of building up a strong state came before all the rest and that the party there was reduced, in contrast with the National Socialist and Communist practice, to a purely auxiliary role. Some writers even go so far as to deduce from this opinion that the regime created by the inventor of the term "totalitarianism" was not totalitarian at all. So it is worth noting in this connection that the Italian army had no exceptional status comparable to that of the Wehrmacht. On the contrary, from the beginning of the thirties, Italian officers were exposed to every kind of pressure to join the party, which also had a considerable influence in the matter of promotion.



THE CONFLICT OF RIVAL loyalties by which the officials are torn is not, as is often thought, simply the result of the complicated and involved relationship between the state and the party. It is, rather, an inherent tendency of the apparatus itself. This is indicated by the position of the Soviet trade-union full-time officers who, as the archives captured in Smolensk show, must be registered as collaborators of the secret police if they are to have access to the correspondence concerning practically all the questions with which these unions deal (Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule,* 1958).

Within one branch of the apparatus there are often, at every level, plenipotentiaries of other branches who are commanded by their hierarchical superiors in their own branch, and yet the responsibility of the head of the branch thus infiltrated is not thereby lessened in any way whatever. Thus in Italy the party representatives implanted in the provincial administration as members of the prefects' councils were appointed not by the prefects but by the national secretary of the party on the recommendation of the provincial secretary. But the classic example is that of the Soviet army; here, while the officers are held to account for the political activities and "vigilance" in their units, they are both backed and supervised by party and secret police officials; these in their turn also deal with discipline, service-duties, the troops' morale, etc.

Similar arrangements exist in most Russian institutions. Professor Barrington Moore Jr. speaks in this connection of "the basic pattern of the Soviet dictatorship" (*Terror and Progress USSR,* 1954). This "basic pattern" is present even in certain services directly dependent on the

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police. It can, for instance, be found in the concentration camp administration. This is based on three relatively independent elements: 1) the technical and economic element, represented by the administration proper; 2) the political element, represented by the political section of the administration and, subordinate to it, the cultural and educational sections; 3) the secret police element, represented by the "special section" of the administration. While they are integrated in the camp-administration—the chief of the political section always holding the office of deputy camp director—these sections depend on the party and on the State Security Committee of the Council of Ministers, respectively.

At the top of a Soviet industrial enterprise the management is surrounded by such bodies as an organ of the secret police, the party cell, the trade-union group, the technical and scientific society, the "rationalizers' " and inventors' organization, the association for collaboration with the army, the youth organization, etc. The union, for instance, has the technical and scientific society and the "rationalizers' " and inventors' organization under its orders, and is, in its turn, under the orders of the party cell (all those of its members who are at the same time members of the party are grouped together in the "fraction" commanded by the cell). The directors themselves are union members, and their immediate subordinates are generally also among union officials. Moreover, it is one and the same official of the party secretariat for the district who controls the appointments of managers and those of union leaders, as can be seen from the Smolensk archives.

The strange intertwining of the apparatus is often explained in terms of circumstances peculiar to that country. Thus in the case of the USSR it has been said that this intertwining is due to "the speed with which the Soviet bureaucracy was constructed" (Barrington Moore Jr.). But since the same thing appears in one form or another in all despotic or totalitarian regimes, it is clearly a characteristic inherent in the apparatus itself. Indeed, the nature of the apparatus does not permit any consistent specialization or differentiation. In the USSR a "narrow specialist spirit" is enough to justify the dismissal of any man in a responsible position. Most of the attacks on the bureaucracy in Hitler's Germany or Mussolini's Italy were based on the same accusation. If the apparatus is constantly to interfere in numerous aspects of the life of the social body, the responsibility of several of its branches must converge on the same point and each of them must attack the problem from several points of view. Therefore everything in the apparatus must at the same time be state, party, police, church, administration, propaganda, etc.

ANOTHER REASON FOR THE CONFUSION and rivalry between the various branches is the heterogeneity of the apparatus, which is its third characteristic. All the despotic or totalitarian apparatuses consist of two elements: a little nucleus in which all power is vested and, around it, a system of various groups which it uses for its own ends. George F. Kennan saw this clearly when he said: "The totalitarian 'state'—if there is such a thing—seems to me to consist in the top party clique plus the secret police apparatus." (*Totalitarianism.*)

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For the so-called Communist regimes, this diagnosis was confirmed by the Hungarian uprising in October 1956; this stripped the apparatus of all the sections linked to it, and clearly showed up its true nucleus. In the light of this experience only one change should be made in Kennan's statement: instead of the secret police, the group in question consists rather of those who have compromised themselves to such an extent in the service of the ruling clique that they remain bound to it for life and death. This is a small change, but it has a certain significance. It shows quite definitely that the nucleus itself contains elements which in fact are nothing but tools. Its National Socialist equivalent was SS: to them were entrusted all the positions of command in the police; they were supposed, especially through their Verfuegungstruppe, to destroy the esprit de corps of the army staff; they were placed in key positions in the "mass-organizations," in industry, in administration, etc. That Hitler gave this function to the "élite of the race" is one of the ironies of history, for, long before the appearance of totalitarianism, in many countries ruled by despotism, it was held by the eunuchs.

More generally, the masters of despotic regimes maintain an apparatus within the apparatus by placing in certain positions men, such as slaves and eunuchs, who owe them everything and would be nothing without the favor of the despot. In other cases they introduce into the apparatus socially alien elements, such as commoners, priests, etc. (cf. Wittfogel).

Around the nucleus gravitate the most diverse elements: bureaucrats, judges, police and army officers, managers of public enterprises, organizers of all sorts and even intellectuals in the service of the authorities. This section of the apparatus, the peripheral section, so to speak, varies considerably according to the regime. But the differences which appear in this respect between despotism and totalitarianism are no more important than those which exist between the various forms of the latter. For instance, if the artists and the learned do not assume exactly the same functions in the despotic regimes as the subservient intellectuals in the totalitarian, these in their turn are not used in the same way by the Communists and the fascists. The essential point is the fact that in both cases they are linked to the apparatus. And often in this section of the despotic apparatus there appear elements which very much resemble certain social categories of our time. This is particularly true of the great merchants who, operating in the one case with their own capital, in the other with that of the state, in both serve the state in the capacity of commercial agents.

As distinct from the Chekists, SS, eunuchs or slaves hoisted up to positions of responsibility, all these elements on the periphery of the apparatus obviously have no reason to uphold the clique in power. Consequently, they can be trusted as long as the apparatus is working smoothly. This shows the intrinsic power of the apparatus and the insignificance of the man drawn in its machinery. Moreover, all the revolts which have from time to time been breaking out in the Soviet empire since 1953 have shown that among those who, in normal times, take part in the oppression of the population as members of the apparatus, the opponents of the established regime are in the majority. Examining the principle which makes

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the despotic government work, the "human passions which make it move," Montesquieu says: "Just as virtue is necessary in a republic and honor in a monarchy, so fear is necessary in a despotic government: as for virtue, there is no need for it, and honor would be dangerous." The same applies to totalitarianism.

The similarity between the totalitarian and the despotic apparatus stops there. As soon as one touches upon their ambitions with regard to the community, they appear essentially different from each other.



THE BASIC VOCATION OF THE TOTALITARIAN APPARATUS is to transform the whole of the society on which it is grafted and even, in the final stage, to absorb it entirely. Italian Fascism, though it was a good deal more moderate in this respect than National Socialism or Communism, formulated its aim thus: "If the State is really to represent the nation, the people who constitute the nation must become part of the State. How can this be achieved? The fascist answer is this: by the organization of the people in professional groups . . . No group outside the State, no group against the State, all groups in the State." And Mussolini declared: "Thus, for the Fascists, everything is in the State and nothing human or spiritual exists—and still less has any value—outside the State. In this sense, Fascism is totalitarian; being the sum and unity of all values, the Fascist State interprets the whole life of the people and ensures its expansion and strengthening. No individuals or groups (political parties, associations, trade unions, classes) apart from the state!"

The practice, however, is much more complicated than the theory; for the aims inevitably clash with social realities. The problem was clearly defined by Friedrich (*Totalitaere Diktatur*). The totalitarian ideology, as he observed, is by its very nature utopian because it "aims at the total destruction of existing society, and at its total reconstruction." Now, any party with utopian claims must, on coming into power, adapt its program in accordance with reality. The totalitarian parties cannot escape from this necessity. The monopoly of power itself cannot save them from it; at most, it allows them to "maintain the opinion that the ideology remains unchanged and that the adaptation is only provisional." The apparatus does not renounce its claim to remake society according to a preconceived pattern. But, as it transforms itself, the final aim recedes further and further away; and the process becomes self-perpetuating. Professor Germino made the point when he said of the Italian Fascists that they were engaged in a

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"perpetual action on behalf of unrealized objectives." It produces convulsions, the chief effect of which is the need for more convulsions.

The phenomenon has not escaped Hannah Arendt, but she does not give it its full weight. First of all, she conceives it as a political matter (the "liquidation" of nationalities, of the soviets and of the independent peasantry, the launching of Stakhanovism, the introduction of labor-books, the transformation of the trade unions, the terror against the elite of the administration and of the army); then, she sees in it only an attempt to break up society into individuals; finally, she regards the terror as the chief, if not the sole, instrument of this policy.

Franz Neumann, in spite of his tendency to minimize the newness of totalitarianism, felt that we are here faced with a sociological phenomenon. So, explaining his theory that National Socialism carried the bureaucratization of society to an extreme, he gave the following definition: "Bureaucratization . . . is a process operating in both public and private spheres, in the state as well as in society. It means that human relations lose their directness and become mediated relations in which third parties, public or private functionaries seated more or less securely in power, authoritatively prescribe the behaviour of man." On the other hand, though he said that National Socialism tried to consolidate the reign of the upper classes, Neumann noted that the party, and society as a whole, were going through a process of differentiation, that this process led to the creation of reliable élites in every sector, and that through these élites "the regime plays off one group against the other."

Indeed the remodelling of the social structure, which totalitarian regimes take upon themselves, is extremely complicated and cannot be reduced to one simple formula. It is a permanent action, in the course of which every component element of society has to be deformed, social groups have to be broken up and the spontaneous ties between them severed, artificial antagonisms have to be created and fictitious affinities discovered where they do not exist. Finally, whole social categories have to be eliminated from the community. The ruthlessness with which the apparatus carries out these sociological operations varies considerably from country to country. One of the main factors tending to slow it down is undoubtedly the cost in human lives: the smaller the population at its disposal, the less can the totalitarian regime afford these *experimenta in corpore vili*. But even Fascism, with its limited demographic reserves, did not stop at the extreme measure. When in 1938 it adopted racial discrimination against the Jews, it began the process of eliminating whole social categories from the community. Professor Germino has convincingly shown that far from being due simply to Hitler's pressure on Mussolini, this campaign was a logical part of the "reform of customs" which had been organized by Achille Starace, the national secretary, since 1937. This reform itself was of course one of the means by which the social structure was to be remodelled.

The aim is to create not merely an amorphous mass of lonely individuals, but a whole artificial structure. It is significant that the principles on which it is to be constructed have no great importance for the apparatus

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itself. This is confirmed by the ease with which Stalin replaced egalitarianism by the principle of privilege; many other, though less spectacular examples could be quoted. It is the process that counts, not its results; in any case, the result can only be provisional, while the process must be permanent.

Far from limiting itself to the terror, the apparatus urges on this process by every means at its disposal: compulsion, blackmail, propaganda, bribery, social assistance, economic policy, etc.

This operation has no equivalent under despotism. At first, it is true, certain despotic practices seem to come near it. The regulation of the social structure in the Inca Empire is a case in point. Besides dividing the population into the various categories of the nobility, the "people" and the yanacuna, a class deprived of civic rights and obligations and bound to certain labor for the benefit of the state and the Incas, this regulation prescribed to the last detail the services which each man and woman of the "people" owed to the state, as well as their economic activities and their family life. On closer examination, however, it appears that the resemblance to totalitarianism is only superficial. In fact the aim of despotism in this sphere is diametrically opposed to that of totalitarianism; its guiding principle is not disruption of the social structure but on the contrary its preservation. In doing this, moreover, it reinforces a tendency inherent in the community which it governs. Pedro Ciefa de Leon, a Spanish author who, in 1533 and 1560 published an important work in two volumes on Peru, remarked that after the fall of the Inca Empire, the inhabitants continued to observe the rules of conduct decreed by the defunct power. Generally speaking, the societies which breed despotic regimes are distinguished by a very marked tendency to stagnation and to a perpetual reproduction of the same social relationships and the same method of production. This tendency is so strong that it has resisted many major political troubles and changes of dynasty as well as the dissolution and re-building of states. The contrary is true of totalitarianism.

A fact of central importance is that the revolutionary ambition, which distinguishes the totalitarian from the despotic apparatus, the ambition which drives it unceasingly to remodel the community, is unparalleled in history. Humanity has indeed known authoritarian regimes with a strong reforming vocation. But it is with totalitarianism that, for the first time, a permanent disruption becomes the guiding principle of a social organization.

PAUL BARTON *was born in Prague in 1919. He was organizer of the underground trade unions during the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. His articles on Russia and East Europe have been widely published and he is the author of several books including* L'Institution Concentrationnaire en Russie 1930-1957.

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Tony Cliff

The 22nd Congress Of the Russian Communist Party

THE 22ND CONGRESS of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will be without doubt a turning point in the history of world Communism. Much of what happened was unexpected, and its effect on the international labor movement will be deep and prolonged.

Six weeks before the November Congress, a new draft program was published, the core of which promised the millenium: Russia would catch up to and surpass the United States' standard of living within the next two decades, with the transition from socialism to Communism achieved. "Happy, beautiful and moving days!" the Minister of Culture, Madame Furtseva, was to call them.

The Soviet press prepared for a great celebration of a glorious future, with Khrushchev's 20 year program served as the main dish. Instead, an extremely peppery course was served as the Congress provided a rostrum for bitter attacks on Albania and on the "Anti-Party Group" led by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich. It is clear that by Albania, Khrushchev and those who parroted him also meant China, and the "Anti-Party Group," as we shall show, stands not for a small number of individuals but for a broad section of the Russian bureaucracy.

There were three main charges against both categories of apostacy: 1) opposition to Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful co-existence between Capitalism and Socialism;" 2) opposition to Khrushchev's reforms in the management of industry and agriculture introduced in the past few years; 3) support of the Stalinist cult and Stalinist atrocities.

1. "Peaceful Co-existence"

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN MOSCOW AND PEIPING over the issue of "peaceful co-existence" was first evidenced with the dramatic successes of the USSR in the conquest of space. On August 26, 1957, Moscow announced that Russia had successfully tested an intercontinental multi-stage ballistic missile; on October 4, the launching

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of the first earth satellite; on November 3, the second sputnik.

On November 18, Mao Tse-tung, attending an international congress of Communist Parties in Moscow for the first time, argued that the balance of forces between the capitalist West and the Socialist East tipped heavily toward the latter. "I consider that the present world situation has reached a new turning point. There are now two winds in the world, the East wind and the West wind . . . I think the characteristic of the current situation is that the East wind prevails over the West wind; that is, the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism."

Mao went on to draw the following strategic conclusions from the military superiority of the "socialist camp":

> In order to struggle against the enemy, we have formed the concept over a long period, namely, that strategically we should despise all enemies, and tactically take them seriously. That means we should despise the enemy in the overall situation, and pay attention to him in every specific issue. If we do not despise the enemy in the situation as a whole, we will commit the mistake of opportunism . . . But if we do not attach importance to the enemy in specific questions . . . we will commit the mistake of adventurism. The war can only be fought battle by battle, and the enemy can only be eliminated bit by bit . . . Strategically we can despise a meal. We can eat it. But the concrete act of eating is carried out mouthful by mouthful; you cannot in one mouthful swallow the whole feast. This is called the one by one solution, and in military literature it is called smashing the enemy one by one.[1]

Following this speech the Chinese press proceeded to deflate the strength of the Western camp. Thus *Shih-chieh Chih-shih* (World Culture) of December 20, 1957, stated:

> The absolute superiority of the Soviet Union with intercontinental ballistic missiles, has placed the striking capabilities of the United States . . . in an inferior position. The Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles not only can reach any military base in Central Europe, Asia or Africa, but also force the United States for the first time in history to a position where neither escape nor striking back is possible.

From now on the United States would be referred to in the Chinese press as the "paper tiger."

Khrushchev, on the other hand, had and has a much more realistic evaluation of the relative strength of East and West; he did not claim that sputnik brought about such a radical reversal in the balance of forces. Khrushchev argued that the East was becoming stronger and the West relatively weaker, but without the former having as yet a decisive superiority. As late as March 4, 1958, he told an East German audience that if it were possible to invent an instrument to measure with precision the political and military strength of the Eastern and Western blocs, it "would show that both sides are sufficiently strong at present." [2] He repeatedly asserted that in case of war Russia, too, would suffer extremely grave damage. Khrushchev also paid tribute to Western economic strength when he announced that the Soviet bloc would not achieve "world historic victory" over capitalism until about 1970, when it would overtake the West in both the physical volume of production and per capita output. "Material production," he emphasized, "is the decisive sphere of human endeavor." Again, at the 22nd Congress, Khrushchev was very cautious in his evaluation of the relative stability and strength of Western capitalism. This stands in marked contrast to the Chinese estimates, and to Stalin's last important statement on the perspectives for world capitalism

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in his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (1952).

For Khrushchev, sputnik alone was not enough to enable the Communists to swallow their enemies "one by one." A contrary possibility perturbed him. As he stated on November 21, 1957: "We must not think that under present conditions minor wars would be localized. Should such wars break out, they could soon grow into a world war."[3]

The new strength served Khrushchev as a means to press on with negotiations with the West, and a couple of months after sputnik the Soviets called for immediate summit talks.[4]

SINCE THE FIRST SPUTNIK, the cleavage between Moscow and Peiping regarding war and peace has widened. During the Lebanese crisis, just over three years ago, Khrushchev declared himself in favor of a summit conference within the framework of the Security Council, only to meet with open hostility to the plan from Peiping, accompanied by the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu from the Chinese mainland. After visiting China at the end of July, Khrushchev withdrew from summitry for a time. But at the height of China's border dispute with India and her conflict with Indonesia over the three million Chinese residents in that country, Khrushchev chose to pay a visit to the two countries. In the summer of 1960, his disarmament policy exacerbated the quarrel. On June 20, of that year *Pravda* stated editorially that "disarmament was not only necessary but possible." This was more than an oblique rebuttal to an assertion appearing two weeks earlier in the *New China News Agency* that such a proposal [for disarmament] can be realized when imperialism still exists, and that the danger of war can be eliminated by relying on such a proposal . . . is an unrealistic illusion."

The following month, China and Russia fell out over policy toward the Congo, with Russia supporting the July 14 resolution calling for United Nations intervention and the Chinese characterizing the decision as "a shield for new crimes of the U.S. pirates." On Algeria, Khrushchev is remembered for his statement in March 1960 about the "historic ties" between France and Algeria, while Mao recognized the Algerian Provisional Government and is reported to be supplying it with arms. More recently, two papers devoted to Chinese affairs have been closed down in Moscow, and Russian technicians have been withdrawn from China.

Regarding the global effect of war, Khrushchev and Mao have differed increasingly. In Vladivostok, on October 8, 1959, Khrushchev made it clear that "Only an irresponsible person can be fearless of war in our days." Four months later, he told the Indian Parliament: "Let us not approach the matter commercially and figure out the losses this or the other side would sustain. War would be a calamity for all the peoples of the world." He repeated the lesson to members of the French Peace Council shortly afterwards: "Imagine what will happen," he said, "when bombs begin to explode over cities. These bombs will not distinguish between Communists and non-Communists . . . No, everything alive can be wiped out in the conflagration of nuclear explosions."

All this had little effect on his Chinese opposite number. Mao Tse-tung was quoted *in extenso* in *Red Flag*, the theoretical organ of the Chinese Communist Party, on March 30, 1960:

> If the imperialists insist on unleashing another war we should not be afraid of it . . . World War I was followed by the birth of the Soviet Union with a population of 200 million. World War II was followed by the emergence of the socialist camp with a combined population of 900 million. If the imperialists should insist on launching a third World War, it is certain that several hundred million more will turn to socialism.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF reasons why Khrushchev and Mao differ sharp-

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ly regarding "peaceful co-existence." Khrushchev believes that as long as his sputniks and H-Bombs can insure "peaceful co-existence," the dynamics of Russia's economy will enable her to overtake Western capitalism. But Mao is out of the nuclear rocket coterie, and it will take decades before China's industry could possibly match that of the West. Indeed, it is China's industrial backwardness that allows Mao to shrug off the danger of nuclear bombardment. Hundreds of millions will die, but the scattered, primitive "Peoples' Communes" could serve as a base for economic reconstruction.

Economically, "peaceful co-existence" means something else for China, too: even if her prospective rate of industrial growth were faster than Russia's (which is not the case at present) the *absolute* gap between the two countries will increase and continue to increase for decades. This prospect cannot but displease Mao.

A national industrial base prescribes a certain investment policy. A million rubles invested in Russia will do more to surpass the U. S. than a loan or gift of the same amount to China. The same applies to the services of technicians. And if Russian capital is to be exported, it is much more fruitfully invested in the more advanced European "People's Democracies," which are largely integrated with the economy of Russia, than in backward China. (It is no accident that neither China nor North Korea nor Vietnam belong to Comecon—the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance – that covers Russia and her European satellites.)

"Peaceful co-existence" also diverts Russian capital from China. In an effort to win the neutral countries from Washington, Russia tries to buy—not overthrow—the rulers of these countries. Hence Nasser can keep his Communists in jail and still get Russian aid. Sukarno and Kassim can outlaw their Communist Parties without fear of economic reprisal. Rubles are required to flirt with these countries. But Mao is not being courted by the United States, so why waste rubles on him?

Since 1956, hardly any credit has gone from Russia to China. There was some flow before this, but its extent is shrouded in mystery. However, some light is thrown on the subject by figures for foreign trade. As trade between the two countries is bilateral, it is clear that where China has an adverse balance of trade, Russia is making up the difference in credit. This was the situation in 1953, 1954 and 1955. In the first year China's imports over her exports to Russia came to 231 million dollars; in the second year, 181 million; in the third, 99 million. However, the picture has changed drastically. In 1956, China's exports exceeded her imports from Russia by 31 million dollars, and in 1957, by 94 million.[5] During the same years, 1953 to 1957, Russia gave some 1,227 million dollars in loans to underdeveloped non-Communist countries. The European Soviet bloc countries contributed another 354 millions. Of these sums India got 362 million, Egypt 208 million, Syria 184 million, Afghanistan 115, Indonesia 113 million.[6]

The withdrawal of Soviet credits was probably the final blow that led the Chinese Communist Party, in its May 1958 Congress, to attempt a "great leap forward" toward industrialization by developing a large number of primitive rural industries. The establishment of People's Communes was a reaction to the scarcity of capital goods. In such a situation, Russia's continuous granting of credits to backward non-Communist countries must have been particularly painful.

The agricultural calamities of 1960 forced China to drink the dregs of her bitterness: although the Soviet harvest in 1960 was some 8.4 million tons larger than in 1959[7] and was probably even larger in 1961, China had to look elsewhere for grain supplies. By the middle of 1961 she had placed orders with Australia and Canada for nearly 10 million tons of grain for 1961-

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1963. It was estimated that this would cost China about 150 million dollars a year. This was obviously a major setback for China's economic plans. It is noteworthy that Russia sent scarcely any aid to China except for 500 thousand tons of sugar at a cost of nearly 50 million dollars to be repaid at some future date—and this at a time when Russia was flooding the West European market with cheap barley!



Relying on a strong industrial base, Russian rulers, in trading with China, drive a hard bargain. Time and again it is announced that the prices charged by Russia for her products and paid for by China's products conform to those of the world market. Now, world market prices entail the exploitation of backward countries by advanced countries. As the Marxist law of value shows, industries with a high "organic composition of capital"—i.e., with a great deal of capital compared with labor—acquire part of the surplus value produced by workers in industries with a low "organic composition of capital." This applies also to international trade between more developed and less developed countries, i.e., countries which have relatively more capital and those with relatively less. As Marx put it, the "favored country obtains in such an exchange more labor in return for less labor."

This argument was put strongly by Joze Vilfan, Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, who said in a speech before the Council:

> The application of the principle of the world market and world prices in relations between industrial countries and insufficiently developed countries constitutes exploitation of the latter. There exists above all an enormous difference in the productivity of labor between developed and insufficiently developed countries; furthermore, the big economically developed countries act like monopolies in trade with the insufficiently developed countries; finally, through their domination over the world market they give a one-sided structure to the export of undeveloped countries. In this way, through this entire mechanism, the world market becomes an instrument for exploiting insufficiently developed countries . . . Experience shows us that the exploiting character of trade on the basis of the principle of the world market does not change, even when it is used in economic relations between socialist countries.[8]

Milentije Popovic, Deputy Finance Minister of Yugoslavia, in his booklet *On Economic Relations Among Socialist States,* writes: ". . . socialist states under the new prevalent circumstances are divided in their mutual exchange into those which are exploiting and those which are being exploited." He went on to argue that "capitalist relations do not unite—they divide. Countries under these relations are split apart into two contradictory categories, into those that are exploited and those that are exploiting. Among them there is neither equality nor unity, but only contradiction." The rich, he says, try to become richer at the expense of the poor, whom they try to keep poor, while the poor are justified in waging a fight against exploitation and oppression.

This, argues Popovic, is the situation under conditions of free competition. The exploitation of the poor countries becomes even harsher when the rich country for one reason or another holds a monopoly position. The back-

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ward countries are then charged even higher and paid even lower prices than those prevailing in the world market.

This is the situation dominating trade between Russia and her satellites.

A few figures will show this. Russia charged her satellites 307 rubles per ton of wheat sold in 1958, while countries outside the Soviet bloc were charged only 273 rubles, a difference of 12 per cent. The comparable figures for barley were 259 and 214 rubles, a difference of 21 per cent. Russian tractors were sold to the satellites for 21,500 rubles each, while outside the bloc they fetched 13,600, a difference of 51 per cent. Cotton goods sold at 1,800 and 600 rubles per square meter, respectively, i.e., the satellites had to pay three times the price charged by Russia in the world market. Interestingly, the more agricultural and backward the individual satellite country, the higher the prices charged by Russia. Albania and Bulgaria did considerably worse than Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

On the other hand, for 17 commodities for which information is available, Russia paid 20 per cent less than she would have paid if charged the same prices by the satellites as they charged outside the Soviet bloc.[8a]

Actual data regarding the terms of trade in the transactions between Russia and China are scanty. There are, however, some indications that the terms are most disadvantageous to China. The informed Hong Kong journal, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, wrote:

> Pig bristles and tung oil, which were the major items in China's exports before the war, have been offered in Western European markets, including Rotterdam, at prices below the market prices in Shanghai and Tientsin. Since the Soviet Union is the exclusive agent for Red China's export goods, Moscow's marketing of pig bristles and tung oil at such low prices indicates that it bought the Chinese products at even lower rates . . .

On the other hand, the imports Red China is receiving from the outside world through Soviet Russia have been found to be priced two to ten times higher than those of the similar Western products available in Hongkong. Chinese Communist purchasing agents have been forced to pay more than H.K. $50,000 for a Soviet Zis 4-ton truck in Tientsin. The price for a comparable 5-ton truck of Western make is less than $15,000 in Hongkong. However, the export of Western trucks from Hongkong to Red China is prohibited. Czechoslovakian saccharine, also imported through Soviet Russia, is sold at H.K. $106.40 per pound in Tientsin. German saccharine of equal quality is obtainable at $6.60 per pound in the British colony.

Thus, "peaceful co-existence" between Russia and China means Russian extortion of Chinese surplus value.

To dry up further the flow of capital resources to China, Russia diverts more and more of her resources into consumer goods industries, housing, etc. In order for Russia to "catch up with the United States," China is pushed to the end of the queue.

According to official Soviet statistics, the share of consumer goods in total industrial production fell from 60.5 per cent in 1928 to 31.2 per cent in 1950 and to less than 28 per cent in 1960. The new Party program submitted to the 22nd Congress was not explicit about consumer goods industries in future plans. However, even its vagueness regarding this question was a major step away from the traditionally overwhelming emphasis on the priority of heavy industry which until recently was still regarded as "the law of socialist development." Indeed, no previous plan in the USSR has given anywhere near as much space to the well-being of the people as this new plan. For the first time no figures are given of the relative investment in the two departments of industry and the relative share of each in the total output. At a reception in Moscow on

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May 20, 1961, Khrushchev said: "Now we consider our heavy industry as built. So we are not going to give it priority. Light industry and heavy industry will develop at the same pace."[9] Presumably, this important statement had been taken from the new 20-year plan then in preparation. There is actually no such statement to be found there, but in his own report to the Congress Khrushchev stated that the rate of growth of the output of means of production would, between 1961 and 1980, not be very much larger than that of means of consumption—in fact about 20 per cent.

China's extremely difficult job of pulling herself up by her own bootstraps, makes severe demands on the morale of her people. It requires maximum national unity under centralized command. An atmosphere of siege helps to justify the sweat and toil. Hence a border dispute with India is manufactured and inflated to threatening proportions, although the tracts of land in question are strategically and in every other way worthless to China. So deep is the siege mentality in Peiping that it has yet to accredit an ambassador to Britain some eleven years after recognition.

"Peaceful co-existence" breaks down this siege mentality. To accept tremendous sacrifices over decades is bad enough. But to have to do so without the conviction or illusion that it is dictated by a besieging enemy is worse. The loss of another element in the siege—the feeling of togetherness—will make it yet more difficult to discipline the Chinese masses. Khrushchev strikes at the heart of this feeling. In effect, he says to Mao: We are not in it together. While your people are practically starving, we will gorge ourselves.

For China to belong to the same bloc while getting less and less materially from her rich partner is bad enough in itself. But as a morale-buster, the effect on Maos' highly disciplined camp can be catastrophic in the long run. If one of the main functions of the Iron Curtain—from Stalin's standpoint—was to prevent Russian workers from comparing their lot with Western workers, a much thicker bamboo curtain will have to be built to prevent Chinese workers making a similar comparison with Russian workers.

2. Struggle Over the Management of Industry and Agriculture

IN A SIEGE ECONOMY the language of administration is a military one. Thus, in China today, as in Russia under Stalin, the language used in economic affairs is that of "campaigns," "mobilization of forces," "attacking and storming the enemy," etc. The campaign method, however wasteful, is successful in the period of forced industrialization and collectivization. It leads to bottlenecks which inspire new campaigns, much waste, but also many successes. Economic calculations, rationality in the allocation of resources, play a very secondary role. However, at a certain stage this method becomes less and less satisfactory, even for the ruling bureaucracy.

Forced collectivization in Russia managed to syphon off millions of people to the towns as well as the food necessary to feed them. This process could continue to a certain point without a rise in the volume of agricultural output simply through an alteration in the distribution of the

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agricultural output as between town and country. Beyond a certain point, *expanding* agricultural output is a precondition for getting surpluses to support industrial growth. In time, Stalin's method of compulsion proved an impediment to raising agricultural output. Russia's grain output, 80.1 million tons in 1913, rose to an average of only 89.1 million tons in 1951-55. The livestock situation fared no better.

Productivity of labor in Russian agriculture remained extremely low. Khrushchev stated on December 15, 1958, that the number of hours spent on the production of one unit of grain was 7.3 times greater in the Soviet kolkhoz than on an American farm; potatoes 5.1; beetroot 6.2; milk 3.1; weight-cattle 14.2; and weight-pigs 16.3.

IT WOULD TAKE US too far afield to describe all the complicated bureaucratic impediments to agriculture existing under Stalin. Khrushchev has introduced a number of reforms aimed at rationalization. The carrot has to some extent replaced the stick. Prices paid to the agriculturists have been raised considerably; the kolkhozes have been given a greater say in planning; the state Machine Tractor Stations have been abolished and agricultural machinery transferred to the kolkhozes. Unfortunately, Khrushchev did not, and for deep historical reasons could not, rely only on the carrot to encourage the agricultural population to expand its output. Therefore, side by side with reforms, he carried out measures designed to strengthen state control over the rural population: the level of obligatory working days imposed on kolkhoz members was raised; the size of the private plot cut; the system of obligatory deliveries, even if in altered form, maintained; kolkhozes have been "encouraged" to transform themselves into sovkhozes (statefarms); and last but not least, the aim of agricultural policy in the expanding areas of the newly reclaimed virgin lands has been to build sovkhozes.

In industry, the set-up inherited from Stalin was chaotic. Nonetheless, the achievements of industry were much greater than those of agriculture because much greater resources were poured into it. It has become increasingly clear, however, that the results have not been concomitant with the resources put into this branch of the economy. Until now, the productivity of labor in Russian industry has lagged far behind the technical level of its equipment. So that while its new equipment comes up to American standards, and is even more advanced than that of Western European countries, Russian labor productivity is only about half the American. In 1955, the number of industrial workers in the USSR was a little larger than the number in USA, while the gross industrial output of the former was only some 48 per cent of the latter.[10]

To raise the productivity of industrial labor, incentives have to be increased, e.g., housing improved, the quantity and quality of industrial goods improved, etc. It is also necessary to get rid of the plethora of officials and paperwork weighing upon industry. For example the Georgian Oil Trust "has three oil fields and 12 offices to serve them." There is one official for every four or five employees. In the Moldavian Fishing Industry "there are 112 officials as against 163 workers at the fisheries, of which only 98 are employed in catching fish."[11] In the Ministry of Building Materials 16,700 people, or 26 per cent of all administrative personnel were busy with accounts and records. In addition, other "employees, technicians and foremen are taken from work to complete all sorts of reports."[12]

The organizational structure of Soviet industry under Stalin was hierarchical and centralized in the extreme. From base to pinnacle, the hierarchy consisted of: brigade, shop, department (comprising several shops), firm, trust, chief subdivision (glavk),

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Ministry, Economic Council of Ministers.

Intertwined with these chains of administration in industry were a number of other apparatuses, criss-crossing at different levels. There were inspectors of the Ministry of Finance, agents of the District Prosecutors, agents of the State Planning Commission, agents of the State Arbitration Board, agents of the Ministry of State Control, "special sections" of the Secret Police, the Party apparatus in the factory. The result was economic irrationality, administrative discord, tensions in the factory.

This is not the place to elaborate on the measures Khrushchev has taken to introduce some rationality into this chaos. We only need note that, first of all, he decentralized the administration of industry. Then efforts were made to cut down irrationalities in the price mechanism and strengthen cost accounting.

It is worth taking a look at a few examples of the waste resulting from the irrationality of the price mechanism. Lacking a price criterion for the success of a factory, the authorities placed all their emphasis on the physical *volume* of production. Hence, for many years Russian agricultural machinery has weighed considerably more than similar machinery produced elsewhere. For instance, the diesel tractor, Belarus, weighs 3 tons, whereas the similar British Fordson-Major 1951 model weighs only 2 tons. Premier Bulganin remarked that ". . . the greater the weight of the metal, the heavier the structure, the more 'profitable' " for the factory directors.[13]

The topsy-turvy price position leads to a situation where, in fact, a cabman in Moscow may earn more by traveling without a fare than with a fare. His bonus on the mileage and petrol saved—assured on a long drive along a quiet road without stopping and starting—could be larger than the bonus on the same drive his share in the fare pays.

Another fantastic example comes from heavy engineering, where, according to official prices, wages made up 10.9 per cent of total costs, while, according to calculations made by a competent Soviet economist, the percentage of the real cost was 39.2.[14]

The Polish Vice-Premier, Jarosewicz, summed up the situation: "The economic system which has prevailed hitherto is an abracadabra about prices, costs and wages. No wise man can tell what is profitable or what is not."[15]

Other measures aimed at the smoother running of industry, besides the reorganization of its administration and efforts to rationalize the price mechanism, have been introduced by Khrushchev—such as enlargement of supply resources, to prevent overloading of the industrial machine, and encouraging workers' and technicians' efforts by offering incentives, etc.

The efforts have been only partially successful. In agriculture, for example, after a noticeable advance accompanying the opening up of the virgin lands in the years 1953-6, agricultural output has since risen very little indeed. Grain output rose from 127.6 million tons in 1956 to only 133.2 million in 1960.[16] The number of cattle increased from 70.4 million on October 1, 1956, to 75.8 million on October 1, 1960. The corresponding figures for cows were 30.9 and 34.8, pigs, 56.4 and 68.6.[17]

In speeches in Leningrad (May 21, and June 2, 1957) Khrushchev came out with a plan to overtake the USA in per capita meat output by 1960 or at the latest 1961 (speech in Leningrad) or 1962 (speech in Moscow). To reach the same meat consumption level in USSR (assuming the population to be 220 million in mid-1961) Russia would have to produce 20 million tons of carcass meat. In 1960 meat output was announced to have been 8.7 million tons.[18]

The administrative changes in industry have also failed to achieve notable success. The over-abundance of officials and paper work continues. The irrationalities in the price mechanism persist. (It is true that Khrushchev

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promised that a completely new price structure would be introduced in 1961-2.) Tendencies towards autarchy, even between neighbouring Economic Councils, abound.

However, efforts to streamline and improve the administration continue. But they cannot achieve complete success. The multiplicity and different degrees of efficiency of the control systems in themselves lead to increasing arbitrariness and wastage, and thus to the same conditions that make strict and multitudinous controls necessary.

Unable to rely on the self-activity of the people, denying all working class democracy, the Kremlin has to rely on bureaucrats to control other bureaucrats. Bureaucratic anarchy and its concomitant, bureaucratic control, batten on the workers' alienation from the means of production and their consequent exploitation.

Inside the ruling Russian bureaucracy, there are sections—and not small either—accustomed to the old methods of command. The number of people engaged in the "control" of management reaches many hundreds of thousands. For them Khrushchev's reforms must mean a decline in status. On the other hand, sections of the bureaucracy—the more modern, technically competent—must feel frustrated under the regime of irrationality and arbitrariness.

A clear link can be detected here between irrationality and the role of terror and "purges." One of the paradoxes of the Stalinist regime was that even the socially privileged bureaucrats were not at one with it. Too often the MVD, besides arresting workers and peasants, also laid its hand on the exalted bureaucrat himself. It was estimated that in 1938-40 some 24 per cent of the technical specialists were imprisoned or physically eliminated.[19]

In time the modern, technically competent section of the bureaucracy will certainly gain as against the old section. This is revealed clearly in the educational standards of Party officials. The percentage of First Secretaries of Party District Committees who received only primary education or incomplete secondary education fell from 47.5 in 1946 to 5.3 in 1954; for Secretaries of District Committees in general, it fell from 49.6 to 6.2; and for Chairmen of Party District Executive Committees from 61.3 to 15.8.[20] There are thus almost no ordinary workers on the District Committees of the Party, not to speak of the Central Committees of the Republics, or the Central Committee of the CPSU. The same holds true of lower committees. It was reported from one district, Kaganovich *raion*, that of the 203 secretaries of Party organizations, only 9 are workers and 14 are foremen.[21]

Even if Khrushchev's reforms were completely and demonstratively successful, the old sections of the bureaucracy, accustomed to military commands, would still resist them. With their success limited, the resistance is inevitably greater. *Molotov and Kaganovich are the symbols, if not the actual spokesmen, of this section of the bureaucracy.* In the struggle, Khrushchev is careful not to appeal to the mass of the workers, who are kept out of the dispute. This of course prolongs the struggle.

THE INABILITY OF KHRUSHCHEV to mobilize active popular support against the "Anti-Party Group" is accentuated by the increasing frustrations of the mass of the people.

It is true that the standard of living of the people has considerably improved over the last few years. However, as they have been starved of consumer goods, housing, etc., for decades, their tastes develop and expectations rise considerably faster than the supply of goods. For instance, housing has improved, but very little. The number of people per room in urban centers declined from 3.91 in 1940 to 3.43 in 1950, and 3.04 in 1960. Even after this improvement, the situation is considerably worse than it was

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in 1923 when there were 2.6 persons per room.[22] Today the predominant type of dwelling in Soviet cities is one room in an apartment housing other families, with a kitchen for common use.

The frustration attendant upon rising expectations is an inevitable result of a situation where the gulf widens between improving living standards and even more rapidly rising productivity. According to the report of V. Grishin, Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, real earnings of workers and employees rose by 20 per cent between 1954 and 1959, while labor productivity rose by about 38.5 per cent, and the national income by 61 per cent.[23] The share of the workers in their produce has therefore not risen, but declined.

Better educational standards raise workers' expectations. The gates to educational advance are, however, quite narrow, and entry through them is largely denied to manual workers. While the number of ten-year-school graduates rose steeply from 220,000 in 1950, to 1,340,000 in 1958, the number admitted to higher educational establishments has not risen at all, being estimated at 237,000 in 1950, and 210,000 in 1958.[24] And Khrushchev is on record as saying that full-time higher education would not be expanded in the near future. Thus the discrepancy between the number completing a general secondary education and the number admitted to higher education is very wide, only about one in five succeeding in entering institutions of higher learning (of course millions are not fortunate enough to have even a complete secondary education. It was announced at the 22nd Congress that eight years of secondary education would become a fact in RSFSR, the most advanced part of USSR, only in 1962-63).

The composition of the students at these institutions is predominantly non-working class. According to Khrushchev, only about 30-40 per cent of the students in Moscow's institutions of higher learning were descendants of workers and kolkhozniks (among which are included foremen, kolkhoz chairmen, etc.), the rest being sons of white-collar employees and the intelligentsia.[25]

The vast change in the size, cohesion and skill of the working class constitutes the deepest source of workers' resentment and bitterness against their status as objects of economic planning instead of being themselves the planners.

The sensational technical achievements of recent years has brought these resentments to a head. They were expressed clearly in a letter to the Young Communist League paper, *Komsomolskaia Pravda* (July 11, 1960):

> . . . So our scientists launched a rocket to the moon . . . Do you think this preoccupation with sputniks and the cosmos in general is timely or . . . perhaps premature? What I mean to say by this is that we still have plenty of terrestrial worries: there is a lack of living quarters; of children's nurseries; commodities are expensive. I have no doubt this rocket cost so much everybody would be stupefied if they knew the amount.
>
> Say to any laborer: "Look, Ivan, if we did not launch this rocket your Vovik could go to the kindergarten; a yard of cloth would cost not four notes but only one half, and you would be able to buy an electric iron in the store"—and I am sure, he would answer: "For God's sake, do not launch these rockets!"
>
> Rockets, rockets, rockets!—who needs them now! For the time being, to hell with the moon; let me put something better on my dinner table instead. Afterwards, certainly, let us play around with the moon.
>
> Whether you will print this or not is your business; I doubt if you will risk it. But I am quite cool towards those sputniks and rockets. Premature. Useless.
>
> Greetings, Aleksei N.

In time the resentment against the existing "Soviet democracy" will sure-

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ly grow deeper. The essence of this "democracy" is, in the apt words of one economist, "the activity of large numbers of people in interpreting to their local scene the decisions made higher in the organization, of taking part in carrying out these decisions and in supervising their execution by others, and finally, of trying to mobilize support for these decisions by the general Soviet public. In short, *democracy consists of participation in everything except decision-making.*"[26] The workers are left with "the initiative to implement decisions." "Soviet democracy" is the homage hypocrisy pays to virtue. In the struggle between that section of the bureaucracy led by Khrushchev and that led by Molotov and Co. the mass of people are, in the main, passive onlookers. To the extent that they press for higher living standards they weaken the Molotov wing and widen the cleavage between sections of the bureaucracy. Unfortunately, all bureaucracies, old and new, Khrushchevite or Molotovite, oppose workers' democracy, workers' spontaneity and free activity.

Molotov and his friends find a natural ally in the Chinese bureaucracy. Both represent a command economy. Both need a siege mentality to facilitate economic effort. Both believe in "the priority of heavy industry as the supreme law of socialism." For both, Stalin was the embodiment of all they stand for.

3. The New CPSU Program

UNDER STALIN, PROPAGANDA, WHICH has been defined as "terror against the soul," played a secondary role compared with actual, physical terror. Today, with the effort to substitute persuasion for compulsion, the role of propaganda and ideology must be enhanced. "Ideologies," Mannheim aptly noted "are mental fictions whose function is to veil the true nature of a given society. They originate in the minds of those who seek to stabilize a social order." With the changes from Stalin to Khrushchev there must be a corresponding change in these "mental fictions;" the role, and many characteristics, of the ruling ideologies need to be transformed.

If one telescoped the development of, say, British capitalism, from the industrial revolution, with its misery and cruelty, to its modern "welfare state," one could come close to identifying the ideological issues which face the Russian bureaucracy. During its early phase of primitive capital accumulation, the main emphasis lay in "accumulation for accumulation's sake" and the psychology of the ruling class was one of "abstinence." The division of society into classes was ideologically justified as a prerequisite for creating the surpluses needed for the accumulation of capital and to provide the necessary leisure for the wealthy to develop culture. The rich were blatantly rich; poverty was a necessary evil—if not a sin.

How different this is from today! Now the rich continue to be rich—even richer—but the poor have considerably improved their lot as a result of both the class struggle and the need of capitalism itself for a better educated, more physically fit labor force. Thus, today, the self-image the capitalist tries to project is of a paternalistic benefactor to his employees. It is not the poorhouse, but the factory swimming pool, the attractive canteen, the fringe benefits, that are shown as the symbols of capitalism.

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Compress the above century-and-a-half-long development into one generation and we have an idea of the ideological issues and problems facing the Khrushchev bureaucracy.

However, Russian society, itself, is far from having made the transition from poor, aspiring state capitalism to mature "welfare" state capitalism. Contemporary Russia is a mixture of both. For a number of historical reasons, beyond the scope of this discussion, this transformation will, at best, take decades—if a workers' revolution does not intervene to change the whole picture—and Communist Russia will probably never succeed in becoming a full fledged "welfare" state capitalist society. Nevertheless, it is the effort to bridge the gap, the extent to which that effort has succeeded and the convulsions borne of the effort, that explains, in part, not only the conflicts between Khrushchev and Mao, between Khrushchev and Molotov, but also the new ideological appearance that Russia's new ruler affects in the new Program of the Russian Communist Party.

THE PROGRAM ANNOUNCES the party's aim to establish a Communist society during the coming two decades. It includes a number of production and welfare targets. Some are realistic; some (above all, those for agricultural production) are fantastic. Many of the welfare targets are modest and have been achieved under capitalism elsewhere, such as: "paid holidays will be gradually extended to kolkhoz members," or "sickness or temporary disability grants and old-age pensions will be extended to kolkhoz members." (Incidentally, it must come as quite a shock to Communist Party members in the Western countries to learn that kolkhozniks do not get pensions or sickness benefits or enjoy paid holidays!) Eight years compulsory education is to be fully implemented by 1970 and "a complete secondary education by 1980."

Even if all the targets concerning living standards were achieved, the average Russian worker, not to speak of the kolkhoznik, will not reach the present standard of living of the British workers by 1980. This a far cry from the abundance of Communism!

The Russian people are informed that the "supreme goal of the Party is to build a Communist society on whose banner will be inscribed: 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.'"

But who is to decide the "ability" and the "need?" Not the individual, we are told, but the State and the Party.

Contrary to the teachings of Marxism that the State is the organization of the ruling class directed against other classes, and therefore should, as Engels said, be sent, together with the spinning wheel and the bronze axe, to the museum, the new Program promises that the State will contine to exist under Communism. "The State, which arose as a State of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has become a State of the people as a whole." The original Marxist idea that under Communism there would be an end to all systematic and organized constraint does not even call for refutation from the leaders of the CPSU. Above all, we are told, the role of the State under Communism is to "exercise control over the measure of work and the rate of consumption."

But where needs as well as the amount of work done are decided by coercive authorities, then the principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs" is certainly realized in every prison and in every army.

If the State is to decide the "ability" and the "needs," then instead of withering away, it must become more and more omnipotent, and the individual more and more dependent upon it.

When Lenin identified communism with freedom, and freedom with subjectivity[27] his communism was the exact opposite of Khrushchev's. "We may well imagine Soviet society as a big Communist beehive," Khrushchev stated to the Congress. "Society has be-

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come more united and monolithic than ever before."

The Party is closely identified with the State in the program. "The period of full-scale Communist construction is characterized by a further *enhancement of the role and importance of the Communist Party . . .*" One of its main functions is "control over the measure of labor and rate of consumption."

If needs and obligations are to be determined by the hierarchical State-Party, there is no reason why the needs and obligations of all persons should be equal. Actually the only direct reference to the question of equality in the Program is the call for the "elimination of levelling." Indirectly there are many other signposts to inequality. For instance, different people will reach different levels of education. "In the coming twenty years most members of society will through one medium or another receive a full secondary, specialized secondary, or higher education." The Soviet people are promised that the average real wage will be raised over the coming ten years by approximately 100 per cent, and the minimum wage by about 200 per cent. As the income spread is in the region of 2000-3000 per cent or more, equality is not even suggested.

The central idea of Marx that the division of labor is concomitant with the division of society into cla ses and that under communism a person will "hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, and become a critic in the evening" is entirely missing from the Program. The division of labor is taken to be a permanent feature of Communist Society.



The Program, in sum, is one of "Welfare State Capitalism.

4. The Effects of the Congress on the World Labor Movement.

ONE CAN VISUALIZE the effects of the Congress only in very general outline. Although the differences between Russia and China are fundamental, and a final break can hardly be avoided in the long run, there are reasons why the rulers of both should try to avoid a total rupture at the moment. In the first place, Khrushchev and Mao each needs time to reeducate his own cadres to the crimes of the other. Moreover, the international balance of forces obliges them to "hang together to avoid hanging separately,"—at least for the time being. If, despite these inhibiting factors, Peiping breaks openly and finally with Moscow, then Mao has the following alternative: either to promote the independent international organization of the Communist Parties, mainly in underdeveloped countries; or, if China's resources do not permit this and fear of the repercussions of isolation daunt him, to retreat behind Citadel China.

Whichever way the conflict between Moscow and Peiping develops, one thing is certain—the international Communist monolith has crumbled. World Communism has two independent and conflicting centers.

Mao's "revolutionism," his rejection of "peaceful co-existence" for reasons of nationalist expediency, shamefully disregards the existence of humanity. Khrushchev, for his part, pursues a policy of summitry with Washington in order to maintain the status quo, to limit revolutionary activity everywhere. Yet he resumes nuclear testing on a grand scale. Khrushchev's version of "peaceful co-existence" cannot but compromise his appeal to workers throughout the world—including those affiliated with the Communist parties.

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In many ways Khrushchev's chauvinism exceeds even Stalin's. Stalin at least regarded the international labor movement as a useful "border guard of the USSR." Even this is gone. The role of the international labor movement is to derive vicarious pleasure by watching the "building of Communism" go on in the USSR.

Many of the Communist Parties of the backward, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America will probably follow Mao. (Cuba, dependent on supplies from Russia, might be blackmailed into "supporting" Khrushchev—which would have serious consequences elsewhere in Latin America.) The Communist Parties of the industrial countries will tend to follow Moscow. However, there are bound to be fissures in these parties. Many, especially industrial militants not content to enjoy Russian "communism" vicariously, will join the "China faction."

Whether the crisis of the world Communist movement is convulsive or slow the beginning of the end of the world Communist movement is plain to see. In France and Italy, where the Communist appeal to workers has a radical reformist character, this disintegrative progress may be slowed, but it cannot be halted. As the Communist movement continues to decline and traditional Social-Democracy increasingly turns to undisguised liberalism, the international labor movement will be confronted with the need to start from new beginnings.

FOOTNOTES

1 *New China News Agency*, Peiping, October 31, 1958.
2 *Pravda*, Moscow, March 5, 1959.
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4 Premier Bulganin's message to President Eisenhower, *Pravda*, Moscow, December 12, 1957.
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6 Joseph D. Berliner, *Soviet Economic Aid*, New York, 1958, p. 33.
7 *Pravda*, Moscow, January 26, 1961.
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8a H. Mendershausen, "The Terms of Soviet-Satellite Trade," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Harvard, May 1960.
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14 Ia. Konrad, *Foundations of Economic Accounting*, Russian, Moscow, 1956, p. 186.
15 *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, November 18, 1956.
16 *USSR in Figures in 1959*, Russian, Moscow, 1960, p. 123; *Pravda*, Moscow, January 26, 1961.
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TONY CLIFF *is a long-time socialist who has written articles and books on Russia, China, the Cold War. He is the author of* Stalinism: A Marxist Analysis (London, 1955). *He is a member of the Editorial Board of* International Socialism, *published in England.*



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Hope is placed in the ability of the Latin American middle class to resist the appeal of totalitarian efficiency and thereby realize its democratic potential

The Middle Class Revolution



Victor Alba

WHAT IS USUALLY REFERRED TO as "the Revolution" in South America is only the ascension to power of the middle classes and the social and economic transformation which they have long been seeking. President Kennedy's plan of "Alliance for Progress" represents the offer tendered by the government of a middle class country in order to help bring about this revolution.

Relations between Latin America and the United States would become clearer, more easily dealt with, and freer of misunderstanding if they were frankly put on the basis of mutual interest instead of on such empty words as generosity, continental solidarity, etc. For this reason it is important to study the middle class revolution now going on in Latin America. Whether we are conscious of it or not, the revolution is a fact.

1. The New Class

THERE IS CONTINUOUS TALK of a Latin American Common Market. To some degree this "horizontal integration" is already under way. It is also possible to speak now of a vertical integration; that is to say, of a coordinated and simultaneous effort to solve Latin America's economic problems. Up to now industrialization alone was considered the answer. It is now appreciated, however, that unless industrialization is accompanied by planned agrarian reform, the danger exists of an unbalanced economic development which, politically speaking, may lead to the use of totalitarian methods, to an inhuman technocracy. A solution which would obviate this possibility rests upon the new, rapidly growing middle class.

As of now, the influence of the middle class in Latin America is decisive. What are its characteristics? What is its ideology? What role does it play in the jungle of Latin American politics? What role may it play in international affairs?

UNTIL THE FIRST WORLD WAR Latin American society was sharply polarized: on the one hand were the submerged classes; on the other, the oligarchy. Between the two was a thin layer of liberal professional groups. But since 1919 Latin America has given birth to a new class composed essentially of industrialists, merchants, technicians (who have only recently come into their own), and executives of larger companies. The economic position of this new, already affluent,

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middle class is improving continually. Its status now approaches that of the old oligarchy whose status, at the same time, has diminished proportionately.

There is also the traditional middle class—skilled workers, artisans who have turned into skilled technicians, small merchants, and provincial industrialists—which was once poor but has so markedly improved its condition as to be moderately wealthy. The new middle class wields considerable political influence, and, where necessary, wields it to manipulate the traditional middle class. Combined, these two branches of the middle class of Latin America constitute 35% of the population of Argentina, 30% of Uruguay's, 15% of Mexico's and Brazil's. (The percentage in the other countries is much smaller.) In contrast to what occurred in Europe, the middle class as a whole has not blindly joined other movements (proletarian or Fascist). It has neither vacillated nor temporized; indeed, it has taken the initiative by exercising its steadily growing economic power throughout the continent in movements which for the most part are democratic and nationalist revolutionary.

The middle class may be characterized by the following traits: it is essentially urban, though in certain countries, particularly in Mexico, a rural middle class has begun to emerge. It places its trust in industrialization to solve great national problems. It favors public education. Its nationalism adopts protective measures directed sometimes against the United States. It not only accepts the existence of unions and social legislation, it recognizes the beneficial effect they have upon the country. Generally, it accepts agrarian reform as a means of strengthening the political basis of democracy and of opening up vast interior markets for industrialization. It prefers public and international investments over private investments which it tends not to trust. It does not oppose nationalization or state regulation of large industries, sources of mineral wealth, and public services. On the whole it favors state intervention, state planning, state investments, which serve its ends.

The middle class distrusts the Army which it always suspects of preparing to commit *coups d'etat;* some of its members are to be found among the new generation of military leaders who are further removed from politics than the old. The middle class, however, shows great interest in Soviet methods of development, an interest that sometimes makes it receptive of Communist propaganda, especially on international relations.

For some time now a strong Latin American "continentalist" sentiment has been growing which prompts the middle class to accept willingly such projects as the Common Market, the Inter-American Bank, etc., and which may prompt it in the future to propose a continental solution to agrarian and military problems.

In short, the new middle class (from which, let it be repeated, the traditional middle class takes its cue) has little in common with the Marxists' stereotyped version of the bourgeoisie. Politically, it is now liberal, democratic, and inclines towards socialism.

AS THE MAIN BENEFICIARY of industrialization, the middle class is in constant danger of turning into a new bourgeoisie with all the vices and negative qualities of the old. However, it possesses the antidote to combat this danger. The chief danger derives from its susceptibility to a desire for efficiency. Because it is pragmatic it may one day succumb to the anti-democratic and inhuman methods of development already employed in the USSR and China; that is, capitalization based on forced labor rather than on capital investments. The lack of capital and the rampant nationalism of our generation might cause the middle class to make such a choice—a choice which might have the further consequence of enhancing its recep-

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tivity to Communist propaganda (even if economically and diplomatically attached to the West). The Latin American masses might once again find themselves subjugated, this time to fill the needs of industrial capitalization. Promises of a better future (which evidently will come some day) would be specious, designed only to calm the consciences and silence the doubts of the most idealistic members of the middle class. There would then be no great difference between "The March Toward Socialism" and "Industrialization by Force" or simply "Government by Technocrats."

The consequences would be grave. Such democratic conquests that have been made would be lost (even under a democratic facade). There would be a diminution in the standard of living of the masses (absolute or relative in comparison to that of the middle class). Nationalism (or continentalism) would be intensified. It would be necessary to begin again, from zero, the struggle for human rights in Latin America.

TODAY ONE HARDLY HEARS a phrase in vogue several years ago: "the interests of the working class coincide with the interests of all mankind." Rather, in Latin America, it is the interests of the middle class that coincide with the interests of all Latin America (and, in our context, with the interests of all mankind). This coincidence justifies the acquisition of privileges by the middle class, excuses its mistakes (which result from its lack of political and ideological experience), and, at the same time, leads us to believe that it will act justly and that it can be relied upon to manifest a sense of continental responsibility. It is up to the middle class to assist the suppressed classes: namely, the working class, which is still formless, which still lacks a clear consciousness of its interests and role; the peasant class, which is still bound by obsolete forms of work and life; and, of course, the native masses.

For a long time I held that the working class, acting as a pressure group, might direct the development of Latin American capitalism, might prevent the adoption of traditional capitalist methods of sacrificing the masses to purely selfseeking ends. The facts have not borne me out; the Latin American labor movement as a whole lives off the peasants; is full of vices, a condition for which it has itself to blame; is passive, and bereft of idealism and ideology. Today, it is the middle class which may, paradoxically enough, regenerate the labor movement, infuse it with elan so that it will be true to its purpose. The conclusion is inescapable: only the middle class can find the way to achieve the proper development of Latin America.

But if instead of fulfilling its mission the middle class should fail, should submit, that is, to the fetish of super-efficiency and turn from idealism to pragmatism under which guise it would become, given the pressure of surrounding misery, implacably greedy and callous—if this should happen the industrial revolution now getting under way in Latin America would be betrayed and the lives of those making it rendered meaningless. An exceptional opportunity for progress would be lost.



THE GREATEST DANGER, it bears repeating, lies in the temptation of the middle class to impose efficiency from

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above at all costs. Members of the middle class are Latin Americans in the way they feel and think: slow to decide but quick to act. In virtue of its youthfulness as a social group, the middle class tends to be impatient and to take an "all or nothing" attitude. It has grown rapidly at a time when technocracy has spread all over the world and organizational efficiency has become the measure of all value, the prevailing canon of ethic. For this reason, we are compelled to speak of a Communist danger in Latin America—a danger that does not depend upon the existence of Communist propaganda. It has not arisen through the activity of the Communist party, and its fellow travelers, nor their agents who have infiltrated the labor movement nor through aid agreements, reached with the Soviet Union. All of these could be relatively easy to counteract. The danger resides rather in Communist work methods. Given the blind spots in the minds of middle class technicians it is not surprising that these methods should prove attractive: their efficiency may carry more weight in the eyes of one segment of the middle class (the most specialized) than the quest for freedom and the respect for human dignity. It is possible to accept Soviet work methods (capitalization by suffering, and in consequence, privation of freedom) in good faith with the conviction (which the facts have always proved wrong) that their children and grandchildren will benefit from this generation's suffering.

The middle class still possesses enough idealism, enough creative spirit, to devise restraints against the temptation to Sovietize work methods. It must devise such restraints lest the development of Latin America fail in the end to affirm the personality of each Latin American. Looking into the future this guarantee can only be secured through what we call vertical integration; that is, through a simultaneous and total solution of all of the fundamental problems of the continent. Because industrialization must be achieved in such a way as to avoid parasitism, and because industrialization must not only satisfy the needs of the middle class and the urban "petty proletariat," but also the needs of the peasant and native masses, we insist that simultaneous with horizontal integration (the Common Market, etc.) one should think of vertical integration, and especially of the measures which will lead to it.

This must be done quickly before the temptation to achieve efficiency regardless of means diverts the middle class from the course it has so far followed. Consequently, when this temptation does present itself (if it will at all) the middle class will find it impossible to succumb. The speed, intensity, and enthusiasm with which it will act to combine vertical and horizontal integration will determine whether the new middle class is capable of representing the whole of Latin American society.

2. The Problems

The last few years have seen the slow re-establishment of democracy in Latin America: Peron of Argentina, in 1955; Pinilla of Columbia, Lozano of Honduras, and Podia of Peru in 1957; Jiminez of Venezuela and Batista of Cuba in 1958—all have fled or abdicated. There remain only four professed dictators: Stroessuer of Paraguay; Trujillo of the Dominican Republic;* Samoza's sons of Nicaragua; and Duvalier of Haiti. There can be no doubt that between 1948 and the present, during which time fourteen dictators or virtual dictators were reduced to four, democracy has leaped forward in Latin America.

CONCENTRATION OF landed property in private hands obtains in Latin America to a degree inconceivable in Europe. In Chile 1% of the inhabitants own 52% of the land; in Argen-

*This article was written before the assassination of Trujillo.

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tina 2000 families own 20% of the land; in Brazil there are *fazendas* the size of Belgium. And so on. Only in Mexico, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Haiti, where there have been agrarian reforms, is it any different.

Each time a popular movement develops which is based on a program of agrarian reform or of nationalizing the mines, or when a democratic government takes measures, however limited, against the great landowners, the army makes a pronunciamento and assumes power. Throughout the nineteenth century the "Caudillos" succeeded in preventing the stabilization of political democracy either by protecting the conservative forces or by appealing to the peasant masses to take over the land and later tossing them out.

Because of a lack of land to cultivate, the great Indian masses of the Andes still live in a primitive economy or are just beginning to enter the stage of a market economy. There still exist in some regions of Peru various systems of servitude. Every sociologist studying the problem of native peoples concludes that their progress is not possible without giving them land, be it on a communal basis in those regions where pre-Spanish customs prevail, or be it on the basis of possessing small or middle-sized property. Evidently, land alone does not constitute the solution to native problems; but without land no solution is possible. The economic base is lacking on which to build schools, hospitals, or even brick houses.

Almost half the population of Latin America has still to be assimilated to the conditions of modern civilization. This fact sets the terms under which a solution of the land problem and the stabilization of political democracy is to be achieved. Neither can be achieved without the other.

THE MACHINE AGE ARRIVED in Latin America thirty years too late. Its development was very slow. At the end of the Second World War most of the industrial products had still to be imported. Almost all Latin American exports consisted of non-manufactured products. The war, however, slowed down the importing of industrial goods and accelerated industrialization. Technical assistance, the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank, aided this tendency. Actually, several Latin American countries possess a very modern though very localized industry alongside primitive forms of agricultural production.

The coming of heavy industry has speeded up the whole evolutionary process in each country. Agrarian feudalism, however, has not permitted the forming of a national market to absorb the growing production of middle and heavy industry. At the same time, adjoining countries whose economies were supposed to be complementary, established competing industries (except for Central America whose five governments have created coordinating economic institutions). Other economic obstacles to healthy industrialization are: the rising cost of living because of the exaggerated protectionism afforded new national industries, the creation of unprofitable industries, and the widening gap between urban and rural standards of living

The social aspects of industrialization present correspondingly serious problems. Haphazard use is made of specialized workers recently come to the cities from the country, who, maladjusted to their new life, become alcoholics. National capitals are developed to the point where not only economic but cultural life is unduly concentrated. (The majority of Latin American capitals contain more than 15% of their countries' inhabitants, an altogether disproportionate percentage in the economies of underdeveloped countries.) The "American Way of Life" is more and more being imitated, with the consequence that cultural values, which scientists and modern technicians cannot replace, become crippled.

The most parlous danger in un-

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planned and improvised industrialization lies in the realm of politics. The rapid growth of a working class from which a proper tradition and ideology is absent, results in an endless bidding between contending political parties for its votes. Dictators since Peron have well understood the value of demagogy. Where the working class has not reached significant numbers, it is subject to pressures which it could escape only as part of a more balanced economy. Up till now only the movements that one might call nationalist revolutionary (APRA in Peru, Democratic Action in Venezuela, and National Liberation in Costa Rica), which are essentially middle class movements but which include the working class, have succeeded in protecting the masses against demagogy and negative nationalism.

WHEN THE NATIONS OF Latin America attained independence the mixture of races and the availability of space for territorial expansion committed them from the beginning, at least verbally, to a positive form of nationalism. Accordingly, the nation served the individual. And the individual for this reason idealized the abstraction "fatherland." The history of Latin America throughout the 19th century was in some way the history of each country's efforts to assist in the self-fulfillment of each of its inhabitants. This was a modest kind of self-fulfillment, to be sure, since the goal was to provide each with minimal conditions of life. A way of expression that is genuinely Latin American began to take shape with the beginning of the First World War. Until then Latin America was like a novel without an author. But it found its authors: Icaza, Reyes, Asturias, Azuela and Guzman. And it found its historians and sociologists: Ingeneiros, Freyre, Molina, and Inriques, who were first of all concerned for the worth of individual men and objected to abstract nationalism.

But a continental community of a different sort arose when Communism intervened and set back the march of history. Communism has found greatest acceptance in Latin America among students and the middle class. It did not succeed in taking hold, however, before the period of the Popular Front. Since then, taking advantage of circumstances, Communism has been largely responsible for converting positive nationalism, in which Latin Americans had shown pride, into negative nationalism.

The evidence of this conversion is present for all to see. Abstract nationalism has replaced the concrete reality of man; the subjects of books have changed; a sort of nationalist symbolism has replaced the living personalities of novels and historical studies. In the past twenty years Latin America has not produced a single first-rate intellectual (and even those who stepped forward were smothered, isolated, because they refused to submit to the kind of nationalism which reduced man to abstractions.).

Communism has thus succeeded in its objective in Latin America. The mentality of the Popular Front has been largely responsible for this. Since the Thirties, Communists have embedded themselves in the administration, the army, the press, into publishing houses and universities throughout Latin America. They have kept up a steady stream of propaganda, innuendo, and even blackmail. They have led intellectuals without unmasking themselves, not by deliberate and studied methods, but spontaneously and by improvisation. Later, with the Cold War, they carefully nurtured the fears and prejudices of Latin Americans. The intellectual's prestige grew in direct proportion to his nationalism (that is, anti-Americanism).

Deviating thus from its normal sources of fertility, Latin American culture became sterile. Only a few men resisted, notably Octavio Paz, J. L. Borges, Rufino Tamayo. But there are winds of change. Increasingly, the youth of Latin America recognize the

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myth of a revolutionary Soviet Union and a revolutionary Communist party for what it is—a myth. However, there still remains the reverse myth of a totally evil United States, which, to the degree that it persists, will prevent Latin America from shaking loose its negative nationalism and the effects of Communist divisiveness.

SERIOUS DANGERS BESET the relations between Latin America and the United States. The unsatisfactory quality of the "American Way of Life" to which the urban masses surrender, threatens to disrupt not only Latin America's cultural development; it threatens to unbalance its economic development. Encouraged by American propaganda, this imitation extends into every aspect of life, from drinking to techniques of labor negotiation. More important, United States diplomacy distrusts any attempt at Latin American unification or any attempt at searching for a continental solution to problems of continental scope. One could go so far as to say that Washington fears any reform, however moderate, apparently because it believes that Communism poses no immediate threat to Latin America (and we have seen how the facts contradict this belief), and that the true danger lies in the chain reaction which reform might let loose. Hence, United States diplomacy has tended to regard dictatorial regimes as more stable than democratic ones. This attitude has in turn caused many Latin American democrats to distrust Washington. Only after Castro does the attitude of the United States, under the Kennedy administration, seem to have changed.

We see then that American diplomacy and Communist designs have coincided for different reasons in criticizing (at least tacitly) all attempts at unification. Between the time of Bolivar and the proposals of the Inter-American Economic Conference of Buenos Aires (September 1957) these attempts have very slowly taken root. The five republics of Central America have already set up an economic union which in the future will extend to cultural matters and which, ultimately, will turn into an Isthmian Federation Probably, the coming years will witness the emergence of a Latin American Common Market. (We shall see how profitable a role Europe will play here.)

After 1958, Washington revised its Latin American policies toward dictators and towards efforts at Latin American unity. But on the shores of the Potomac the way was not found for reconciling the two principles which guide United States economic policy in Latin America: private investments "in countries with cheap manual labor and low tariffs," and propaganda for "the American Way of Life." Should this propaganda be successful, wages will rise and so will tariffs. What will then make private investment attractive in countries where the people and the government prefer public and international investments over private ones? The Alliance for Progress and the Punta del Este meeting have taken steps to correct this situation. Now the Latin American democratic and labor movements must put pressure on their governments to effect real reforms. If they fail, we will see only "Potemkin reforms," and the billions in aid will be wasted.

FOR THE MAN IN THE street the army in Latin America is, as President Santos of Colombia put it, an occupation army of its own country. Newspaper readers may have gotten the impression that Peron was driven out of power in Argentina by an alliance of the military and the Church, and that Perez Jimnez suffered the same fate in Venezuela. The opposite was true.

The military has been in back of every coup against legal power even when the leader of it appears to be a civilian. The Church, except for a few countries (Costa Rica for example), has never opposed "pronunciamentos." Only when dictators, for demagogic reasons, blame a sector of the Church,

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will the latter withdraw its support or its neutrality. Where the military opposes dictators—and this occurs only when its power relative to theirs decreases—it does so after having taken advantage of every privilege which can be conferred upon it. In the final analysis, the pressure built up by public agitation forces the military and the Church, representing "order," to rescue property by supporting dictators (as though dictatorship was not the most unstable and capricious of regimes!).

Today, however, in every army there are young officers who look at their countries' problems from the point of view of technicians. They are the first to ask themselves: in a period of atomic and hydrogen weapons what good is it to have an army of rifles, cannons, and hand grenades? They look forward to an army of technical cadre which, under proper conditions, could be integrated into a continental army.

In 1958 President Jose Figueres of Costa Rica, one of Latin America's most democratic and gifted politicians, a man of rare vision, suggested that disarmament begin in the only place in the world where no conflict of great powers threatens the peace and where, therefore, the free world does not run the risk of being deceived. If Latin American armies serve no purpose other than to fight the citizens of their own countries, why keep them? There is no reason why countries could not disarm under the protection of the Organization of American States. It requires that a government come forward to undertake the project of disarmament. Much vacillation and temporizing will precede approval of it. The discussion is itself a step forward and poses the problem in its true terms. As long as Latin America groans under armies of occupation its problems will not be solved.

EVEN WITHOUT AN army such problems as land, industrialization, the incorporation of Indians into civilized life, the liberation of culture from the influences of a negative nationalism exploited by Communists and demagogues—such problems will not be easily resolved. One thing is now on everyone's mind and has many times been expressed by the most important democratic leaders. The solution of Latin American problems cannot be effected piecemeal, country by country; it must be effected simultaneously in time and space, which means that it must be a continental solution. The following program must be undertaken:

(1) It must undertake agrarian reform, financed by international funds, for the purpose not of parcelling out property but of reforming land-tenure practices so as to make them socially profitable and just, be it by distribution through division or addition or be it by "corporativization," all done in accordance with unique regional and social conditions.

(2) It must integrate industrial development in such a way as to prevent absurd competition and anti-economic autarchies, tending to accentuate the division of labor between countries, in order to produce under the best conditions possible and to stabilize the prices of raw material while at the same time diversifying the market; this integrated industrialization accomplished with the help of international and national capital, public and private, administered by a continental agency.

(3) It must dissolve old-fashioned armies and replace them by technical units (without arms) which, though preparing for combat, will be useful in time of peace to help industry.

(4) It must create a continental system to politically guarantee the economic and diplomatic isolation of all dictatorships and respect for the rights of man.

VICTOR ALBA *is Washington correspondent for the Mexican newspaper,* Excelsior. *He is the author of a number of books on the history and social problems of Latin America and Spain.*

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Latin America 2.

Prospects for Change And Growth

Saul Mendelson

THESE DAYS EVERYONE apes the Communists. In Algeria the French army officers use Mao Tse Tung's writings as their text in studying how to carry on a "revolutionary" war. In the U.S. the leader of the John Birch Society states that he favors setting up front groups and infiltrating other groups just like the enemy he is fighting. These French officers and the worst of our John Birchers weren't *converted* by the Communists to anti-democratic ideas. But it is a sign of the insecurity that these forces feel in the changed world situation that they should take lessons from such a source.

This inferiority complex with regard to the Communists takes a somewhat different form among some liberals and radicals. They look at the figures for economic growth in Russia in recent years, or at other dictatorships forcing a rapid accumulation of capital, and conclude that only outside help can keep the underdeveloped world from evolving along these lines. Fundamentally, they accept the authoritarians' claim that backward countries can develop themselves in genuine independence only under a dictatorship.

In Latin America there is no question that the Castro revolution and the economic changes it has wrought were enormously attractive. But there is a big gap between sympathy for little Cuba and the transformation of the political life of Latin America along Castroite lines.

BEFORE WE BEMOAN THE instability and precariousness of democracy in Latin America, we should survey a more extensive fact than the existence of the Castro regime, i.e.—the sum total of political changes in Latin America in the past decade. This period has been marked by the overthrow of one dictatorship after another. Perhaps more important, in a number of countries genuine popular parties have arisen, participated in by large numbers of workers and peasants, so that it was not merely a matter of replacing a military dictator by a two party oligarchy, each representing a faction of big land and business interests.

Recall briefly the problems that have weighed upon the people of Latin America. Independence from Spain 150 years ago was the work of a section of the creole aristocracy plus some ambitious mestizos. It meant nothing to the mass of Indians on the land and in the mines. The big landowners, depending on cheap human labor, were uninterested in technological advance. The economy stagnated. Politics and especially the military were the vehicles available for power hungry members of the small middle class. The political issues that were raised in the struggles that wracked all the Latin American countries in the 19th century—federalism vs. centralism, clericals vs. anticlericals —had little real content, despite the sincerity with which some people raised them, because the struggles involved exclusively the small privileged classes and ended merely as convenient vehicles for the ambition of rival caudillos.

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Into this backward semi-feudal society, cursed with military regimes, came foreign capital, at first British, but soon mainly American. This capital flowed primarily into the exploitation of raw materials—mineral or agricultural—to be extracted or grown for export. In addition to these fields the only really substantial investment was for a long time the railroads, necessary for effective development and marketing of the products of mines and fields. Much later utilities—gas, electric, telephone—became important.

Separated by gigantic natural barriers, as well as by the ambitions of their respective caudillos, the Latin American nations had almost no economic relations with each other. Each was tied economically primarily to its main trade outlet, the U. S. (or, in the case of Argentina, Britain). Not only was the development of the economy thereby confined to those fields most readily profitable for the foreign investor, but the big companies bought the support of the caudillos, so that the governments became their firm supporters and agents.

Another burden on the population was the usurious relation of European and American bankers to the Latin American governments. The dictators paid for their armies (and built up their deposits in Switzerland) with government bond issues that paid the ultimate investors 8 to 12% but cost the issuing government close to 20% because of the fantastic charges of the bankers that handled the issues. In South America these issues were sometimes defaulted, but closer to us, in the Caribbean, the U. S. occupied the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua for twenty years, and took over the customs revenues in order to pay off the bond obligations. The investor took his "risk" and collected courtesy of the Marines. In Cuba, we refused to end our military occupation after the Spanish-American War for almost four years, until we obtained perpetual lease of Guantanamo, and the Platt Amendment in the Cuban Constitution, allowing us to occupy the country whenever we decided order was endangered.

IN THE 20TH CENTURY the very slow urban and industrial growth that had taken place, the World War I boom, and the post-war beginnings of nationalist stirrings here as in Asia began the development of new political movements. We will see their coming of age after World War II, but only after Latin America's previous problems had been exacerbated by two new ones that have especially characterized the most recent period.

One is familiar enough by now—the population explosion. Western Europe and the U.S. had their first great population explosion after 1800. But in their case the fall of the death rate because of medical advance was accompanied by an enormous expansion of food growing areas, a great advance in agricultural productivity and a rapid rise of industry that had the whole world market at its feet. In Latin America today the rapid rise in population constitutes, instead, pressure on the existing cultivated land. There is land that can be settled, cleared, cultivated. But its location is such that investment is necessary to make settlement possible. Investment for settlement, investment for industrialization are needed not only to advance but just to hold per capita income even because of the rapidly rising population.

The other characteristic problem of the post-war period is the unfavorable change in terms of trade. Ever since the end of World War II raw materials prices have been falling while prices of manufactured products have risen In January 1961, Dag Hammarskjold's office issued a report showing that from 1950 to 1960, while Latin America was receiving $1 billion in aid, it suffered a total loss of $2 billion because of the shift in trade terms. Even during recessions the "administered prices" of American products like steel

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hold their level or even rise, while raw material price levels plummet. American steel companies show a profit during a recession while operating at 50% capacity, but during the same recession a Latin American country may lose half its total yearly government revenue in a 3 month period because of falling prices of its exports.

CONSIDERING THE TERRIBLE conditions and staggering problems we have mentioned, the political advance of the past ten years bears witness to the strength and tenacity of the democratic revolutionary movements that have arisen. The best illustration is perhaps Bolivia. Here we have the lowest per capita income in Latin America, well under $100 a year, 75% illiteracy, the highest T.B. and infant mortality rates in the world. Over half the population are Indian peasants, speaking their own Aymara tongue and ever since independence, they have remained practically chattels of the landowners.

In 125 years Bolivia had 60 successful revolutions (we mean here coups, not popular uprisings) and 100 lesser risings. In 1952 the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, supported by the tin miners, and by the workers and some sections of the middle class in the cities, overthrew the dictatorship. Since then there have been three general elections, each essentially free, although always with some scattered violence.

The MNR government has carried out the following major reforms:

1. The right to vote to the illiterate majority for the first time in the country's history.

2. Abolition of the old standing army. A new army was organized, with cadets selected from the sons of workers, peasants and middle class families only. Most of this army is employed in construction and colonization projects rather than on garrison duty. The new army does *not* replace the militia of the unions and of the peasant leagues.

3. A thoroughgoing land reform.

4. Nationalization of the large tin mining companies.

These represent a far more thorough change in the structure of society than has taken place anywhere in Latin America save Cuba, and on a far more democratic basis. The peasants are their own masters, and I mean in relation to the government, too. It is the militia that has saved the government when right wing coups have been attempted.

The U.S., evidently feeling that Bolivia was far enough away, that the mining companies were largely not American-owned and that we had no alternative anyway, recognized and aided the MNR regime. But U.S. aid has barely equalled Bolivia's losses from changes in trade terms. Further, Bolivia's tin production has declined, because the mines are old and deep and productivity per worker therefore steadily lower; not because the tin miners have been coddled by the government, as the American press would have it.

Actually income in Bolivia where it can be measured (i.e., outside the subsistence economy of the peasants) has stood still. This democratic government has lasted four times as long as the average Bolivian regime in the past not primarily because of aid but because it brought the Indians into political life as free men.

I emphasize Bolivia because democracy and social reform are maintaining themselves under the harshest circumstances. But look elsewhere. In the past five years the dictators Carias of Honduras, Peron of Argentina, Odria of Peru, Rojas Pinilla of Colombia and Perez Jimenez of Venezuela have gone. The overthrow of Perez Jimenez was the most striking because it was sparked not by action inside the military, or by the descent of a band of heroes from the Andes, but by a general strike of the entire population, organized by the clandestine parties. Accion Democratica, the majority party in the country, has achieved some major reforms. It has been too cau-

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tious, and it has its Tammany patronage aspect, but it is also a living movement in which the bulk of organized workers and peasants participate. The Apristas of Peru and the National Liberation Party of Costa Rica are similar examples of genuine mass popular parties. These movements are not fly-by-night products of the winds blowing in the world. They were built over a period of decades. APRA survived thirty years of illegal activity.

OF COURSE, FOREIGN AID of the right type can greatly assist the popular movements of Latin America. Without foreign aid investment must be at the expense of the inadequate current consumption levels. But this can be achieved where the mass of people feel that the government is theirs and that they have effectively freed themselves from feudal and semi-colonial status.

Unfortunately the Kennedy aid program is, in fact, inadequately surrounded with guarantees as to its ultimate use, and to some extent positively harmful. The latter characterization applies to the $75,000,000 in military aid for "internal security purposes." No Latin American government that is responsive to the most elementary needs of the workers and peasants needs to worry about the totalitarians of the left. Military aid can only strengthen the professional officer caste that spawns caudillos. The biggest brake on the reforms of the Venezuela government is its fear of the army. The revolution in Venezuela was able to force democratic elections, but it wasn't able to abolish or purge the army, which stands as a constant threat against revolutionary social and economic change.

As to guarantees, a proposal was made to limit to 8% the interest that any Latin American government can charge on projects like low cost housing, farm loans, etc., if it wishes to get matching funds for these projects through the "Alliance for Progress." This proposal was withdrawn in committee. We are free to imagine to what extent anyone can actually be helped by this program if charges as crushing as 8% may actually be exceeded!

On the other hand certain aspects of the Administration's program are praiseworthy. If, as seems to be the case, large amounts of surplus food are to go directly to people like the starving farm laborers of Northeastern Brazil, this is all to the good. Far from appeasing these laborers, a full stomach will probably greatly increase their capacity for organization and action.

Another promising action was our recent loan to the Bolivian government oil corporation. This is the first time that the U.S. has extended aid to a government oil company. It doesn't indicate that the administration is encouraging nationalized industry, but merely that it is not entirely out of touch with reality (a rash statement on my part so soon after the CIA invasion of Cuba). It realizes that new oil concessions to private companies in Bolivia simply can't and won't be obtained. It makes a loan for public investment because nothing else is possible. New foreign private investment in Latin America is steadily diminishing because it obviously isn't safe any longer (no matter how many ads Betancourt puts in the *New York Times*), and cannot compare in possibilities for profit with the fabulous rate of growth of the big corporations in their activities in the U.S. itself and in the countries of Western Europe and the British Commonwealth.

But this only fortifies the point that the only sure way for the masses of Latin America to get help is by helping themselves. Only the development of the political and economic power of their own movements can place the U.S. in a situation where aid on a progressive basis becomes the only kind possible. And only such development can provide a viable basis for democracy where such aid is withheld.

SAUL MENDELSON *is a member of the National Committee of the Socialist Party–Social Democratic Federation.*

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Maximilien Rubel

Notes On Marx's Conception of Democracy

MARXISM AS A POLITICAL CONCEPT and an ideological current, often has antedated factual knowledge of Marx's doctrines. Thus at a time when one-third of the world is living under "Marxist" systems, there is still no complete, scholarly edition of Marx's works available. Some of the difficulties faced by Marx scholarship today center around the publication of documents in closed collections: the unpublished materials at Amsterdam and Moscow; the suspension of the *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA) in Moscow in 1935.

Many "Marxist" concepts have been originated and propagated by others, in the absence of a Marx-dictum or in ignorance of his true position. Thus "dialectical materialism" was an invention of Plekhanov; the term "historical materialism" derives from Engels, and the entire concept is based on a few passages in the Introduction to the *Critique of Political Economy of 1859*.

Considering the contrast between the actual writings of Marx and their fate in succeeding decades, one can say that there exists today a myth of Marx and a mythology of "Marxism." This myth or mythology can be shaped to various purposes, although with the same effect: to exploit politically the paradoxical and sometimes sensational character of certain of Marx's ideas. As an illustration of this fact, let us quote two judgments on Marx's political teachings as expressed by two American scholars. The first: "The theory and practice of communism, and this is true not only in the Soviet Union, but in every country in which communists have come to power, cannot in essential respects be identified with some of the central doctrines, right, wrong, or confused, of Marxism."[1] The second: "Here . . . is a philosophy of liberation and freedom that in our day has given fruit in two of the most despotic and bureaucratic states history has seen."[2]

[1] Sidney HOOK: *Historical Determination and Political Fiat in Soviet Communism*, In "Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society," Philadelphia, 1955 (vol. 99, No. 1, p. 5).
[2] Adam B. ULAM: *The Unfinished Revolution*, New York, 1960, p. 3.

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IN THE FOLLOWING PAGES I shall try to comment on Marx's concept of democracy. My purpose is not so much to expound doctrinal interpretations as to arrive at certain conclusions based on an examination of the main documentary sources.

During the forty years of his career as a scientific and political writer, Karl Marx was not only an acute witness and interpreter of the world events of his time, he also fought, in this dual capacity, for radical changes in the social structure of continental Europe and of Great Britain. Each writing of Marx, whether it be scientific or political, shows him to be a passionate observer and a stern judge of deeds and men, pronouncing his verdicts in conformity with certain norms and values underlying the Weltanschauung he built up in the first five or six years of his intellectual formation,—first as a student of law and philosophy, then, after he had to give up his function as the editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung,* in the voluntary seclusion of Kreuznach where he devoted himself to historical and sociological studies; and finally during his exile in Paris and Brussels where he voraciously read political economy. It was in this period that Marx conceived of the method of inquiry in social history which he modestly called the "Leitfaden," the guiding thread for his subsequent scientific work, and which Engels was mistakenly led to call "historical materialism."

ONE CAN DISTINGUISH in the political career of Karl Marx two phases: first when he was a liberal and democratic writer, and second when he presents himself as a communist. It seems natural that the idea of democracy Marx held in the first period would be different from that which he had as a communist. In fact, most of the commentators even see an opposition between the two conceptions. A current opinion is that Marx in becoming a communist abandoned his philosophical and political ideas; in other words, that he left behind the idealism and the liberalism of the preceding period.[3]

Now, it is highly significant that Marx adopted communism before he became what he called a "materialist": he came to communism through the adoption of an ethics of democracy and he never denied the positive nature of his earlier conceptions, neither in theory nor in his political attitudes. If I wished to give my thesis a paradoxical form, I would say that Marx was a revolutionary communist only in theory, while he was a bourgeois democrat in practice. And I could add, to attenuate the irony of the paradox, that what may seem ambiguous or contradictory

[3] To quote one example, Auguste Cornu, in his biography of Marx and Engels dealing with their earlier political career, asserts that Marx remained "on the soil of bourgeois ideology" insofar as he accepted Hegel's model of "universal reason" realized in the state, a model which idealized the class character of the bourgeois state. In criticizing Hegel's philosophy of law, Marx, in Cornu's opinion, did not yet arrive at communism but at "a rather vague conception of democracy," which implied a justification of universal suffrage; in short, a political program which was not essentially different from that of bourgeois democracy. See A. CORNU: *Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels*, I. Band (1818-1844), Berlin, 1954.

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in Marx's thought and activity, is only, after all, the logical consequence of his dialectic method which, in his belief, disclosed to him the "historical necessities" within which he was constrained to act.

BEFORE ENTERING INTO MORE DETAILS on the philosophical and historical studies to which Marx devoted himself before he became a communist, and which have been neglected by almost all who have traced Marx's intellectual biography, we have to remember the following: Since 1927-1932, when the first three volumes of section I of the *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA) were published, containing sources unknown before, the understanding and the evaluation of the author of *Capital* have been considerably modified. An enormous number of commentary studies have been devoted, for example, to the philosophy of alienation as worked out in Marx's so-called *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. However, except for a few commentaries, there has not been a serious analysis of the important, though unfinished, work written by Marx in Kreuznach to prove the inconsistency of Hegel's philosophy of law and of the state. This writing reveals, as we will see soon, a concept of democracy – as opposed to Hegel's apology for monarchism – which goes much further than the usual notion held by the radicals in Germany when the Young Hegelians struggled to replace the Prussian absolutism by a constitutional monarchy.This was already visible in Marx's articles written for Ruge's *Anekdota* and the *Rheinische Zeitung* against the Prussian censorship of the press and on the debates of the Prussian Landtag relating to liberty of the press and to certain local facts of social misery.

There is, so far as I know, no English translation of these, so that I cannot help offering you a brief illustration of Marx's style: (Marx views a Prussian ordinance which instructs writers to impose on themselves stern restrictions in commenting on facts and ideas):

> Is it not the first duty of one who seeks the truth to pounce on it without looking left or right? . . . You admire the inspiring diversity, the inexhaustible richness of nature. You don't ask the rose to have the perfume of the violet, but you want the mind, the richness of all things to exist in only one way? I am humorous, but the law commands me to write gravely. I am bold but the law orders that my style be modest. Gray on gray, the only color of liberty which the law *authorizes* me to employ . . . the true control, inherent in the liberty of the press is criticism; it is the court which the liberty of the press provides for itself and by itself.[4]

When Marx wrote this he already had a serious philosophic culture, classical and modern. This can be seen, among other testimonies, from the notebooks he used to fill regularly with excerpts from and sometimes with comments on the authors he read.[5]

WE ARE CONCERNED HERE PARTICULARLY with one of Marx's notebooks belonging to the time when he was student in Berlin, in 1841-42. It

[4] *Bemerkungen über die neueste preussische Zensurinstruktion*, in "Anekdota", February, 1843. MEGA, I/I, p. 153.

[5] The original, until now unpublished notebooks of Marx are in the possession of the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam. See my articles published in the *Intern. Rev. for Soc. Hist.* in 1957 and 1960.

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contains about one hundred and sixty excerpts from Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* dealing with such themes as miracles, faith and philosophy, reason and theology, the liberty of teaching, the Republic of the Hebrews, the Foundations of the Republic, the authority of the apostles, prophecy and prophets, the divine law, etc. The copy book does not contain a single personal note, comment or criticism, yet on the cover we can read (in German): "Spinoza: Political and Theological Treatise, by Karl Heinrich Marx, Berlin, 1841."

What does it mean? Simply that Marx appropriated what seemed to him necessary for his own Weltanschauung. In doing this he obviously asserted his conviction, that human truth is the work of mankind rather more than of the individual; he held this conviction from Goethe, whom he admired and who avowed himself a disciple of Spinoza.[6]

Marx found in Spinoza, and thus in himself, the main arguments which stimulated him to start in Germany the fight for liberty and democracy. Spinoza's concepts of the republic of democracy and of human liberty are the component parts of a rational ethics which conceives of men and human happiness in the realm of nature and society, while it yields to the individual the chances of freedom by consciousness, knowledge and love. It is with Spinoza and not with Hegel that Marx learned to conciliate necessity and liberty, so that in undertaking the demolition of Hegel's mystifying and moralizing anti-democratic metaphysics of the state, he was well prepared to accomplish this act of mental recovery. One would not go wrong in asserting that Marx's criticism of Hegel is no more than a poetical and satirical transposition of Spinoza's detached pleadings for the best form of government, namely democracy.



We will deal later with the reasons which impelled Marx to expand and to amplify Spinoza's concept of democracy (a concept which discards the social implications of the accomplishment of human liberty), or to speak more precisely, led him to integrate the Spinozan concept of democracy with his own concept of communism. We have to know, first of all, something of Marx's concept of democracy as exposed in his *pre*-communist period, and we turn of course to the main source, namely to the unfinished and posthumous manuscript on Hegel's philosophy of the state.

[6] Besides the *Tractatus*, Marx copied himself or had copied, in two copy books, about sixty excerpts from Spinoza's Correspondence.

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Marx's early and unconditional rejection of Hegel's political philosophy makes all the more dramatic the subsequent return to Hegel. Marx himself, when he begins to work on *Capital,* will euphemistically – if not ironically — call this return a "flirting" with Hegelian dialectics. One can say that, spellbound by Hegel during his university years, as he confessed, Marx never succeeded in escaping completely from Hegel's philosophy of history. But at the same time we must recognize that the revolutionary inspiration is fundamental in Marx's socialist ethics, — and that the incompatibility of the Hegelian element with the ethical in Marx's teachings, constitutes premises in their essential ambiguity. This ambiguity appears as the result of the misunderstandings which are usually designated as "Marxism."

In Spinoza's views on democracy, Marx found what he could find neither in Hegel's political philosophy nor in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Social Contract,* namely: the chance offered to the individual to reconcile social existence and natural life. Spinoza put it clearly in his *Tractatus*: Democracy is a society which wields all its power as a whole and which, therefore, is "of all forms of government the most natural, and the most consonant with individual liberty." And Spinoza adds: "In it no one transfers his natural right so absolutely that he has no further voice in affairs; he only hands it over to the majority of a society, whereof he is a unit. Thus all men remain, as they were in the state of nature, equals."

NOW I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE some literary proof of my argument dealing with the Spinozan influence on Marx's early political thought. We will undoubtedly recognize at the same time a certain echo of Feuerbach's criticism of Hegel.

> Democracy is the solved enigma of all constitutions. There, the constitution is constantly brought back to its actual contents, to real man, to the real people, and laid down as its own work, and this not only in itself, according to its essence, but according to its existence, and according to reality. The constitution appears to be what it is, a free production of man.[7]

Continuing his criticism, Marx argues that while Hegel's state is a hypostasis and the starting point from which man derives, democracy starts from man and makes the state an object, an instrument of man. And as a variant of Feuerbach's criticism of religion, Marx gives the following description of political constitutions:

> Just as religion does not create man, but man who creates religion, it is not the constitution which creates the people, but the people who create the constitution. Democracy is, in certain sense, to other political forms what Christianity is to all the other religions. Christianity is the religion *par excellence,* the essence of religion, man defined in the system of a particular religion. In the same way, democracy is the essence of all political constitutions, man socialized as a particular political constitution. Democracy is, as it were, the Old Testament of all other political forms. Man does not exist for the law, the law exists for man; it is a human existence, while in the other forms man is a legal existence. This is the basic uniqueness of democracy.[8]

It is obvious from these quotations, that the connotations inferred by Marx from the concept of democracy are in fact self-created ingredients

[7] *Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts.* Posthumous work, written in 1843. MEGA I/I, p. 434.
[8] *Op. cit.*

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which burst the conceptional framework supporting the ordinary definition of democracy. So far, Marx gives no empirical evidence to prove why extending the content of the concept of democracy is valid. But when he found this empirical evidence he associated his concept of democracy with another concept, which he derived from democracy, namely *communism.*

Marx acquired this empirical evidence during his scholarly retreat at Kreuznach, having been forced to abandon the editorship of the *Rheinische Zeitung.* During this retreat, Marx studied intensively the revolutionary history of France, England and America. There is no doubt that these studies led him to the conviction that the normal and even inevitable outcome of democracy is communism.

FOR THE SAKE OF MY ARGUMENT, I shall confine myself to a single source of Marx's notes in one of his copybooks dating from his Kreuznach period (1843). My choice is all the more plausible as it concerns a document on the United States, which has been unjustly forgotten. This document is the record of a Scotsman's visit to the United States, whose conclusions are, in a sense, more radical that those of Alexis de Tocqueville. The Scottish visitor, Thomas Hamilton, published his book in 1833, two years before *Democracy in America* appeared, under the title *Men and Manners in America.* (He was known as the author of a valuable novel, *Cyril Thornton,* published in 1827.) He visited the United States in 1830-31 and his book on America had three editions. Marx read it in a German translation published in 1834 and he selected and noted from it about fifty passages. These excerpts deal with the main American problems as seen by Thomas Hamilton: federalism and universal suffrage; legal and real position of the citizens; the conflict of interests between the North and the South; the constitutions of the different New England states, etc.

But what interested Marx particularly is the way Thomas Hamilton — whose ideas are a curious mixture of liberal generosity and aristocratic taste — understands, or, more exactly, resents, the social tendencies in the functioning of American democracy. Hamilton's description of the Republican and Federalist parties, of the "silent revolution" which started with Jefferson's accession to power, and the rise of the "numbers," in opposition to men of property and intelligence, testifies to a remarkable "historical instinct." Marx could not remain indifferent to certain striking facts as reported by the Scottish traveler. In Thomas Hamilton he found what Tocqueville failed to notice: the revolutionary implications of American democracy. Tocqueville was convinced that America was "the image of democracy itself," namely "an almost complete equality of conditions."

In spite of his fear that democracy may lead to the tyranny of the majority, Tocqueville was essentially optimistic about the social and

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economic prospects of democratic regimes. On the other hand, Thomas Hamilton's insight upon certain economic features of American society allowed him to recognize a tendency which in Marx's opinion, could become a decisive factor in America's future, namely: the class struggle.

Here are some passages noted by Marx in the German translation and which are quoted from the original edition. Thomas Hamilton had conversations with "enlightened Americans" on the social prospects of the American Constitution and he gained the conviction that there was no will to "counterpoise . . . the rashness of democracy by the caution and wisdom of an aristocracy of intelligence and wisdom." Then he gives the following illustration of what he calls the "progress and tendency of opinion among the people of New York":

In that city a separation is rapidly taking place between the different orders of society. The operative class have already formed themselves into a society under the name of "THE WORKERS," in direct opposition to those who, favored by nature or fortune, enjoy the luxuries of life without the necessities of manual labor. These people make no secret of their demands, which to do them justice, are few and emphatic. . . . Their first postulate is "EQUAL AND UNIVERSAL EDUCATION." It is false, they say, to maintain that there is at present no privileged order, no practical aristocracy, in a country where distinctions of education are permitted. That portion of the population whom the necessity of manual labor in fact excluded from all the valuable offices of the State. There does exist then—they argue—an aristocracy of the most odious kind—an aristocracy of knowledge, education, and refinement, which is inconsistent with the true democratic principle of absolute equality. They pledge themselves, therefore, to exert every effort, mental and physical, for the abolitione of this flagrant injustice. They proclaim it to the world as a nuisance which must be abated, before the freedom of an American can be something more than a mere empty boast. They solemnly declare that they will not rest satisfied, till every citizen in the United States shall receive the same degree of education, and start, in fair competition for the honors and the offices of the state. As it is of course impossible —and these men know it to be so—to educate the laboring classes to the standard of the richer, it is their professed object to reduce the latter to the same mental condition with the former . . .

But those who limit their views to the mental degradation of their country, are in fact the MODERATES of the party. There are others who go still farther, and boldly advocate the introduction of an AGRARIAN LAW, and a periodical division of property. These unquestionably constitute the EXTREME GAUCHE of the WORKY parliament, but still they only follow out the principles of their less violent neighbors, and eloquently dilate on the justice and propriety of every individual being equally supplied with food and clothing; on the monstrous iniquity of one man riding in his carriage while another walks on foot, and, after his drive, discussing a bottle of champagne while many of his neighbors are shamefully compelled to be content with the pure element. Only equalize property, they say, and neither would drink champagne or water, but both would have brandy, a consummation worthy of centuries of struggle to attain. (pp. 160-61)

Dealing with the labor policy of the American government and the vast internal resources of the United States, Thomas Hamilton has no doubt "that the Americans are destined to become a great manufacturing nation." And then he makes the following prognostication:

Huge manufacturing cities will spring up in various quarters of the Union, the population will congregate in masses, and all the vices incident to such a condition of society will attain speedy maturity. Millions of men will depend for subsistence on the demand for a particular manufacture, and yet this demand will of necessity be

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liable to perpetual fluctuation. When the pendulum vibrates in one direction, there will be an influx of wealth and prosperity; when it vibrates in the other, misery, discontent and turbulence will spread through the land. A change of fashion, a war, the glut of a foreign market, a thousand unforeseen and inevitable accidents are liable to produce this, and deprive multitudes of bread, who but a month before were enjoying all the comforts of life.

And now Thomas Hamilton enunciates a prophecy in the purest "Marxian" style:

Let it be remembered that in the suffering class will be practically deposited the whole political power of the state; that there can be no military force to maintain civil order, and protect property; and to what quarter, I should be glad to know, is the rich man to look for security, either of person or fortune?

Not one of the "eminent" Americans with whom Thomas Hamilton conversed on the future prospects of his country denied that a period of trial such as he had ventured to describe, was inevitable. But the general answer was that this period was very distant and that people feel very little concern about evils which may afflict their posterity. At this, the Scottish visitor notes:

I cannot help believing, however, that the period of trial is somewhat less distant than such reasoners comfort themselves by imagining; but if the question be conceded that democracy necessarily leads to anarchy and spoliation, it does not seem that the mere length of road to be travelled is a point of much importance. This, of course, would vary according to the peculiar circumstances of every country in which the experiment might be tried. In England, the journey would be performed with railway velocity. In the United States, with the great advantages they possess, it may continue a generation or two longer, but the termination is the same. The doubt regards time, not destination. (p. 166)

In becoming a communist, Marx had only to substitute the word "communism" for Hamilton's words "anarchy and spoliation." And in becoming an economist, Marx will give to Thomas Hamilton's premonitory warnings the theoretical coating in the famous chapter of *Capital* entitled "Historical tendency of capitalist accumulation."

Tocqueville expressed in a general and somehow Hegelian formula the guesses about times to come which Thomas Hamilton expressed in the various passages scattered through his record. For Tocqueville, gradual development of the equality of social conditions was a divine, a providential fact. "Is it credible," he asked, "that the democracy which has annihilated the feudal system and vanquished kings will respect the citizen and the capitalist?" He spoke of an "irresistible revolution," and believed that any attempt to check democracy would be a violation of a "divine decree;" he addresed the Christian nations and rulers to remind them of their first duty, namely education of democracy, and he called for a "new science of politics . . . which is indispensable to the new world."

ONE MAY BE TEMPTED TO SAY that Karl Marx was the spiritual executor of the legacy of Tocqueville in carrying out his demand for a "new social science," in which the dialectics of "historical necessity" takes the place of the belief in a divine providence. But it is not our task to deal here with the problem which occupies the central place in the academic

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debate on Marx's so-called historicism. What I have tried to demonstrate so far is the existence, in Marx's political formation and development, of an intimate link between his pre-communist convictions and his adherence to communism, between Marx the democrat and Marx the communist, between his early, non-economic writings in which his communism takes the form of a vehement indictment against the modern cult of money (as in the *Jewish Question*) and *Capital* in which the same indictment is inherent in the scientific pattern of the capitalist system of production.

To give my argument a final piece of evidence, I will recall that in 1850, seven years after he became a communist and while he was a militant leader of the Communist League, Marx authorized Hermann Becker, one of his friends in Germany and a member of the same League, to publish a selection of his writings in separate volumes. In April, 1851, the first volume appeared in Cologne. It contained exclusively Marx's liberal and democratic articles from the *Anekdota* and the *Rheinische Zeitung*. It is clear from this that Marx did not consider his first political writings and his fight for democratic liberties as superseded. On the contrary, he was convinced that his early concept of democracy contained virtually all the elements of his subsequent humanism of which communism was only a specific aspect, as Marx states in his *Manuscripts of 1844* — the first variants of *Capital*.



IN MARX'S INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL development, the separation of the two concepts, democracy and communism, corresponds to the distinction inherent in his pre-communist writings and explicitly formulated after his conversion to communism, between a *political* revolution and a *social revolution*; in other words; between two stages of the proletarian revolution: the first stage is described as the "conquest of democracy" (*Communist Manifesto*) by the working class, leading to the "dictatorship of the proletariat" (a concept forged by Marx after the failure of the bourgeois and proletarian revolutions of 1848-1849); the second stage is described as the abolition of social classes and political power, as the genesis of human society.

The distinction made by Marx between a political and a social revolution is fundamental for the understanding of his attitudes as a Party man. We cannot deal here with the various aspects of Marx's political sociology, but one thing has to be emphasized: in Marx's views, the social

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development was subjected to the historical laws of motion and consequently social revolutions are subjected to certain conditions, materials and moral, which are involved in the process of social evolution. This process is characterized by the growth of "productive forces" in their dual manifestation as technical progress on the one hand and as the maturing of human consciousness on the other hand. There are undoubtedly certain epistemological ambiguities in Marx's thesis of the determination of social consciousness by social existence. However, what we have to point out is the ethical character of Marx's thesis — or postulate — of proletarian consciousness.

Marx's dualistic conception of the revolution has its parallel in the dualistic aspect of his political thought and activity. It would be easy to show by means of concrete examples the exoteric and the esoteric aspects of Marx's political fighting during his whole career as a Party man. Let us choose two or three examples among many others: In 1847, Marx agreed to be elected vice-president of the "Association Democratique" in Brussels and at the same time he became a member of the Communist League. In January, 1848, he wrote the *Communist Manifesto* and in the same month he gave a public speech in favor of free trade, which was published by the Democratic Association. In that year, the year of the Revolution, he founded and edited in Cologne the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* with the subtitle "Organ of Democracy." In 1847, Marx wrote: "The domination of the bourgeoisie hands to the proletariat not only entirely new weapons for the battle *against* the bourgeoisie, but also a completely different position as an officially recognized party." Eighteen years later, when fighting against the spirit of Lassalle in the German workers movement, Marx and Engels made a public statement in which they reaffirmed their position of 1847 and denounced the delusions of Lasalle's followers who worked for an alliance of the proletariat with the Royal Prussian Government against the liberal bourgeoisie. It contains the following sentence: "We still subscribe today to every word of our statement made at this time." [9]

DEALING WITH MARX'S CONCEPT of democracy, in a general way, we may recall the main episodes in Marx's political career, which make him appear as in indefatigable and convinced fighter for democratic liberties:

- in the early fifties, Marx's connection with the Chartist movement;
- during the whole reign of Napoleon III, Marx combated Bonapartism in hundreds of writings (most of them published in the *New York Daily Tribune* and not yet re-printed completely;[10]
- the same can be said of his struggle against *tsarism* and of *Prussianism* as an instrument of tsarism;
- during the Civil War of the United States, Marx was a fierce partisan of the North, taking a position in favor of the system of free labor against the slavery. In 1861, Marx wrote that "the true people of England, of France, of Germany, of Europe consider the cause of the Uni-

[9] Marx-Engels: *Selected Correspondonce*. Moscow. (s.d.) p. 201.
[10] See my *Marx devant le Bonapartisme*, Paris, 1960.

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ted States as their own cause, as the cause of liberty, and that despite all paid sophistry, they consider the soil of the U. S. as the free soil of the landless millions of Europe, as their land of promise, now to be defended sword in hand, from the sordid grasp of the slaveholder."[11] In 1865, he drew up in the name of the General Council of the First International, an address to Abraham Lincoln, where we read:

. . . From the commencement of the titanic American strife, the working men of Europe felt instinctively that the star-spangled banner carried the destiny of their class. When an oligarchy of 300,000 slave-holders dared to inscribe, for the first time in the annals of the world, "slavery" on the banner of armed revolt; when on the very spots where hardly a century ago the idea of one *great democratic republic* had first sprung up, whence the first Declaration of the Rights of Man was issued, and the first impulse given to the European revolution of the eighteenth century . . . then the working classes of Europe understood . . . that the slaveholders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy crusade of property against labor, and that for the men of labor, with their hopes for the future, even past conquests were at stake in that tremendous conflict on the other side of the Atlantic . . . The workingmen of Europe feel sure that as the American War of Independence initiated a new era of ascendancy for the middle classes, so the American anti-slavery war will do for the working classes. They consider it an earnest of the epoch to come, that it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggle for the rescue of an enchained race and the reconstruction of a social world.[12]

In 1871, Marx magnified the Commune of Paris as "the true representative of all the healthy elements of French society, and therefore the truly national government," but also as "the working man's government," as "the bold champion of the emancipation of labor," as the antithesis of bonapartism and imperialism, as the "self-government of the producers;" it was essentially a working class government, chosen by universal suffrage, responsible and revocable at short terms; it was "the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic emancipation of labor." [13]

To cite a last episode, let us recall that in 1872, Marx had Bakunin excluded from the International because he was convinced that the anarchist would use the International as a screen for his own conspiratorial undertakings, which he meant to direct as an absolute master. He wrote Bakunin's society was "the reconstitution of all the elements of the authoritarian state under the name of *Revolutionary 'Commune'* . . . The executive body . . . is a revolutionary staff office, numerically few . . . The unity of thought and action mean nothing other than orthodoxy and blind obedience. *Perinde ac cadaver.* We are 'en pleine Compagnie de Jesus' . . ." [14]

LET US NOW SUMMARIZE the conclusions of the foregoing pages. We disclaim any pretension of being exhaustive.

1. Marx's concept of democracy can be understood only in relation to his general conception of human history and social development,

[11] *New York Daily Tribune*, November 7, 1861. See Marx-Engels: *The Civil War in the United States*, New York, 1937, pp. 22-23.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 279-281.
[13] *Address on the Civil War in France.*

[14] See *L'Alliance de la Democratie socialiste et L'Association Internationale des Travailleurs*, 1873. The conclusion of this pamphlet from which we have quoted is by Marx.

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and in relation to the general conditions of his time. As a theorist and a party man he participated in the struggles of the workers and the middle class for democratic rights, and in the struggle for national emancipation from the yoke of absolute or reactionary regimes. Democracy and national liberation thus become the immediate aims which he deemed necessary to be attained, as historical prerequisites of a classless society. The first goal — democracy — was the starting point from which the workers' movement should conduct its own struggle, using the general suffrage as a means to conquer political power, as a necessary stage on the way to social emancipation.

2. Marx's concept of socialism and communism is derived from the concept of democracy he held before his conversion to communism. He forged his concept of democracy through a criticism of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, rejecting Hegel's doctrine of bureaucracy, of princely power and constitutional monarchy. Thus Marx's conversion to communism was not a break with his earlier conception of democracy, but a stimulation: in communism, as understood by Marx, democracy is maintained and raised to higher significance.

3. The first positive result of Marx's study of classical and modern philosophy and history was a humanist ethics which he later tried to base on scientific premises. The adoption of this humanism caused Marx to abandon philosophical speculation in favor of social theory and political action. Marx's conversion to communism took place *before* he began to study political economy and before he had any idea of the bourgeois mode of production and of capitalism! It was only after he published his communist confession that he gave himself up completely to the study of the great economists. His critical and passionate commentaries prove that he already possessed the criteria and values which, in his belief, authorized him to speak of the "infamy" of political economy. In short: Marx became a socialist before he arrived at "scientific socialism."

4. Democracy signifies for Marx, as for the radicals of his generation, self-government of the people. But democracy is not an aim in itself; it is only a means. As an aim, democracy should be realized jointly by the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in their common struggle against the feudal and absolutist past. This aim attained, the proletariat is bound to win its emancipation by its own means, an emancipation which is identical to the emancipation of mankind. The concept of democracy implies political struggle for a higher stage of society, democracy being the legal basis for poltical self-education, for the Stäteigkeit, the autonomy of the proletariat. The main vehicle of this struggle is the proletariat, which is defined by the inhuman conditions (the alienation) of its existence as well as by its historical mission. Class struggle changes from a historical fact into an ethical postulate. The modern proletariat has to organize itself into a class; it must change from a class in itself to a class for itself. This becomes possible only when democracy has become a permanent element in social life. Engels put this clearly when he wrote: "For the ultimate triumph of the ideas set

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forth in the *Communist Manifesto,* Marx relied solely upon the intellectual development of the working class, as it necessarily had to ensue from united action and discussion."

5. What Marx calls the "conquest of democracy," namely the achievement of political power by the proletariat, is theoretically guaranteed to the workers through the normal functioning of democracy, excluding violence in the fight for social equality. Violence is not a *natural law* in human history but only a natural *result* of class conflicts which characterize societies in which the forces of production also become forces of social alienation. Formal democracy, then, hides a *real* dictatorship relationship between exploiting and exploited classes, a real divorce between fundamental rights and material oppression, the exploitation of the majority by the ruling minority. The historical and moral antithesis of this permanent phenomenon of past and present social history is the rule of the majority, which is the normal result of social conflicts, when universal suffrage is changed, as Marx wrote "from an instrument of dupery into a means of emancipation." [15] Democracy offers to the producers, organized in trade unions and in parties, the legal means to conquer power and consequently to work progressively for the transformation of the whole society, to build, as Marx called it, "an association in which the free development of each [individual] is the condition for the free development of all." [16]

[15] See *Considerants du programme electoral des travailleurs socialistes,* published in "L'Egalité," Paris, 1880.
[16] *The Communist Manifesto.*

MAXIMILIEN RUBEL *is the Editor of an anthology of Marx's writings,* Pages choisis pour une éthique socialiste, *and author of* Karl Marx, Essai de biographie intellectuelle. *Mr. Rubel is Editor of a scholarly journal,* Etudes de Marxologie. *The above article has been adapted by Mr. Rubel from a series of lectures recently delivered at Harvard University.*



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Mass Film Criticism and the Modernization of the Movies



parker tyler

ONE OF THE MOST TANGIBLE, if dubious, myths of the century is that the movies are a mass art—i.e., as both art and commodity, "the movies belong to everybody." This presumed axiom is not at all limited to the ad-writers, the newspaper critics and the makers themselves (who at least *want* them to belong to everybody) but compasses the sociologists, the psychiatrists and—grace permitting!—the aesthetic and technical academicians. Epidemically oppressive, this idea is mainly responsible for the severe lag of film criticism as a respectable and effective entity. For serious critics, the movies function on the one hand as a set of symbolic texts for socio-psychological-mythical interpretation, with aesthetic overtones, and on the other as a supposed laboratory where it is possible to show the Film has inexhaustible ways to produce what theoretically has every right to be termed "art," but which *is* art only because it *must be* in order to save "everybody's" face.

The movies' commercialization is responsible, of course, for the hypersensitive professionalism that imbues all occupations connected with them, including supposedly disinterested "criticism." If the very term "disinterested" comes into question, it is because film critics are distinguishable from, say, literary or art critics only by the fact that Shakespeare, for instance, does not need the praise or blame of literary critics to stand or fall: his plays perennially endure in theatre and library. Yet a filmic *Hamlet* by Laurence Olivier must be shifted critically to a fresh dimension to decide if "the Bard"—as I think Broadway reviewers still refer to him in 1961—has been proved screenworthy. The legitimate theatre also is a thing so much belonging to "everybody"—to everybody, at least, in New York's five boroughs and environs—that mass-minded newspaper critics never fail to get in a dig at the supposed fact that Shakespeare's dramaturgy, especially in his comedies, distinctly "dates." It is easy to see why the impression should gain head that "the Bard," some of his comedies having been successfully rewritten as musicals in our time, needs refurbishing for the modern stage. Indeed, Shakespeare, in his relation to both the stage and the movies, provides an excellent case for deciding to what extent the process of modernization has blanket application, these days, to the arts.

If we glance at the ever-indicative realm of high fashion, we are struck by the presence there of the widest eclecticism. In recent decades, designers have pilfered the centuries, period by period, for ideas on decors and women's clothes. Shakespeare, also

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going to the past and exotic literatures for his ideas, expected to see them appareled in contemporary dress while Racine's neo-classic dramas were done in place and period costumes adapted to French contemporaneity. But in their cases, one speaks strictly of *creative* convention; in the case of our contemporary theatre, it is largely a matter of *interpretive* convention. Did Anouilh, modernizing his classical subjects, center more on theatrical interpretation or on literary creation as the "fashionable" cachet? It is perhaps more important to decide why the Old Vic production of *Troilus and Cressida,* seen in New York some years ago, should have conceived the play in the spirit and dress of Continental militarism during England's Edwardian era. This production seemed to lose inward dimension in ratio to its gain in outward smartness. The moral is, I think, that one should distinguish between modernity, *that which is viable at any time,* and modernization, *that which becomes viable by being brought up to date.*

The historic dialectic put in focus by the question of art's basic timeliness is change as perennially having the dynamic edge on permanence. Therefore, a past which does not speak directly to a present—i.e., a past whose continuity does not flow easily, inconspicuously into a present—is one in which an urgent crisis is suspended. There are usually reasons to reject the past as there are reasons to keep it; hence, the idea of modernizing the issuing remnant, the questionable survival, makes a profuse appearance in this century. Does not the same thing seem to happen to movie stars as happened to the kings called "Louis"? They begin to require a New Look; at least, this is conceived to be all that will save them. Art museums, in service to showmanship, are constantly being given new looks, and apparently for fun, the Louvre (shades of its first residents!) illuminates certain collections on specified weekly evenings. And the Louvre is correct: light from a new direction dramatically transmutes the familiar image on which it falls even if the aesthetic gain is no more than minor.

THE MODERNIZATION FACTOR is so quick within the bosom of the movies because the movies have become, all too grandly, suddenly and hollowly, a standard set of back-numbers. As both industry and craft, they have blossomed and declined in an era when civilization itself has begun to have a chic "museum" look: a look at once antique and modern, permanent and changeful, passive and aggressive. Modern poetry, as an objective culture-myth in Pound's *Cantos,* is essentially a research library in the survival of "classic" virtues. Now poetry is, above all, eclectic; good or bad: eclectic. But the importance of one special point has been neglected by critics. Pound happens to illustrate it in the *Pisan Cantos,* where he calls upon Paquin, early-century creator of women's fashions, to characterize his own, the poet's, pride as "vanity": "Pull down thy vanity,/Paquin pull down!/The green casque has outdone your elegance."

Pound's elegant gesture does not seem so personal and isolated as it

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might if we consider the following passage from Rilke's *Fifth Elegy*:

> Squares, O square in Paris, unending show-place,
> where the modiste, Madame Lamort twists and winds the restless ways of the world, those endless ribbons, and out of them shapes new bows, ruches, flowers, cockades, artificial fruits—all falsely colored—for the cheap Winter hats of Fate.

The poet has just spoken of "this sorrowful Nowhere . . . the unspeakable place . . . "

> . . . where the too-little inconceivably changes—, springs round into the empty too-much.
> Where the uncountable reckoning, numberless, vanishes.

I take it that, with these two passages, Rilke meant to contrast *modernity* and *modernization,* the immanently modern and the superficially modern; the latter would be symbolized today by the phenomena of "Sputniks" and America's "Explorers," all presumably successful experiments in bringing aviation up to date, and so justifiably replacing the term "aviation" with that of "space-travel." Sputnik became the fashion-plate of the Heavens. As Madame Lamort is the image of the false refurbisher of life, reviving it with furbelows, fashion at large is the image of the falsely revived hero, he who takes on an artificially new life, as with Icarus and his wax-fastened wings or the Frankenstein legend so dear to the movies. Metaphorically, Madame Lamort is a frivolous measure of the concept of death-and-resurrection as Sputnik, metaphorically, is a frivolous measure of the concept of spatial majesty—or, more precisely, of "infinity." Aviation as *"space-travel"* assures the expanding future of man's habitation of outer space, and however "expensive" at first, it will become a high fashion to be yearned after and achieved even by the masses.

A perfectly good external gauge of the specious mass-look worn by the movies resides in the fashion magazines, which have a tradition older than theirs. The realm of chic, our age abundantly proclaimed, includes "everything" plus dresses—everything from Gertrude Stein and Whitehead to the latest smart novelty to arrive on the international art scene. Exquisite token of this may be found in the books of that ingenious faculty which is Cecil Beaton, the only devotee of high fashion who can safely look down on Elsa Maxwell. He deploys a wickedly elfish camera and his literary sensibility thrives on the borderland of the juicy garden of dry sophistication cultivated by *The New Yorker.* The point is that Beaton's strength is nurtured in his *mass* feeling for high fashion, which is fully as much gauged by circulation and its profits as are the currently hard-breathing movies. The latter, in losing a few million spectators to television, have long been rumored on the verge of collapse. Now, perhaps, it is too late for the new optical effects, hastily souped-up fiction and theatre-remodelling to save the movies' part in the universal modernization program unless their part is revived on television. Little remains whereby space-travel as such can help, because the movies were hardly born before they predicted (by example) trips to the moon. They also followed, decades ago as well as now, time-travel as projected in H. G. Wells' *The Time Machine.*

IN THE COMPLEX INNER crisis of things filmic, film criticism perforce must accept a good share of the blame and ignominy. In either its low or high brackets, it has scarcely ever been aesthetically independent except where it busied itself with constructing "working theories" on the writing desks of the craftsmen themselves. It is no accident, moreover, that two of the most brilliant and idea-conscious technicians in film history, Sergei Eisenstein and Vladimir Pudovkin, developed their theories both of style and technique under the tutelage of the Stalinist-

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Marxist bureaucracy, and that the famous ABC concept of filmic composition, *montage*, was intellectually drawn by Eisenstein from Marx's dialectic—that is, from the adaptation of the traditional dialectic of the schools to the social ideology of revolutionary politics. The irony of such aesthetic endeavors on the part of talented craftsmen is that, even as Pudovkin and Eisenstein became grim ideological opponents in the arena of Russian film-making, film-makers elsewhere in the world were less consciously, but just as concretely, putting the tenets of *montage* into wide, non-ideological practice.

Obviously, the political ideology of Russian film-making was, and is, but another form of making the movies "belong to everybody"; namely, to the Soviet Union and the "masses" of the world. More at fault, however, than the *political* ideology of this line of filmic reasoning was, and is, its *mass* ideology. Whatever fine and valid rules of procedure the film-maker may follow, the artistic criteria for evaluating what he does must be derived from scrutiny of the product itself rather than stress on its "working theories," its technical postulates. Instead of pointing out and acting on this highly pivotal distinction, film critics and commentators, even outside Russia, have perennially regarded the product's value as loosely predicated on its technical postulates, *ipso facto* realized, and ignored content and widely comparative aesthetic standards as the inevitable problems of the film art. As undoubtedly brilliant a silent film achievement as is Eisenstein's *Potemkin*, its universal acclaim still reverberates chiefly because the purity of its *means* is still a rarity, rather than because its pathetic *theme* attains great tragic stature.

If English film criticism is bogged down in workaday professionalism and passive goodwill, French film criticism lifts itself only a little higher by mannered aestheticism, which actually remains parochial in its culture. The main tradition of German film criticism—individually represented in this country by Siegfried Kracauer and Rudolf Arnheim—was established by those who regarded the new art not, primarily, as one to be submitted to independent artistic judgment but as, on the one hand, a field of socio-psychological inquiry and, on the other, a field of aesthetic-technical inquiry. Kracauer's overwritten psychological case-history, *From Caligari to Hitler*, which, along with incidental aesthetic insights, views the German film wholly as the progressing agent of Nazism, is far from being the only evidence for this trend. His latest book, *Theory of Film*, published a year ago, falls into the class of aesthetic-technical criticism only to renounce aesthetic values for those of "physical reality," a blanket strategic concession to the documentary film.

Many critics to this day—when, of course, it is a museum "classic"—cite G. W. Pabst's pyrotechnic silent film, *Variety*, for its pure visual expressivity, both as to camera-use and acting. It is not that *Variety's* filmic virtues are actually unreal but that, since they serve a creative idea of very thin interest, they are implicitly assessed beyond their proper context. Physical "acrobatics," as Kracauer's new book shows, remains the film's biggest popular strength. Dozens of striking instances of narrative technique, psychology through dialogue, and so on, could be extracted from the novel, *Gone With The Wind*, just as parallel technical triumphs are sought out in the "classics" of film museums. But *Gone With the Wind*, either as a film or a novel, does not become thereby a better or more memorable work of art, and neither, in truth, do the classics of the film museum which are analyzed for *their* orthodox expertise.

Essentially, *Variety* represents the classic technical *fault* of filmic creation: concentration on the physical means at the expense of the aesthetic

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end. This, interestingly enough, is an inversion of the ethical proposition fostered by neo-Marxist rationale: the means are justified by the end. To the movies—not merely as mass art but also as mass criticism—it is, rather, the end which is justified by the means . . . at least for a while. The fatal moment comes when the novelty of means seems magically dissolved. The valid filmic pioneering of D. W. Griffith in this country became inept as soon as he applied it to themes which did not strike popular sympathies in the right area; in consequence, this most distinguished American filmmaker of his time tobogganed to obscurity and enforced retirement. Much the same happened to the talented Erich von Stroheim. Actually Griffith's mass virtues, his talent for spectacle and his respect for the film's legitimate vocabulary, had been only a *means*. For these same virtues, even in his own time, were outstanding because, primitive as they were, they were still new and startling. Ironically enough, Griffith's famous spectacles were no more artistically distinguished than second-rate historical novels and they suffered from the same crudities of character-drawing and intellectual values as such novels always have.

The way and degree to which famous or popular plays and novels are revised for mass presentation by the movies is notorious. Occasionally, something is made of this scandal by a newspaper critic desirous of filling a weekly column devoted to the more timeless problems of the object of his daily criticism. Invariably, of course, such lucubrations exhibit the most superficial acquaintance with the true values of the familiar work in question. William K. Zinsser, formerly the New York *Herald-Tribune's* critic, once found himself moved to deplore the emphasis on circumstantial details in the film version of *A Farewell to Arms,* these details covering bedroom sex and childbirth; the puniness of the cultural perspective in which such a critic thinks becomes clear on observing that the domain where the movies are guilty of so much vulgar distortion of an original is not *their degree of candor about physical processes* but *their degree of candor about moral and psychological processes.* An especially cruel irony, moreover, attaches to Mr. Zinsser's complaint. Since the movies first became an industry, it has been the permanent lament of enlightened criticism that they systematically decline to acknowledge the carnal truths of sex. But now, in our advanced age of disillusion with sentiment, a certain minimal candor in such matters has won out even in Hollywood; in Europe, it is growing rampant (vide *The Green Mare*). The point is that *taste* in artistic affairs is bound to be the weakest factor in mass entertainments—no matter what the subject matter or the line of treatment—and taste is likewise the weakest factor in the mass phenomenon of film criticism. Taste implies intellect, morals, aesthetics but has no power over "physical reality."



THE PALE, PRETENTIOUS IRRELEVANCE of aesthetic sensibility in which newspaper critics indulge is naturally to be traced to the "mass" character of their audience and yet, of course, only a very minor proportion of all moviegoers reads the reviewing columns. Right here, in this apparent discrepancy, is my reason for isolating what *mass film criticism* really is. Film criticism, in the main, is written for the literate masses in a primary stage of artistic education; thus the two main divisions of film criticism, popular/journalistic and academic/technical, find it obvious, as well as convenient, to assume that a movie is simply a means of translating a given artistic

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quantity—a play, novel, or "original script"—into a new form. The movies primarily, then, are an extension of a specifically literary culture; film criticism, consequently, is concerned preponderantly with the interpretive values of what is part of common education: the exposition of art classics and their principles to a "student" public. All is clear sailing for film critic, as for film maker, once the rule is accepted that basically film-creation is a form of higher education; in short, a novel is "educated" into being a movie and, by the same act, "modernized."

Hence, the reason that no effective body of film criticism has arisen is that the profession has mechanically followed the general line—however disguised—that film-making is a science of re-creation rather than an art of creation. I must hasten to disarm those who will rush forward to say that exactly the opposite is true; that, for instance, the paperback compendium of Rudolf Arnheim's criticism, *Film as Art,* is about nothing but the uniqueness of creative filmic procedures. First, I would answer that mechanical uniqueness does not confer aesthetic or creative uniqueness; while the rules of the film camera are as essential to the movies as basic grammar is to the novel, "grammar" is not synonymous with "imagination." Second, Arnheim's encyclopaedic aestheticism suffers not only from a semi-barbarous language of its own but it also leads him into naively drawing what *seem* simple conclusions from simple premises; these conclusions, however, are neither obvious nor inevitable and, as put, are often misled and misleading. What is actually needed by film criticism, sadly enough, is a handbook in which film craft is "translated" into literary craft, so that at least a lucid linguistic system can enable one to "read" the ABC of film craft correctly, and not through semantic equivalents.

It cannot be denied that, as the more scholarly writers on the movies such as Arnheim have claimed, many minor creative devices are automatically brought to birth by the mere process of re-creation or, if you like, cinematization. Yet these same writers, becoming fascinated with their own theoretic fabric, easily allow the creative purview to slip from grasp and begin talking as if creative film were a difficult foreign tongue almost impossible to explain in English. As a result, even the best-informed writers neglect the important empiric truth of their subject: that the value of filmic devices is damaged, and their scope fatally limited, by being subservient (as means) to an end which, in almost universal practice, they help not *to create* but *only to recreate.* It follows that the technical means assumes an undue significance and becomes a false end in itself. Thus, film becomes *fashion;* novelty, modernization, window- dressing . . . *anything but true creation.*

THE "MASS QUANTITY" so insidiously dominating film criticism, goes qualitatively from top to bottom of the aesthetic gamut and like a chemical taint spoils even superior criticism. Does it not seem expedient to suggest that fewer people should see and criticize the movies as they are, and more people should make them into something different from what they are? If more people begin making them upon that premise, the chances of creative achievement in the resulting experiments would be much greater than they are—even today when the American industry is desperate enough to seek the help of the more conventional Experimentalists. That the film as an art, after more than fifty years of life, should remain virgin territory to so large an extent, is a thought which it is to official interests to pretend is an outmoded prejudice of aesthetic snobs and old fogies. These official interests are, of course, the museums and the academies as well as the industry.

The "mass" growth of art museums, inevitably, has been in proportion to the amount, quality, and variety of their attractions. It is good—at least

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it is hard to argue it is bad—that the showmanship of "modernized" museums induces more people to visit them regularly. Yet the thought must cross one's mind that the Metropolitan Museum in New York, by embellishing its types of acquisition constantly and expanding its means by such things as the showing of film documentaries about art, is refurbishing the cultural past as forms of interior decoration both literal and figurative; the great museum becomes a study-chamber of "high fashion." Since the movies have so varied a technical history and body of work, why should they be omitted from a program of such massive glitter?

Eclecticism, in its way, is all very fine. Surely, the Metropolitan itself has come a great distance in fifty years: a fact oddly demonstrated by a two-line reference to it in a 420-page *Historical Guide to the City of New York* published by Frederick A. Stokes and Co. in 1909, "In the Metropolitan Museum of Art (near Eighty-first Street) may be seen a fine collection of historical relics" . . . and, it might have been added, "some art works of historic interest." But perhaps the distinction, now as then, is actually blurred. Since they began to be petted by departments, the movies have added a "museum look" to their perennial "new looks." All a musty old "historical relic" needs is brushing up and a showcase to look important. The point I am concerned in emphasizing is that mass-modernization is, and always has been, part of the movies' normal operation, and that, more particularly, the same operation has been conventionally applied to what was already a "museum" art (literature) long before the movies touched it. This has led to an historic impasse in film criticism at this up-to-date hour; possibly film criticism may lead the movies *out* where itself was led *in*. If so, criticism would have to begin by assuming that the myth of the movies as a *mass art* is a false one and recognize them, rather, as a quite esoteric art whose latent creative powers—as distinct from "cinemascope" window-dressing – are imperfectly understood even by the select few. The movies have actually made history itself into window-dressing, or at least into an art of the couturière, Madame Lamort . . . Now, either coyly or brazenly, and with the goodwill of most of the critical profession, the movies desire history to return the compliment and take them into the modernized Permanent Collections,

PARKER TYLER'S *fourth book on the movies,* The Three Faces of the Film, *appeared in 1960. Early in 1962 he will give a course of lectures on the film for the School of Visual Arts. He has published two volumes of verse and for many years was staff contributor to* Art News. *In 1960 he began a series of art monographs with the study of Conrad Marca-Relli.*



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Douglas Dowd

Ideology and American Social Structure

THE DEPRESSION OF THE Thirties placed American capitalism on the defensive. It had failed to deliver the goods, and some began to wonder if the vehicle had run out of gas; a small but growing number questioned the worth of the vehicle itself. But with the economic stimuli of World War II and its aftermath, the doubts of the former were dispelled and the searching questions of the latter were regarded as sheer perversity.

Today, despite record-breaking production levels and per capita incomes, an uneasy feeling has begun to spread that, even though the total economic breakdown of the Thirties is unlikely to be repeated, the economy is behaving sluggishly; moreover, it has become popular to snipe at the wisdom of what we produce, even though times be good. The liberal euphoria of the early postwar years was perhaps best exemplified by Galbraith's *American Capitalism;* the bemused scepticism of the present is also best exemplified by Galbraith, in his *Affluent Society*.

This article proposes that American capitalism is rapidly becoming obsolete, as evidenced by the growth and composition of its output and a multiplying set of serious socio-economic problems; that matters cannot be otherwise; that the current and prospective problems of this society require a changed social outlook, and a changed social and economic structure; that, in short, America must undertake a new phase in its economic development. Finally, it will be proposed that all this sets certain requirements for American radicals.

Clearly, such complex questions can be no more than suggested in a brief discussion. Just as clearly, there are many ways one might approach the theme. I shall do so by an analysis of our current emphasis on economic growth—to be distinguished from economic development below—which appears to be an efficient means of coming to grips with the larger questions.

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The rate of growth of the American economy receives an ever-increasing amount of attention; not surprisingly, the attention mounts when the current rate falls off. On the one hand, our growth rate is compared moodily with that of West Germany, Japan, France, Italy, and, of course, with that of the Soviet Union. In all cases, our performance is some fraction of theirs. The precise fraction depends partially on fluctuating business conditions in this country; it depends more importantly on the fact that in the past decade or so the growth rates of the countries mentioned (and some others) have been very high—much higher than our historical rate. That all these countries have a way to go to catch up with us in absolute terms provides intermittent solace, but it can provide no more than that.

Apart from what other countries are doing, we have compelling reasons to advance our own rate of growth—so long as we remain basically a capitalist society. For only with a rapid rate of growth can we put reasonable limits to the steadily widening stain of unemployment; only with a rapid rate of growth can we support an insanely expensive military establishment—whatever else may be said of it—without provoking public concern (despite the fact that the cost of the establishment is a vital source of income to millions of people); only with rapid growth can we regard productivity gains and a rising labor force without fear. And so on.

What has been happening to the growth rate in America? If we take the period 1839 to 1959, our average rate of growth of real GNP was 3.5 percent per annum. The average for the years 1929 to 1958 was just under 3 percent. And the years 1953 to 1960 had an average rate of just below 2.5 percent.* Secretary of Labor Goldberg recently stated that 1962 must provide 10.5 million *new* jobs if we are not to have more than 4 percent unemployed. This year, with business on the upswing, according to most reports, we still have between 6 and 7 percent unemployed. Thus, the fact that other countries grow more rapidly than we, embarrassing though that may be to publicists in the State Department, is not the real problem. We must begin to grow rapidly, soon, or face serious economic and political crises.

However, there are strong reasons to believe that a satisfactory rate of growth in America cannot now ensue, or be sustained, without economic development. The latter term, as distinguished from growth, implies change in the structure and institutions of the economy and of the society, and the growth of a new social outlook. To make this point, it will be useful to examine the role of growth in a capitalist society, to relate and contrast this with economic development, and to cite a few illustrative historical examples. Then, present prospects may be examined.

*Since population also grows, the per capita rate is lower than the rate for GNP. Thus the per capita increase 1839 to 1959 was 1.6 percent; it is similarly reduced for the later periods. For the Soviet Union, the years 1951 to 1958 show an average increase in the **per capita** rate of about 5 percent—i.e., five times ours.

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IT IS A COMMONPLACE THAT a capitalist economy must expand, if it is not to contract. This would be true even without spreading automation and a rising labor force. The existence of the latter merely underscores the need for growth. Why in any event is growth critical?

The answer lies basically in the fact that capitalism is an economy whose engine is the search for profits. This is to say that capitalist economics are the economics of scarcity. Profits are made in a context of scarcity—whether that scarcity be induced by market controls, by natural disasters, or, among other things and most importantly for our purpose, as an outcome of an expanding economy. It is not a matter of vital concern to the capitalist whether his profits come from one kind of scarcity or another; but it *is* a matter of some concern to society, and it specifically affects the attitudes with which the population regards capitalist institutions. That capitalism has on the whole had a popular existence in this country rests principally on our having enjoyed a process of rapid growth sustained for over a century—with many, but relatively brief, interruptions. The one serious interruption—the Thirties—also saw capitalism's popularity wane, and its institutions subjected to modification.

It is of course an irony—Marx would have called it a contradiction—that the growth process as it proceeds also produces the conditions for its tapering off. This is because the process of growth is also a process of increasing productive capacity; i.e., a process, after some point, of diminution of market scarcities. How is it possible, then, that the growth process was sustained for so long in America? It was because growth intermingled with development. The economy not only grew, it also changed structurally and institutionally. These qualitative—economic development—changes had quantitative—economic growth—consequences, and these in turn encouraged, made possible, or required further qualitative changes. Where growth ends and development begins is a question that does not have a precise answer; in certain respects the two are but different aspects of the same process. But they are also different processes: there is a difference, e.g., between the introduction of the railroad as a form of transportation, and the addition of track and rolling stock over time.

In the 19th century, certain of the most obvious developmental changes included the slow but decisive transformation of the economy from one based on agriculture and (essentially foreign) trade, to one based on industry. As industrialization proceeded, particularly after the 1840's, structural changes took place within the industrial sector—a movement from dependence on light industry to dependence on mixed light and heavy industries. As the 19th century melted into the 20th, the stage was taken over by the modernization of old and the emergence of new industries, yielding an electrified and motorized economy, and one vitally dependent on the production of durable goods. And the period since World War I has witnessed the emergence of an economy dependent for its health on

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the mass-production consumer durable goods industries (ignoring military production, at this point).

The foregoing could not and did not occur in a vacuum. Changing and growing foreign markets, rapid population growth, and many other developments all played important contributing roles. Less obvious than matters of this nature, but quite important, were the changes in social structure and outlook accompanying the process of economic development. None of what will be said of this below is novel, but it is worth emphasizing.

Thus, when we refer to the emergence of an economy oriented to the mass production of consumer durables, what is simultaneously suggested about the society within which such a structure of production exists? Many things, not least of which are a level and, critically, a distribution of income significantly different than that of a society bent on the development of its basic industrial framework. But the distribution of income does not simply happen; it is the product of the institutions and power relationships bearing on economic affairs. Thus, we must expect that a consumer-oriented capitalist economy will be one in which the distribution of income will be significantly affected by the governmental fiscal process (on both its taxing and spending sides), and by trade unionism, to mention only the most prominent institutional forces.* But to bring the government and trade unions into the picture enables us to see the role of ideological change in economic development. The point may be made by asking a question: In the America of the late 19th century could government and trade unions in their present forms have existed? Whatever the shortcomings of both may be at present, their existence is owed to a change—confused and modest, but still significant—in the social outlook of Americans a generation ago (outlook and institutions changing in an interacting fashion, of course). It was in this respect that the New Deal was of great importance in American economic development. That the immediate influence of the New Deal on economic growth was limited is not to say the same of its long run impact; nor is it to forget that had the New Deal been as radical as most of its critics thought (and still think) it was, its influence on economic growth would have been considerably greater. The boom of the past twenty years or so is not, of course, to be explained by the changes of the New Deal alone. But the effects of war and cold war expenditures (and related factors) are not a sufficient explanation either. The explanation lies in a combination of the two. Briefly, because of institutional changes, the economy was able to get more economic growth out of a given amount of war-induced stimuli. The added growth was in turn attributable basically to the much enlarged strata of those able to buy expensive consumer durables (including housing).

*Growing industrialization itself has a leavening impact on income distribution, of course, to the degree that it lifts an increasing percentage of the labor force up to more productive lines of work, other things remaining the same.

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The structural changes in the economy of the 19th and 20th centuries in America had the effect of working directly in the arena of scarcity-producing changes; changes in the ideological and institutional realm worked indirectly, through the emergence of new value priorities and expectations (and demands), and through a reshuffling of social classes, with interacting economic changes.

WITH THESE GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS in mind, we may now ask: what is the likelihood of a satisfactory growth rate for America in the foreseeable future? And it seems reasonable to contend that the growth possibilities of existing institutions and productive relationships are steadily playing out; that for further healthy growth to take place, substantial change is required in the American social outlook and in our socio-economic institutions.

Why is this a reasonable contention? The answer lies in the present structure of production, the structure of market controls, and the nature of economic motivations (of both consumers and businessmen). Let us examine each, with terrible brevity. The structure of production, as suggested earlier, is increasingly biased in favor of consumer durable goods production (meaning, here, autos, TV sets, washers and dryers, and the like, and homes). This is fine; so much so that peoples in most other economies (including that of the Soviet Union) aim to match us as soon as possible. But this too has its limitations. The goods in question are both durable and expensive.

The problem emerging from these characteristics is of course well-known to the producers of the goods, and it has led them to ever more fervent blandishments emanating from Madison Avenue, to the encouragement of a truly astonishing volume of consumer indebtedness, and to what is candidly called built-in obsolescence. Withal, stultification gradually sets in. For the distribution of income constitutes a brick wall at one end of the problem, and consumer satiation a swamp at the other. Doubtless, variations and multiplications of consumer durables lie in the offing and always will, but their relative importance in the economy is and must be slight, and ever-slighter. Doubtless, too, substantial and pervasive price reductions would push the brick wall back temporarily (as rising incomes and improved distribution have in the postwar years). But such price reductions are out of the question with the present structure of market controls. Effective price competition and modern industry are incompatible; rivalry is expressed in product changes and selling efforts, and slack is taken up by reduced production schedules.

The motivations of consumers and businessmen at present provide little reason to believe that under their prodding or guidance the economy will move in a more viable direction. Both are individualistic and materialistic, in the crudest sense of the terms. A recognition of the social pre-

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requisites of a healthy individualism is lacking; as is the ability to distinguish between sheer acquisition of goods and the achievement of material well-being.



All this is not to suggest that the American economy is on the verge of collapse. Our wealth and the times in which we live give us great staying power—the former because we can blunt the edge of economic crisis without straining too much either pocketbook or principle; the latter because military expenditures provide a most useful and upwardly flexible fiscal crutch for the economy, when needed. But this is as far as optimism can be stretched, and even this may be too far.

America does face a prospect of relative decline; consequently, in today's world, it faces the prospect of multiplying indignities, which in turn may and probably will be translated into fears and panic (as witness the recent uproar over the gold drain, not to mention Cuba). Faced with a process of relative stagnation, our most likely move is in the direction of restrictive policies, aimed to hold what we have; briefly, economically our most likely policies are toward tighter organization of (both commodity and labor) markets, politically toward even more curbing of civil liberties, and in foreign policy toward jingoism. To avoid this ugly possibility—in effect the corporate state—we must solve our problems in positive terms; in terms joined to the expansion of social and economic opportunities here and elsewhere.

A "reasonable approach" to our great and growing economic and political problems would constitute the most conservative approach we now could take, but even a reasonable approach is not probable with the outlook and institutions of present-day America. More specifically, the traditional American belief that the criteria of business are relevant to the solution of social problems—never more than fortuitously correct—has now become patently ludicrous. This is so not because the criteria of business have changed for the worse, but because the nature and magnitude of social needs are increasing daily, commensurate with the advance of industrialism in America, and the rapidly changing economic and political scene abroad.

The problems that today can be solved by capitalist techniques are trivial; those that require social purpose, social control, and social insti-

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tutions specifically designed for their amelioration threaten to overwhelm us. The beginnings of a list of the latter will make the point better than extension of the argument. Thus, there is widespread agreement today that we somehow must move ahead decisively in (among other) the following areas:

1) Urban renewal, with its host of connected problems (e.g., juvenile delinquency, mounting fiscal and transportation crises, sprawling slums, etc);

2) Rapid quantitative and qualitative improvements on a vast scale in our educational system, from top to bottom;

3) Immediate and large-scale steps to aid in the development of the underdeveloped areas (for their socio-economic needs, our own economic needs, and as a means of lessening cold war tensions).

Few, if any, imagine that adequate steps will or can be taken in these and other problem areas in the present mood of the American people; or, more to the point, with the present structure of power in America. Still, few deny the critical nature of these, and a longer list of, problems.

The present impasse does not exist because America is bereft of the natural resources, the skills, the capital equipment, or even the ideals relevant to a solution of its economic and social problems. The impasse exists because the American people—and, almost in caricature, their political representatives—live enthralled by an ideology, and lie captive within a set of socio-economic institutions that, far from providing access to solutions, act as obstacles to reason and action. It must be made clear to the American people that the continuing and deepening conflict between ideals and realities, a conflict that has already led to many and severe corruptions in practice, can only be resolved happily by a deliberate and self-conscious reappraisal of capitalist economic institutions.

"Ah!" liberals say, "what about President Kennedy's New Frontiers?" The greatest likelihood is that the New Frontiers will remain almost entirely rhetorical. This is not because Kennedy is insincere; nor is it because of defects in his administration, though doubtless it has many. It is because the Kennedy Administration is seeking to keep everything but the end product of the economy the same. It is seeking to achieve a more rapid rate of growth in an economy and society which has exhausted the possibilities of rapid growth, and one whose social vitality increasingly takes the form of nervous activity and vulgar display. Kennedy is seeking to move increasing amounts of our resources into social (and military) channels. Success with military programs is likely to be substantial; achievements in the areas of housing, health, education, urban renewal, and foreign economic aid will be minimal to zero.

The people and the Congress have been thoroughly indoctrinated with the cold war psychology, and military expenditures fit happily into our present economic institutions and situation. Has there been any similar

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indoctrination regarding the other questions? Quite the contrary. Social proposals are, if anything, put forth apologetically.

Thus the Kennedy Administration speaks to the end results of a socialist society—social purpose, material well-being, equity, élan vital—within the framework and the essential trappings of capitalism. If the welfare states of Europe—in Scandinavia and Great Britain, e.g.,—are pointed to as examples where this sort of mixture can be realized, it must be remembered that such achievements as have been made have been in a context of long and vigorous labor, cooperative, and socialist political movements, all conspicuous by their absence in this country. One would have to be skeptical of the chances of significant social progress under Kennedy in any circumstances; when we add in the strong and growing cold war emphasis of this administration, the inability of its leaders to embark on a decisive program of economic and social reform—whether here or abroad—is merely emphasized. We all remember how the reforming spirit of the New Deal receded when Roosevelt moved foreign policy and war to the top of his agenda.

The economic growth and social betterment so urgently needed in America require and would be an integral part of a renewed process of economic development. In turn this will only be brought about by changes, consciously and effectively sought, in the structure of the American economy, in the value priorities of the American people, and in the relationship of social classes as that stems from and impinges upon economic affairs.

It is this situation that gives added meaning, added hope, and added urgency to the aims, the understanding, and the activities of existing and potential radicals in America. But it must be added immediately that the latter must address themselves more directly, more clearly, and more diligently to specifically mid-20th century American problems and possibilities than has typically been true in the past.

AMERICAN RADICALS HAVE too frequently taken their cues from their counterparts in other countries; and, to make matters worse, from other times. On the most general level, that of basic goals, this is entirely reasonable. But a new society, if it is to be achieved at all, will not be built from general ideals alone, and certainly not in pragmatic America. In America, the process of education and persuasion—and is there another way to build socialism in America?—must take the form of moving from the particular to the general, of explaining how the realization of American ideals and needs with respect to each of a long string of particular problems requires new institutions, and a new, flexible, and essentially radical spirit. Let me illustrate with only one example.

Currently, there is a vexed and growing concern for the already low and steadily deteriorating educational system in our country. Sputnik I merely triggered these attitudes, which had been growing much before 1957, and whose ramifications extend well beyond the question of scien-

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tific and technological competition. But if the American people desire a markedly improved educational system, do they know what the implications and possibilities of such a system would be, and what it will take to bring it about? The implications and possibilities by no means end, or even begin, with enlarged governmental expenditures on education. To mention only a few required accompaniments: 1) an improved and enlarged educational system requires more and better teachers on all levels, in turn requiring 2) enhanced prestige, status, and incomes for all teachers, stemming from a changed recognition of the role of education in society, and 3) the result would be a substantial change in the occupational structure, not just to accommodate larger numbers of teachers, but more importantly to allow meaningful absorption of more and better educated young people. This last would facilitate and require 4) a society turning away from the simple production of goods and services, and turning toward one increasingly emphasizing thought, culture, meaningful leisure, and education for its own sake—i.e., all this would imply a changed society, a changed economy, and a changed social outlook.

An educational program in and of itself would not and could not achieve all these changes; but neither can the kind of educational system increasingly desired by Americans be achieved if only it is sought. And much the same may be said of other problems: urban renewal, race relations (which, e.g., cannot be substantially improved in times of depression, but which can be improved greatly in the context of, say, an economic development program in the still underdeveloped American South—although just as clearly, more than economics is involved); housing, health, and so on.

Radicals can and must understand and explain that improvement along lines such as the foregoing is predicated upon a pervasive and self-conscious movement of social reform, construction, and reconstruction. It goes without saying—but it must nonetheless be said—that all the above also requires a substantial change in the structure of power and status in America: the businessman, the symbol of capitalism, must lose out in important ways. Thus, social ownership and planned operation of basic productive facilities must be sought for and achieved, if the society is not to suffer from the consequences of the private ownership and operation of those facilities. Not all the problems now afflicting America stem from capitalism; but none can be solved without lessening the power of capitalists to make, and to influence, decisions.

The resulting task of study, of education, of persuasion, and of political action is formidable; almost overwhelmingly so. Has there ever been a time when the alternatives have been so disastrous?

DOUGLAS DOWD *teaches courses in European and American economic history at Cornell University.*

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Paul Mattick

Anton Pannekoek (1873-1960)

ANTON PANNEKOEK'S LIFE span coincided with what was almost the whole history of the modern labor movement; he experienced its rise as a movement of social protest, its transformation into a movement of social reform, and its eclipse as an independent class movement in the contemporary world. But Pannekoek also experienced its revolutionary potentialities in the spontaneous upheavals which, from time to time, interrupted the even flow of social evolution. He entered the labor movement a Marxist and he died a Marxist, still convinced that if there is a future, it will be a socialist future.

As have many prominent Dutch socialists, Pannekoek came from the middle class and his interest in socialism, as he once remarked, was due to a scientific bent strong enough to embrace both society and nature. To him, Marxism was the extension of science to social problems; and the humanization of science, an aspect of the humanization of society. His great interest in social science was entirely compatible with his interest in natural science; he became not only one of the leading theoreticians of the radical labor movement but also an astronomer and mathematician of world renown.

This unifying attitude regarding natural and social science and philosophy determined the character of most of Pannekoek's work. One of his earliest publications, *Marxism and Darwinism*, elucidates the relationship between the two theories; one of his last, *Anthropogenesis*, deals with the origin of man. "The scientific importance of Marxism as well as of Darwinism," he wrote, "consists in their following out the theory of evolution, the one upon the domain of the organic world, of things animate; the other upon the domain of society." What was so important in Darwin's work was the recognition that "under certain circumstances some animal-kinds will necessarily develop into other animal-kinds." There was a "mechanism," a "natural law," which explained the evolutionary process. That Darwin identified this "natural law" with a struggle for existence analogous to capitalist competition did not affect his theory, nor did capitalist competition become therewith a "natural law."

It was Marx who formulated the propelling force for social development. "Historical materialism" referred to society; and though the world consists of both nature and society—as expressed in the need for man to eat in order to live—the laws of social development are not "laws of nature." And, of course, all "laws," whether of nature or society, are not absolute. But they are reliable enough, as verified by experience, to be considered "absolute" for purposes of human practice. At any rate, they deny sheer arbitrariness and free choice and relate to observed rules and regularities which allow for expectations that form the rationale for human activities.

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WITH MARX, PANNEKOEK HELD that it is "the production of the material necessities of life which forms the main structure of society and determines the political relations and social struggles." It is by way of class struggle that decisive social changes have been brought about and these changes have led from a less to a more productive level of social production. Socialism, too, implies the further development of the social forces of production, which are now hampered by the prevailing class relations. And this can be done only by a laboring population able to base its expectations on the emergence of a classless society.

In known history, stages of human and social existence are recognizable through changing tools and forms of production that alter the productivity of social labor. The "origin" of this process is lost in pre-history, but it is reasonable to assume that it is to be found in man's struggle for existence in a natural setting which enabled and forced him to develop a capacity for work and social organization. Since Friedrich Engels wrote *The Role of Labor in the Transformation of Ape into Man,* a whole literature has been built around the question of tools and human evolution.

In *Anthropogenesis,* Pannekoek returned to problems raised in his early *Marxism and Darwinism.* Just as there are "mechanisms" that account for social development and natural evolution, so there must be a "mechanism" that explains the rise of man in the animal world. Society, mutual aid, and even the use of "tools" are characteristic of other species besides man; what is specific to man is language, reason, and the making of tools. It is the last, the making of tools, which in all probability accounts for the simultaneous development of language and thought. Because the use of tools interposes itself between an organism and the outer world, between stimulus and action, it compels action, and hence thinking, to make a detour, from sense impressions by way of the tool, to the object.

Speech would be impossible without human thinking. The human mind has the capacity of abstract thought, of thinking in concepts. While mental life for both man and animal starts from sensations, which combine into images, the human mind differentiates between perceptions and actions by way of thought, just as the tool intervenes between man and that which he seeks to attain. The break between perceptions and actions, and the retention of past perceptions, allows for consciousness and thought, which establishes the inter-connections of perceptions and formulates theories applicable to practical actions. Natural science is a living proof of the close connection that exists between tools and thinking.

Because the tool is a separate and dead object which can be replaced when damaged, can be changed for a better one and differentiated into a multiplicity of forms for various uses, it assured man's extraordinary and rapid development; its use, in turn, assured the development of his brain. Labor, then, is the making and the "essence" of man, however much the worker may be despised and alienated. Work and the making of tools lifted man out of the animal world to the plane of social actions in order to cope with life's necessities.

The change from animal to man must have been a very long process. But the change from primitive to modern man is relatively short. What distinguishes primitive from modern man is not a different brain capacity but a difference in the uses of this capacity. Where social production stagnates, society stagnates; where the productivity of labor develops slowly, social change is also tardy. In modern society social production developed rapidly, creating new and destroying old class relationships. Not the natural struggle for existence but the social struggle for one or another

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concept of social organization has determined social development.

FROM ITS VERY BEGINNING, socialism has been both theory and practice. It is thus not restricted to those who are thought to benefit by the transformation from capitalism to socialism. Being concerned with the classless society and the ending of social strife, and by attracting intelligent men from all layers of society, socialism demonstrated its possible realization in advance. Already as a young student of the natural sciences, specializing in astronomy, Pannekoek entered the Sozial-Demokratische Arbeiterpartij and found himself, at once, in its left-wing, on the side of Herman Gorter and Frank van der Goes.

This party, under the influence of its non-Marxian founder, Domela Nieuwenhuis, had been more militant than the strictly Marxist organizations within the Second International. Anti-militarism was its foremost concern and Nieuwenhuis advocated the use of the General Strike for the prevention of war. He could not get a majority for his proposals and he detected, quite early, the trend towards class collaboration within the International. He opposed the exclusion of the Anarchists from the International and his experiences as a member of Parliament led him to reject parliamentarism as a weapon of social emancipation. The "anarchist-syndicalist" tendencies, represented by Nieuwenhuis, split the organization, and a new socialist party, more akin to the "model" German Social-Democracy, came into being. However, the radical ideology of the old party entered the traditions of the Dutch socialist movement.

This traditional radicalism found expression in the new party's monthly, *De Nieuwe Tijd,* particularly in the contributions of Gorter and Pannekoek who fought the growing opportunism of the party leaders. In 1909 the left wing group around Gorter was expelled and established a new organization, the Sozial-Demokratische Partij. Pannekoek had meanwhile gone to Germany. He lectured in the party schools of the German Sozial-Demokratische Partei, wrote for its theoretical publications and for various other papers, especially the *Bremer Burgerzeitung.* He associated himself with Gorter's new organization which, years later, under the leadership of van Revesteyn, Wijnkoop, and Ceton became the Moscow oriented Communist Partij.

Though in the tradition of the "libertarian socialism" of Nieuwenhuis, Pannekoek's opposition to reformism and social-democratic "revisionism" was a Marxist opposition to the "official Marxism" in both its "orthodox" and "revisionist" form. In its "orthodox" form, Marxism served as an ideology that covered up a non-Marxian practice; in its "revisionist" form it was destroying both Marxist theory and practice. But Pannekoek's defense of Marxism was not that of the doctrinaire; more than anyone else he recognized that Marxism is not a dogma but a method of thinking about social issues in the actual process of social transformation. Not only were certain aspects of Marxian theory superseded by the development of Marxism itself, but some of its theses, brought forth under definite conditions, would lose their validity when conditions changed.

THE FIRST WORLD WAR brought Pannekoek back to Holland. Prior to the war, together with Radek, Paul Frohlich and Johann Knief, he had been active in Bremen. The Bremen group of left-radicals, the International Communists, later amalgamated with the Spartakus Bund, thus laying the foundation for the Communist Party of Germany. Anti-war groups in Germany found their leaders in Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg and Franz Mehring; anti-war sentiment in Holland centered around Herman Gorter, Anton Pannekoek, and Henriette Roland-Holst. In Zimmerwald and Kien-

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thal these groups joined Lenin and his followers in condemning the imperialist war and advocating proletarian actions for either peace or revolution. The Russian Revolution of 1917, hailed as a possible beginning of a world-revolutionary movement, was supported by both Dutch and German radicals despite previous basic differences between them and the Leninists.

While still in prison, Rosa Luxemburg expressed misgivings about the authoritarian tendencies of bolshevism. She feared for the socialist content of the Russian Revolution unless it should find a rectifying support in a proletarian revolution in the West. Her position of critical support towards the bolshevik regime was shared by Gorter and Pannekoek. They worked nevertheless in the new Communist Party and towards the establishment of a new International. In their views, however, this International was to be new not only in name but also in outlook, and with regard to both the socialist goal and the way to reach it.

The social-democratic concept of socialism is state-socialism, to be won by way of democratic-parliamentary procedures. Universal suffrage and trade unionism were the instruments to accomplish a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism. Lenin and the bolsheviks did not believe in a peaceful transformation and advocated the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. But their concept of socialism was still that of social-democracy, and instrumentalities to this end still included parliamentarism and trade unionism.

However, Czarism was not overthrown by democratic processes and trade union activities. The organization of the Revolution was that of spontaneously-evolving soviets, of workers' and soldiers' councils, which soon gave way, however, to the bolshevik dictatorship. Just as Lenin was ready to make use of the soviet movement, so was he ready to utilize any other form of activity, including parliamentarism and trade unionism, to gain his end—dictatorial power for his party camouflaged as the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Having reached his goal in Russia, he tried to consolidate his regime with the help of revolutionary movements in Western Europe and, should this fail, by trying to gain sufficient influence in the Western labor movement to secure at least its indirect support. Because of the immediate needs of the bolshevik regime, as well as the political ideas of its leaders, the Communist International was not the beginning of a new labor movement but merely an attempt to gain control of the old movement and to use it to secure the bolshevik regime in Russia.

The social patriotism of the Western labor organizations and their policy of class collaboration during the war convinced the revolutionary workers of Western Europe that these organizations could not be used for revolutionary purposes. They had become institutions bound to the capitalist system and had to be destroyed together with capitalism. However unavoidable and necessary for the early development of socialism and the struggle for immediate needs, parliamentarism and trade unionism were no longer instruments of class struggle. When they did enter the basic social conflict, it was on the side of capital. For Pannekoek this was not a question of bad leadership, to be solved by a better one, but of changed social conditions wherein parliamentarism and trade unionism played no longer an emancipatory role. The capitalist crisis in the wake of the war posed the question of revolution and the old labor movement could not be turned into a revolutionary force since socialism has no room for trade unions or formal bourgeois democracy.

WHEREVER, DURING THE war, workers fought for immediate demands they had to do so against the trade unions, as in the mass-strikes in Holland, Ger-

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many, Austria and Scotland. They organized their activities by way of shop committees, shop stewards or workers' councils, independently of existing trade unions. In every truly revolutionary situation, in Russia in 1905 and again in 1917, as well as in the Germany and Austria of 1918, workers' and soldiers' councils (soviets) arose spontaneously and attempted to organize economic and political life by extending the council system on a national scale. The rule of workers' councils is the dictatorship of the proletariat, for the councils are elected at the point of production, thus leaving unrepresented all social layers not associated with production. In itself, this may not lead to socialism, and, in fact, the German workers' councils voted themselves out of existence by supporting the *National Assembly*. Yet, proletarian self determination requires a social organization which leaves the decision making power over production and distribution in the hands of the workers.

In this council movement, Pannekoek recognized the beginnings of a new revolutionary labor movement which, at the same time, was the beginning of a socialist reorganization of society. This movement could arise and maintain itself only in opposition to the old labor movement. Its principles attracted the most militant sector of the rebellious proletariat, much to the chagrin of Lenin who could not conceive of a movement not under the control of a party, or the state, and who was busy emasculating the soviets in Russia. But neither could he agree to an international communist movement not under the absolute control of his own party. At first by way of intrigue, and then openly, after 1920, the bolsheviks tried to get the communist movement away from its anti parliamentary and anti trade unionist course, under the pretext that it was necessary not to lose contact with the masses which still adhered to the old organizations. Lenin's *"Left-wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder* was directed first of all against Gorter and Pannekoek, the spokesmen of the communist council movement.

THE HEIDELBERG CONVENTION in 1919 split the German Communist Party into a Leninist minority and a majority adhering to the principles of anti parliamentarism and anti trade unionism on which the party had originally been based. But there was now a new dividing question, namely, that of party or class dictatorship. The non Leninist communists adopted the name, Communist Workers Party of Germany (KAPD), and a similar organization was later founded in Holland. Party communists opposed council communists and Pannekoek sided with the latter. The council communists attended the Second Congress of the Third International in the capacity of sympathizers. The conditions of admission to the international — complete subordination of the various national organizations to the will of the Russian Party—divorced the new council movement from the Communist International altogether.

The activities of the Communist International against the "ultra left" were the first direct Russian interventions in the life of communist organizations in other countries. The pattern of control never changed and subordinated, eventually, the whole world communist movement to the specific needs of Russia and the bolshevik state. Although the Russian-dominated movement, as Pannekoek and Gorter had predicted, never "captured" the Western trade unions, nor dominated the old socialist organizations by divorcing their followers from their leaders, they did destroy the independence and radical character of the emerging new communist labor movement. With the enormous prestige of a successful political revolution on their side, and with the failure of the German revolution, they could not fail to win a large majority in the communist movement to the principles of Leninism. The ideas and

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the movement of council communism declined steadily and practically disappeared altogether in the fascist reign of terror and the second world war.

While Lenin's fight against the "ultra left" was the first indication of the "counter revolutionary" tendencies of bolshevism, Pannekoek's and Gorter's struggle against the Leninist corruption of the new labor movement was the beginning of anti bolshevism from a proletarian point of view. And this, of course, is the only consistent anti bolshevism there is. Bourgeois "anti bolshevism" is the current ideology of imperialist capital competition, which waxes and wanes according to changing national power relations. The Weimar Republic, for instance, fought bolshevism on the one hand and on the other made secret deals with the Red Army and open business deals with bolshevism in order to bolster its own political and economic position within the world-competitive process. There was the Hitler-Stalin pact and the invasion of Russia. The Western allies of yesterday are the cold-war enemies of today, to mention only the most obvious of "inconsistencies" which, in fact, are the "politics" of capitalism, determined, as they are, by nothing but the profit and power principles.

Anti bolshevism must presuppose anti capitalism since bolshevik state capitalism is merely another type of capitalism. This was not as obvious, of course, in 1920 as it is now. It required experience with Russian bolshevism to learn how socialism cannot be realized. The transfer of control of the means of production from private owners to the state and the centralistic and antagonistic determination of production and distribution still leaves intact capital labor relations as a relation between exploiters and exploited, rulers and ruled. In its development, it merely leads to a more modern form of capitalism where capital is directly —and not indirectly, as it was previously—the collective property of a politically maintained ruling class. It is in this direction that all capitalist systems move, thus reducing capitalist "anti-bolshevism" to a mere imperialist struggle for world control.

In retrospect, it is easy to see that the differences between Pannekoek and Lenin could not be resolved by way of argument. In 1920, however, it was still possible to hope that the Western working class would take an independent course — not towards a modified capitalism but towards its abolition. Answering Lenin's *"Left-wing" Communism: An Infantile Disease,* Gorter still tried to convince the bolsheviks of the "errors" of their ways, by pointing to the differences in socio-economic conditions between Russia and the West, and to the fact that the "tactics" which brought bolshevism to power in Russia could not possibly apply to a proletarian revolution in the West. The further development of bolshevism revealed, however, that the "bourgeois" elements in Leninism were due not to a "faulty theory," but had their source in the character of the Russian Revolution itself, which had been conceived and was carried out as a state capitalist revolution sustained by a pseudo-Marxian ideology.

IN NUMEROUS ARTICLES IN anti bolshevik communist journals, and until the end of his life, Pannekoek elucidated upon the character of bolshevism and the Russian Revolution. Just as he did in his earlier criticism of Social Democracy, so here, too, he did not accuse the bolsheviks of a "betrayal" of working-class principles. He pointed out that the Russian Revolution, though an important episode in the development of the working class movement, aspired only to a system of production which could be called state socialism, or state capitalism, which are one and the same thing. It did not betray its own goal any more than trade unions "betray" trade unionism. Just as there cannot be any other type of trade unionism than the

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existing one, so one cannot expect state capitalism to be something other than itself.

The Russian Revolution, however, had been fought under the banner of Marxism, and the bolshevik state is almost generally considered a Marxist regime. Marxism, and soon Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, remained the ideology of Russian state capitalism. To show what the "Marxism" of Leninism really implied, Pannekoek undertook a critical examination of its philosophical basis, published under the title, *Lenin as Philosopher*, in 1938.

Lenin's philosophical ideas appeared in his work, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, in Russian in 1908 and in German and English translations in 1927. Around 1904 certain Russian socialists, Bogdanov in particular, had taken an interest in modern Western natural philosophy, especially in the ideas of Ernst Mach, and tried to combine these with Marxism. They gained some influence within the Russian socialist party and Lenin set out to destroy this influence by attacking its apparent philosophical source.

Though not in a philosophical sense, Marx had called his system of thought materialism. It referred to the material base of all social existence and change and grew out of his rejection of both the philosophical materialism of Feuerbach and the philosophical idealism of Hegel. For bourgeois materialism, nature was objectively given reality and man was determined by natural laws. This direct confrontation of individual man and external nature, and the inability to see society and social labor as an indivisible aspect of the whole of reality, distinguished middle-class materialism from historical materialism.

Early bourgeois materialism, or natural philosophy, had held that through sense experience and the intellectual activity derived therefrom, it would be possible to gain absolute, valid knowledge of physical reality—thought to be made up of matter. In an attempt to carry the materialist representation of the objective world to the process of knowledge itself, Mach and the positivists denied the objective reality of matter, since physical concepts must be constructed from sense experience and thus retain their subjectivity. This disturbed Lenin greatly, because for him, knowledge was only what reflects objective truth; truth, that is, about matter. In Mach's influence in socialist circles, he saw a corruption of Marxian materialism. The subjective element in Mach's theory of knowledge became, in Lenin's mind, an idealist aberration and a deliberate attempt to revive religious obscurantism.

It was true, of course, that the critical progress of science found idealistic interpreters who would give comfort to the religionists. Some Marxists began to defend the materialism of the once revolutionary bourgeoisie against the new idealism—and the new science as well—of the established capitalist class. To Lenin this seemed particularly important as the Russian revolutionary movement, still on the verge of the bourgeois revolution, waged its ideological struggle to a large extent with the scientific and philosophical arguments of the early Western bourgeoisie.

By confronting Lenin's attack on *Empiriocriticism* with its real scientific content, Pannekoek not only revealed Lenin's biased and distorted exposition of the ideas of Mach and Avenarius, but also his inability to criticize their work from a Marxian point of view. Lenin attacked Mach not from the point of view of historical materialism, but from that of an earlier and scientifically less developed bourgeois materialism. In this use of middle class materialism in defense of "Marxism" Pannekoek saw an additional indication of the half bourgeois, half proletarian character of bolshevism and of the Russian Revolution itself. It went together with the state capi-

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talist concept of "socialism," with the authoritarian attitudes towards spontaneity and organization, with the outdated and unrealizable principle of national self-determination, and with Lenin's conviction that only the middle-class intelligentsia is able to develop a revolutionary consciousness and is thus destined to lead the masses. The combination of bourgeois materialism and revolutionary Marxism which characterized Lenin's philosophy reappeared with the victorious bolshevism as the combination of neocapitalist practice and socialist ideology.

HOWEVER, THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION was a progressive event of enormous significance comparable to the French Revolution. It also revealed that a capitalist system of production is not restricted to the private property relations which dominated its laissez-faire period. With the subsiding feeble wave of revolutionary activities in the wake of the first World War, capitalism reestablished itself, despite the prevailing crisis conditions, by way of increasing state interventions in its economy. In the weaker capitalist nations this took the form of fascism and led to the intensification of imperialist policies which, finally, led to the Second World War. Even more than the first, the Second World War showed clearly that the existing labor movement was no longer a class movement but part and parcel of the various national systems of contemporary capitalism.

IN OCCUPIED HOLLAND, during the Second World War, Pannekoek began his work on *Workers' Councils*, which he completed in 1947. It was a summing-up of his life experience with the theory and practice of the international labor movement and the development and transformation of capitalism in various nations and as a whole. This history of capitalism, and of the struggle against capitalism, ends with the triumph of a revived, though changed, capitalism after the Second World War, and with the utter subjugation of working class interests to the competitive needs of the two rival capitalist systems preparing for a new world war. While in the West, the still existing labor organizations aspire, at best, to no more than the replacement of monopoly by state-capitalism, the so-called communist world movement hopes for a world revolution after the model of the Russian Revolution. In either case, socialism is confounded with public ownership where the state is master of production and workers are still subjected to a ruling class.

The collapse of the capitalism of old was also the collapse of the old labor movement. What this movement considered to be socialism turns out to be is a harsher form of capitalism. But unlike the ruling class, which adapts itself quickly to changed conditions, the working class, by still adhering to traditional ideas and activities, finds itself in a powerless and apparently hopeless situation. And as economic changes only gradually change ideas, it may still take considerable time before a new labor movement—fitted to the new conditions—will arise. For labor's task is still the same, that is, the abolition of the capitalist mode of production and the realization of socialism. And this can be brought about only when the workers organize themselves and society in such a way as to assure a planned social production and distribution determined by the producers themselves. When such a labor movement arises, it will recognize its origins in the ideas of council communism and in those of one of its most consistent proponents—Anton Pannekoek.

PAUL MATTICK *was an associate of Anton Pannekoek. He is a noted Marxian economist and his articles have appeared in many radical periodicals.*

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Currents in Japanese Socialist Thought

新しい安保条約ばれるま

右派の一部は中立に批判的な立

革において国民から

「米国と軍事同盟」か「中立」かをめぐって世論がふっとうした。

とって、

を加えられ

を半分以

にのびてい

立政策と

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ならない。

とっていこ

ところが、第二次大

後の総選挙では、いずれの場合にも中心の問題は外交であり、「日米安保条約」か

「中立」かをめぐっ

われてきた。資本主義か社会主義かの対立が直接の争点とはならなかった。戦後

の日本政治の特異性

つがここにある。

社会主義者の場合には、国民の審判もまた外

ないこと

を証明した。ところがこ

がわずかに三議席

、その以後は

党は四三議席をとり

日本の共産党が自

乏しいからである。とくに外交政策においてはそれがはなはだしく、中・ソ両国に

いつも追随している

共産党はもともと社会党の唱える中立には、これを「幻想」であるとして保守党以上

には厳しい攻撃を加えていた。当時は中・ソ両国も日本の中立を支持しなかった。ところが五八年の末にこ

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Introduction: A Critical Evaluation

LEWIS FEUER

THERE HAS HITHERTO BEEN little contact between Japanese and American liberals and socialists. When John Dewey spent several months in Japan after the First World War, he was disheartened by the militarist absolutism which dominated the country, and he was at a loss what to advise Japanese liberals. The American occupation after the Second World War brought social and political reforms, but the rapidly growing Japanese socialist parties and labor unions had no sense of solidarity with either the American or European movements. It is well that the effort now be made to revive the spirit of socialist internationalism, and that Japanese and American liberals, confronting the problems of making their Pacific Ocean a bond, indeed, of peace, engage in a common discussion.

The Japanese socialists have indeed been more completely isolated than any other similar group in the world. The Communist empires distrust them, while America, in its turn, denies them visas. They are courted neither by the Cominform nor the State Department. Consequently, their traits of insularity are reinforced, and they must repeat painfully steps in the critique of Marxism which were made in America twenty years ago.

The Japan Socialist Party at the election last November received almost eleven million votes, and won almost a third of the seats in the House of Representatives. In terms of popular vote, it is one of the world's foremost socialist parties. In actuality, however, it has affected very little the consciousness of the people. Born after the Second World War from the merger of all sorts of socialists, Marxian, Kautskyan, Christian, Fabian, Populist, it gained very quickly a big electoral following, but achieved little in the way of promoting a socialist consciousness among the Japanese people. Its membership has remained astonishingly small,—only about fifty thousand. The ratio of its members to its voting supporters is probably the smallest among the socialist parties of the world. Its accomplishment in Parliament is not commensurate with its voting strength. It carries the tactic of class warfare into the Diet Chamber but its influence on actual legislation is not what one would have expected from a skillfull parliamentary socialist party.

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Most important, however, has been its failure to instill a socialist consciousness among the workingmen, farmers, middle class, and intellectuals. Japan still remains gerontocratic, familistic, formalized, authoritarian; its teachers are radicals, but are denied the right to run or campaign for political office. The massive trade unions are relatively new and inexperienced; among the largest are the teachers and governmental workers. Indeed the movement as a whole is much less that of the working class than in America. The majority of its textile workers, young women, miserably underpaid, live in "dormitories" which are proletarian barracks, policed by an espionage system. Many Japanese laborers work fourteen hours a day, and have only two free days a month. The Socialist Party engages in vigorous periodic crises but not in an everyday reconstruction of Japanese life. The Democratic Socialist Party, formed early in 1960 in a secession from the Socialist Party, has despite an intelligently conceived program, failed signally to impress the Japanese people. Its representation in Parliament declined from 40 to 17 seats, and its leadership especially has failed to win the moral respect of the younger people. The American occupation, although a foreign military force, thus far has been the chief liberalizing force in Japanese social and personal existence.

ESPECIALLY ACUTE IN JAPAN is the separation of generations which obtains between the youth of the Zengakuren, the National Federation of Student Self-Governing Associations, and both the Socialist and Democratic Socialist Parties. At the Socialist headquarters, a Party secretary belittled to me the significance of Zengakuren. Their interest in politics, he said, was transient; of the more than sixty persons in the socialist secretariat, only three or four were active as students in Zengakuren. At the Democratic Socialist office, they told me likewise that they had no members among the Zengakuren. The Zengakuren leaders, they said, were rich boys who could engage in radical political activity because they didn't have to worry about getting jobs after they graduated from their universities. At the same time, the Democratic Socialists acknowledged that the Zengakuren leaders were young men with "pure minds" who saw certain evils, above all, the growing gap between rich and poor, and refused to accept them; they tended toward political extremism because the wrongs they saw affected them with an undue pessimism.

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The Zengakuren activists, on their side, feel little affinity with the older generation of Socialists and Democratic Socialists. The older generation of socialists discredited itself in the minds of the youth by collaborating with the Japanese fascists and militarists during the war and pre-war periods. At election time, the Zengakuren "main stream" students, when they voted, voted Socialist rather than Communist, but there is no warmth between the Zengakuren and the existing Socialist movement. The memory of the socialist and labor leaders participating in Tojo's one-party system is too strong for that.

The Zengakuren activists look for a sense of the heroic in the leftist leadership which the Socialists have lacked. The Socialist parties, to their mind, are groups of practical parliamentarians whose dislike for political theory and theorists springs from their desire not to think through to the basis of things. They are as unheroic in their thought as in their action, and the Zengakuren look for leaders whom they can trust and admire. Until this rift of the generations is overcome, and the young socialists find their place in the Socialist Party, the latter will remain a tired leftist machine which, from time to time, salvages its socialist conscience by physical forays in the parliamentary chamber. The Zengakuren graduates, for their part, will disappear into political impotence and quiescence unless they come to terms with participation in the Japanese political process through the Socialist parties, and give to them their own youthful vigor and courage. Since the Socialist parties are so small, the Zengakuren graduates could very soon have a significant influence.

I HAD READ SOMEWHERE that the Zengakuren activists are inarticulate nationalists who are unconsciously continuing the battle of their elder brothers against the Americans; the Kamikaze pilot has found his successor, it is said, in the angry anti-American demonstrator. Actually there is little truth to this characterization. The Japanese radical students are beginning to go back for their inspiration to the Twenties and early Thirties, to the pioneers of the socialist movement who were destroyed by prisons, policemen, and assassins. They were flocking last fall by the thousands to see a stilted film *Struggle Without Weapons* which tells the life-story of Senji Yamamoto, a Labor-Farmer member of the Diet who was murdered by a reactionary in 1929. "Yamasen," as he was called, fought a martyr's battle against the militarists, and the young generation, learning about him feels that it is taking up the fight where such as he left off. The Zengakuren feel that they have renewed the battle against the imperialists

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and anti-democrats which the true leftists lost thirty years ago. The Socialist chairman, Inejiro Asanuma, who was assassinated last October, saw the film a week before his death; at later showings, the audiences rose in his memory before the performance.

The Zengakuren leaders feel that Marxism must be revitalized. Some of them have been reading Sartre's critique of Marxism; also they were much impressed by his endorsement of their actions in May and June, 1960. Although they don't call themselves existentialists, they find themselves in selective accord with elements in existentialist philosophy. They have pursued their political disagreement with Stalinism to its philosophical foundation. The "subject-object" problem especially fascinates students like Koyama. The notion that there is an inevitable law of history which dictates one and only one possible course of human action is repugnant to them; they find in it the source of Stalinism. So Koyama and his friends have read Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-criticism,* and found inadequate its theory of perception as passive reflection. Seeking the repressed ethical basis of Marxism they have, like many Western Marxists, sought out the writings of the young Marx and Feuerbach. In that awkward vocabulary, they speak of restoring to Marxism the dialectical interrelation of subject and object, and overcoming the Stalinist distortion which obliterated the subject.

Karl Marx said that existence determines consciousness, but as I talked in Japan last year with such persons as Kenichi Koyama, it seemed to me that an intellectual might well be defined as one whose consciousness determines his existence. Koyama was President of Zengakuren from 1956 to 1958, and its General Secretary from 1955 to 1956. He is a graduate student in economics at Tokyo University, and has been the intellectual spokesman for Zengakuren.

There is in his character that mixture of romanticism and realism which has always characterized the young socialist revolutionaries. He pores over Vol. IV of *Capital,* and reads papers to seminars and study groups on dialectical method in economics. He studies the development of capitalism in Japan. But he also quotes passages from Wordsworth's Nature poetry and Heine's love songs, and his favorite novel is Turgenev's *A Nobleman's Nest.* Would an American student radical today feel much kinship with the brooding Lavretsky or the Byronic Rudin? The young Japanese Marxists, have, however, that sense of a decaying society and the feeling of pending events which pervades Turgenev's novels, and like their Russian forebears, they have a faith in the sheer force of their will to impose their initiative on the direction of future developments. They have the revolu-

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tionist's total dedication. They renounce purely social pleasures, and spend their hours, and in emergencies, days and nights, in the dusty, littered store-room which they have converted into a national headquarters. Tuberculosis, their national ailment, takes its toll of the young Japanese intellectuals.

Koyama, like almost all the recent leaders of Zengakuren, has been a Communist, and has been expelled from the Communist Party. The young activists of Zengakuren have seen the corruptions of Stalinism at first hand, and have vigorously fought the Party Bureaucrats. They have studied Trotsky, but with one principal exception, have not become Trotskyists. That exception was Shiokawa, a Tokyo student of Oriental history, who served as president of Zengakuren for a half-year in 1958. Shiokawa, a young man of high intelligence, felt that only the residue of fear of Trotsky's name derived from Zengakuren's Stalinist past prevented the students from becoming Trotskyists. Also he felt that Zengakuren should be concerned more with organizing workers rather than with continual demonstrations against the government. Shiokawa lost his leadership, and together with his Trotskyist associates, was ousted from the Zengakuren Executive Commitee. Since then, they have helped organize a small branch of the Fourth International called the Revolutionary Communist League.

The latest trend in Zengakuren is remarkably enough a "Blanquist" one. The new student leaders are taking on the vanguardian attitudes of an intellectual class which aspires to political power. They are self-conscious representatives of the intellectual elite; disaffected by the passivity of the Japanese workers and farmers, they look to their own courage and intelligence to remake society. Their guiding book is Lenin's *What is to be Done?* with its mission for the socialist intellectuals, rather than Marx's *Capital,* with its vision of a progressive proletariat. Koyama and his friends fight against the Blanquist trend; one wonders whether "intelligarchy" (to invent a term) is becoming the ideology of the socialist intellectuals, or whether it is an aberration nurtured in Japan perhaps by the special immaturity of its working class.

IKUTARO SHIMIZU IS ONE OF the few intellectuals of the older generation whom the Zengakuren students call "sensei" (teacher). He has recently been active in organizing a new leftist non-communist group called the Gendai Shiso Kenkyu Kai, the Association for the Study of Contemporary Thought. Shimizu lived through the blight of the thirties when liberalism could find no voice against the rising militarism. Educated at Tokyo Imperial University where he wrote a thesis on Comte, Shimizu found academic doors closed to him. He supported himself by compiling anonymously books on child care based on American works; he learned English by reading the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.* Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct* profoundly influenced him with its conception of social psychology as the basis for liberal social reform. He believes that while Marxism is true on the macroscopic level of history, the pragmatic outlook is most valid in the microscopic world of everyday problems. Recently, he has been deeply influenced by existentialist ideas. In the tur-

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moil of the demonstrations against the Security Treaty, under the necessity of making choices as to whether or not to participate in a crucial, dangerous action, almost everyone, he feels, became something of an existentialist. Especially was this true for the large number of former Communists who, he says, no longer had a Party Committee to decide for them, but had to decide for themselves.

Like most Japanese leftist intellectuals, Shimizu has not participated directly in a political party. The Socialist Party asked him to be a candidate for Parliament, but he preferred to remain independent. He has been a vigorous critic of Stalinism. When he was invited to the Soviet Union by the Academy of Science in 1954, he identified himself as "a humble student of John Dewey," and persisted in questioning his hosts as to how they could affirm pragmatism to be the philosophy of imperialism. He is now engaged in making available to Japanese readers for the first time the writings of Dewey in defense of Trotsky in 1937. As a sociologist, he has tried to analyze the "return to nothingness" propensity in the Japanese mentality; his recent study on the response to the earthquake of 1923 is part of this critique of the Japanese nullitarian ideology.

The older Japanese intellectuals especially have a strong guilt-feeling for their weakness against the militarists in the thirties. They wish to abreact the trauma of their failure, and they therefore, it seems to me, read into the Sixties an analysis of events which was valid rather for the Thirties. Consequently, they see in the Japanese-American Security Treaty a revival of capitalist imperialism, and often insist that class struggle is a necessary tactic in their agitation for peace. The Japanese leftists have, in my opinion, an entirely wrong conception of the "cold war" as an emanation from "American imperialism." They have failed to see that Stalinism was not simply a domestic phenomenon in the internal workings of Soviet society, but that it expressed itself as far as it could *externally* as well. Stalinism injected an atmosphere of terror into international relations, provoked the Berlin crisis of 1948, the Czechoslovak coup, the attempted overthrow of Tito, the opposition to the Marshall Plan, and the Korean War. Stalinism prevented the kind of cooperation between Communist and Socialist which might have renovated post-war European democracy. All this the Japanese leftists tend to overlook as they reiterate the exhausted phrases of Japan's having become a colony of American imperialism. Struggling to overcome a guilt for their past, the Japanese intellectuals have made a whipping-boy of the present.

The awareness of differences, however, should not make us forget the essential community of spirit which joins men such as Koyama and Shimizu with American liberals and socialists. The basic philosophy is the same. Above all, Japanese thought is fluid, searching and re-thinking.

Professor Yoshhiko Seki has, with a singular honesty and thoroughness, set forth the problems which confront a democratic socialist party in Japan. Professor Seki, the principal author of his party's program, is a political scientist at the Tokyo Metropolitan University.

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WILL NEUTRALISM CONTINUE TO BE the dominant ideology of the Japanese Socialist Party and Japanese Marxists? Its shortcomings seem to me to stand out in the straightforward presentation of Mr. Hiroo Wada, chairman of the International Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Socialist Party, and I wonder whether Mr. Wada would write today, after the Soviet fifty-megaton bomb, as he did three months ago. Mr. Wada calls for the United States to restore to Japan the Bonin Islands and Okinawa; I regret that he does not likewise call upon the Soviet Union to return the Kurile Islands.

Neutralism, says Mr. Wada, involves the struggle to disarm Japan completely in the full realization of the spirit of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Would a disarmed Japan be better able than was Tibet to safeguard its independence against an armed China? I found Japanese socialists last year curiously reluctant to talk about Tibet; invariably they pleaded lack of information. They tended with a kind of rationalistic wish-fulfilment to argue that a Communist form of imperialism was impossible, and to insist that it was not in the self-interest of either the Soviet Union or Communist China to engage in aggression against a disarmed Japan. At the same time, however, they would not wish the United States to revert to an isolationist policy and they feel that America is now too mature a power to entertain such a course.

Neutralism indeed is today a pseudo-neutralism, for the neutralist country relies on American arms to guarantee its independence while it indulges in self-righteous gestures of absolute pacifism. At its worst, neutralism can become a crude rationalization by means of which the poorest countries extract the maximum economic aid from the duopolists of political power, the United States and the Soviet Union. There were once ideologies of imperialism to justify the extraction of super-profits from backward countries; now the latter, by an equal and opposite reaction, have the ideology of neutralism to extract super-grants from the rival political powers.

The neutralists are latter-day Aristotelians; they believe political virtue lies in the mean between two extremes. But to apply this crude formula, you have to choose extremes. Stalin and Hitler were opposite extremes, but moral balance was lost when Harry Truman was taken as an extreme to replace Hitler. This is precisely what neutralists have tended to do.

Neutralism today has become a commentary of feeble protest. The neutralist countries have not been able to constitute themselves into an international moral force to press for civil liberties and democracy everywhere. Did a single Asian neutralist country ever speak up against the suppression of free thought and expression in the Soviet Union, or against the Stalinist wave of anti-Semitism? I found a regrettable indifference with respect to such questions among Japanese left socialists. The neutralist countries have not spoken to the Soviet world of the democratic precondition for an enduring peace. For the still unresolved problem in international relations is the permanent pall of insecurity which the Soviet Union casts upon other countries simply by the very fact that it is a dictatorship, with its major decisions enveloped in secrecy.

The Zengakuren happily are not neutralists. They take stands directly and clearly on questions of right and wrong, even when they make mistakes.

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Immediately after the Soviet Union announced it was resuming the testing of nuclear bombs, the central committee of Zengakuren convened in emergency session, and denounced the Soviet action as a blow against the freedom of the working class of the world, in language modeled on the *Communist Manifesto*. Then they called for a demonstration against the Soviet decision. The Japanese Socialist Party at first responded with the usual neutralist equation of the Soviet Union and the United States as equals in the evil-doing of nuclear tests, but since then, with the rising radio-active fallouts on their islands, they have begun to acknowledge the ethical inequation produced by the Soviet bombs.

The left wing of the Japanese Socialist Party still has an ideological impediment to finding its own voice. At the moving memorial service for their assassinated chairman, Asanuma, their loyalty to Marxian doctrine made it hard for them to speak clearly against the incipient right-wing terrorism. As Marxists, they had to ridicule the right wing extremists for thinking that individual terrorism could affect the course of history, but as men of common sense, they nonetheless went on to say that theirs was the responsibility to see to it that "government by assassination," which eviscerated liberalism and the labor movement in the thirties, would not return to their country. One hopes that the common sense will triumph over the political dogma.

The Japanese people, by and large, have spontaneous warm feelings towards America. They speak often of the liberalization of family, schools, trade unions, and government which America inspired. This was indeed the first time in the history of the world that an army of occupation brought democratization and liberties. For this reason, the residues of anti-American ideology within the Japanese Socialist Party are more a sign of doctrinal rigidity than a link to their people. When their own consciousness is more fully socialist, I think they can look forward to the support of the majority of their country.

MEANWHILE, JAPANESE SOCIETY IS CHANGING in basic psychological ways. A heritage of masochism which pervaded their everyday life is being shed. Last year I talked for several hours with a group of Japanese farmers' wives in a small agrarian village. They told me they had television sets, and to my surprise, that they enjoyed American Western films most. They explained that they liked the happy endings. The fact that the good man won, and that things happened so quickly. In the old days, they said, a play was worthwhile if they cried a lot, and always the good were defeated. The Western cowboy film has become in Asia the vehicle of an optimist philosophy of history. These women were full of praise for the electric rice boilers that saved them lots of time which they used to publish their own club newspaper. They were active in the local P.T.A. These homely beginnings and the spontaneous growth of local democratic associations will be, in the long run, the most solid foundation for a liberal Japanese socialism.

LEWIS FEUER *is Chairman of the Social Science Integrated Course and Professor of Philosophy at the University of California. He is the author of* Psychoanalysis and Ethics (1955); Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism (1958); *Editor of the anthology,* Marx and Engels: Basic Writing on Politics and Philosophy (1959).

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KENICHI KOYAMA

The Zengakuren

THERE ARE FEW COUNTRIES in which the gap between generations is so extreme as in Japan. This is largely due to the rapid transformation of Japanese society during the past century. In less than a hundred years, Japan has moved from a feudal society to the stage of the primitive accumulation of capital, and rapidly emerged as a mature capitalist and imperialist power. In this century, Japan was further transformed by war and aggression, imperialist expansion abroad and brutal exploitation and suppression of the people at home. The older generation was unable to react adequately to these rapid changes which has made it vulnerable to the criticism of a highly conscious new generation.

On the other hand, modern political, social and ideological events have placed great pressures on young Japanese students and they have seriously and independently tried to comprehend and meet them. Japanese students have embraced a revolutionary image of the future ideal human society and for this they have suffered a great deal in their struggle to overcome the ugly realities of contemporary Japan. In this student movement lies the promise of the future and the revolutionary power needed to achieve it. Those who ignore or mock at this will be ignored by history itself. Ours is not the age of impasse and I believe that the youth of the world will find the way out themselves.

The Marxist leanings of the post-war Japanese youth has its roots in the telescoped and brutalized evolution of Japanese capitalism. If it was true as Marx suggested in 1844 that "For Germany, fundamental revolution or universal human liberation is not a utopian dream, but a revolution which would never touch the pillar of the house is a dream," it is even more true for post-war Japan. The post-war generation was keenly conscious of the need for a thoroughgoing socialist revolution. That, and not incomplete democratic reform, could save the people of a nation that was almost completely ruined after the Second World War.

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Indeed, it was not only the students who sought a radical solution to the tragedy of post-war Japan; mass movements of peace and democracy fermented within Japan after the war and many workers and intellectuals believed that nothing short of Marxian socialism could guarantee the success of these movements. Nevertheless, the promise of socialist revolution did not materialize largely because the leaders of the pre-war generation, on the whole, were corrupted or defeated by the reaction and militarism which characterized Japanese life. The pre-war generation proved incapable of providing either political or ideological leaders commensurate with the socialist potential in post-war Japan. It was not merely that the conservative parties were nothing but bands of war criminals and fascists, considered enemies of the people by the youth, but the parties of the left were also held in low esteem—and justifiably so. The Democratic-Socialist Party had been the wartime accomplice of the Conservatives, the right wing of the Socialist Party was suspect on the same grounds, and the Communist Party had waged an ineffective struggle against the reaction. While the older generation of the Communist leadership, exemplified by Kyuichi Tokuda, Secretary of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), boasted that they had been imprisoned for eighteen years because of their opposition to reaction, the youth, acknowledging the integrity of these men, saw this not as a glorious accomplishment, but as a disgrace, a defeat. The older leaders wanted to reconstruct a socialist movement based on the legend of eighteen years of imprisonment and its pure past; the younger generation tried to reconstruct the movement by attempting to understand and overcome the causes of the disgraceful defeat. While the youth did not simply want to turn its back on the past of the Japanese Socialist movement, it did not want to accept it unconditionally.

Until the complacent leadership of the JCP could be overcome, therefore, the revolutionary movement was blocked. At the end of the war, large sections of the Japanese people turned to the JCP because it, indeed, had been the only Party that had not been an accomplice of, or contaminated by, the reaction. This turn to the JCP reached its climax when thirty-five Communists were elected to the Diet in 1949. The illusions about the JCP had to be examined and dispelled.

THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY, bureaucratized and stagnant, was too incompetent to lead the Japanese people. Although it is true that in the final analysis the failure of the JCP was the responsibility of the Japanese people, it is not sufficient to explain it by pointing to this failure or to such objective circumstances as the cruelty of the ruling class. The JCP failed to make the necessary criticism of its own mistakes and no one outside of the Party did so because all deferred to the fact that the Communists had resisted the reaction more courageously than any other group in society. The Party became complacent and considered even constructive criticism a criminal attack. As a result, the postwar generation gradually began to abandon the JCP.

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Although the youth moved away from the CP, it remained hostile to that section of the pre-war generation which was attracted by "American democracy." While the older generation of revolutionaries succumbed to this vision, the younger generation quickly understood its limitations, considering it not thoroughgoing but hypocritical. For these young people, democracy had to be based on the idea of real social equality. They were fully aware of the fact that "American democracy" denied social equality at home, and gave important assistance to the revival of Japanese monopolies, freed war criminals who returned to positions of importance in society, oppressed the socialist movement and drove part of it underground. The American occupation forces openly interfered with Japanese workers' strikes, suppressing them by mobilizing tanks and airplanes.

If the Japanese post-war generation regarded American democracy as incomplete and hypocritical, Stalinist socialism was treated similarly. The youth began to realize that Stalinist socialism was a distortion of the thought of Marx and Lenin.

THE POSTWAR COMMUNIST MOVEMENT began with great sympathy for the Communist Party, then passed through a period of disappointment and is now ready to break with the past and attempt regroupment. The history of the conflict between the Zengakuren and the Japanese Communist Party best exemplifies this development.

"Zengakuren" is an abbreviation of "All-Japan Federation of Student Governments," a unified, national student organization. It was founded in September 1948, directly stimulated by the nation-wide student struggle against the government proposal to raise the tuition at government universities. Encouraged by the revolutionary upheaval of the post-war labor and socialist movements, the Zengakuren reflected general social changes in Japan. From its inception, this student movement was directly involved in general political events in keeping with its basic slogans, "peace, democracy, democratic education, and better student life."

The movement began with the struggle for the democratization of the campus. Professors with militaristic tendencies had to be expelled while those who had been deprived of their rights because of socialistic or liberal views had to be recalled to universities. The students won these victories through open struggle. More than this, Zengakuren has always tried to

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act in concert with other political and cultural organizations, such as Sohyo (Japanese General Council of Labor Unions), the Socialist and Communist parties, while maintaining its autonomy.

In the past thirteen years, Zengakuren has organized a number of major campaigns including the struggle for the removal of American military bases, against nuclear bases in Okinawa, for prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs, against the nuclear armament of Japan, against imperialist intervention in Korea, against British and French aggression in Egypt, in support of the war for Algerian national liberation, for restoration of diplomatic relations between Communist China and Japan and against the U.S.-Japanese security treaty. In addition to anti-imperialist and anti-war demonstrations, Zengakuren has fought for democracy and democratic education, opposed the "red purge" in the universities, fought for increased scholarships, improvement of campus facilities, against raising tuitions, as well as opposing other laws that would have denied academic freedom and curtailed the freest expression of electoral democracy.

ZENGAKUREN IS A MASS organization of students, a national federation of many student governments, and not a monolithic organization like the Communist Students' League. At present, there are 140 university student governments affiliated with Zengakuren, as well as some 280 autonomous units. There are approximately 300,000 members.

The program is decided at a national convention, usually held once a year at which representation from each autonomous unit is based on its size. Between conventions, the organization is directed by a Central Executive Committee and Secretariat. The program of Zengakuren is adopted after heated discussions in each class, circle or dormitory.

ALTHOUGH MOST OF THOSE who have been elected leaders of the Zengakuren are Marxists and originally members of the Communist Party, recent years have seen a sharp conflict between the two organizations. This conflict became public in the Fifties when the Communist leadership attacked student Party members as anti-party agents and started a mass expulsion campaign. This conflict has its roots in the history of the Japanese Communist Party.

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During the period between Japan's surrender and 1950, the CP considered the American occupation troops a liberating force and advocated a peaceful, democratic bourgeois revolution under the aegis of these troops. This was in line with the theory that the bourgeois revolution had to be accomplished before advancing to socialism and resulted in suppressing the struggles of the Japanese working class which had begun to organize for purposes beyond bourgeois reforms. Student members of the CP opposed this policy, aware that it lagged behind actual developments, and began to organize anti-imperialist campaigns. In 1950, the Cominform sharply criticized the Party for this policy of accommodation. It pointed out that the Party's program glorified imperialism and urged the preparation of an anti-colonial struggle against the transformation of Japan into an American colony.

This created extreme confusion within the Party leadership. Stimulated by this situation, student members demanded of the leadership that the Party thoroughly examine its previous course. During this fight, the student leaders went beyond criticizing the Party in the Cominform's terms and developed a revolutionary critique of the CP's program, organization and tactics.

The Party's answer was to condemn these student opponents as a Trotskyist, ultra-left, anti-Party group and to expel Akio Takei, President of Zengakuren, and many others.

The second period of the post-war history of the CP began in 1950 and ended with the Sixth National Conference in 1955 and the criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the following year.

After temporary confusion and internal conflicts, the Party, subservient to the dictates of the Cominform, accepted its criticism and adopted a "New Platform" in 1951. This platform defined Japan as a semi-feudal colony and stipulated the need for a democratic revolution of national liberation in order to realize national independence and bourgeois democracy.

Lacking any facility for independent thought, the leadership of the Party was eager to imitate the techniques of the Chinese Revolution, without consideration for the vast differences in the historical and social background of the two countries. The Party adopted methods based on guerrilla

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troops and the establishment of liberated areas in remote regions despite the fact that, unlike China, Japan is a highly developed capitalist country.

The Party organized demonstrations involving throwing Molotov cocktails at police stations. These unprepared and provocative activities, calling the workers into the streets for certain defeat, resulted in a loss of support among the masses. At the same time, the CP intensified its campaign against the anti-Party leadership of the Zengakuren and replaced them with faithful and cooperative Party members.

Under this new leadership, the student movement was totally disoriented. The strategy combined sporadic armed attacks with a conception of a national, bourgeois revolution. As a consequence of this suicidal policy, the Party could not maintain the leadership of the Zengakuren for more than a few years. By 1955, this policy, combined with surprising revelations of moral and financial corruption made the bankruptcy of the Communist Party readily apparent.

At the Sixth National Conference of the Party in 1955, the leadership went through the motions of evaluating its adventuristic and bureaucratic errors. This criticism, however, was nothing more than a token gesture since the tone of the Conference was set by a statement which said: "The events and experiences of the Party which have taken place since the adoption of the new platform (1951) proved that all the stipulations of this platform were perfectly correct." The Conference failed to perform the essential task of reexamining its ideological and political activities and inaugurating a new strategy for the liberation of the Japanese working class. It did nothing to eliminate the Stalinist attitudes which had permeated the Party since its founding in 1922.

What was needed was nothing less than the following: a rejection of the outdated dogma that Japan was a semi-feudal colony in need of a national, bourgeois revolution; a criticism of Comintern theses on Japan in 1927 and 1932; and a re-evaluation of the methodology and philosophy which had produced these catastrophes.

The mistakes of the 1951 platform were not simply *Japanese* errors; they were errors which permeated all the activities of both the Comintern and the Cominform in Stalin's era. This was the crucial source of the strife between the leaders of the Party and its student members.

As a result of this failure of the Party leadership, student members started their own study of the history of the international Communist movement: the history of the October Revolution, the Popular Front in Spain, economics, philosophy and socialism, depending not on any authority, but only on themselves. They critically examined authors condemned in official circles, as well as the classical works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky. Jean Paul Sartre and Lefebre were popular among them. They dared criticize not only Stalin, but also Khrushchev or Mao-Tse-Tung and they never accepted even Marx and Lenin uncritically. In the course of this process of self-education, student members began to lead actual class struggles.

IN JUNE, 1958, at a meeting of more than 100-Communist delegates to the National Convention of Zengakuren, thoroughgoing criticism of the

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incompetent Party leaders was made. The Party leadership made an attempt to declare the conference invalid but under attack from the students, they withdrew and the conference adopted several important resolutions concerning ideology, strategy and organization. The last resolution demanded that the Party Convention dismiss all members of the Central Committee of the Party and was passed 105 to 0 with 1 abstention.

The Party leaders decided to expel the student members and invented the myth that the students had used physical violence and that they were part of a conspiracy organized by agents of American imperialism. A number of student members were expelled, resulting in the disappearance of Communist cells from many key universities and the formation of new, independent, socialist organizations. These socialist students began to develop their own, independent road. They reformed Zengakuren and helped to shatter the authority of the Party. The answer of the CP was to attack the Zengakuren as a band of provocateurs.

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE CONCLUSION of the new Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty involved all of Japan in 1959 and 1960. Its climax was a world shaking event. Zengakuren, headed by a young Communist group which had abandoned Stalinism, played an extremely important role. Not only did the Japanese ruling class attempt brutally to suppress this movement, but the Communist Party denounced Zengakuren as an enemy of the working class and an agent of American imperialism. The Party actually attempted to destroy Zengakuren during this period.

The Party insisted that the revision of the security treaty would intensify the degree of dependence of the Japanese nation upon American imperialism and that the struggle against the treaty should be a national struggle, anti-American in character, in which the entire nation could unite against a small band of traitors. As a result, the Party opposed demonstrations and strikes which, according to it, might prevent the participation of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie. Zengakuren, on the other hand, interpreted the revision of the treaty as the reorganization of the alliance between Japan and the United States resulting from the strengthening of Japanese monopolies which could demand more favorable terms from the United States, and American hopes to integrate these new monopolies within the sphere of an American controlled world market.

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Zengakuren concluded that the revision of the treaty would be an important step for imperialist expansion and we therefore insisted that the struggle should be organized, not as a national, anti-American campaign, but as a class struggle, headed by the working class, against Japanese monopolists. Thus Zengakuren opposed any suppression of violent forms of struggle such as strikes and mass demonstrations.

The entire conflict between the Communist Party and the Zengakuren cannot be detailed here, but certain examples must be cited:

- The CP was opposed to the slogan "overthrow the Kishi government" presented by labor unions and Zengakuren during the summer of 1959 on the grounds that this might weaken the position of anti-Kishi elements within the Conservative Party and thus limit the range of unified action;
- The CP tried to hinder workers and students from demanding the withdrawal of the revision of the treaty on the occasion of the Fifth World Conference Against A and H Bombs held in Hiroshima in 1959;
- On November 27, 1959, thirty thousand demonstrating workers and students entered the Diet compound. The CP condemned this action as provocative and opposed any demonstration in the neighborhood of the Diet building. Even the Socialist Party criticized the Communist Party as rightist and defeatist.
- The CP violently opposed the demonstration at the Haneda Airport on January 16 for the purpose of hindering Prime Minister Kishi's trip to the United States to sign the treaty. When Zengakuren and some revolutionary labor unionists carried out the demonstration, they were attacked by the CP even more severely than by the government and the Conservative Party. The CP expelled a number of intellectuals who had helped those arrested on this occasion.
- On June 15, Zengakuren demonstrators were attacked by the police and one girl from Tokyo University was killed and a great many others were injured. The CP prevented workers from helping the student demonstrators, attempting to isolate Zengakuren in the area of the Diet compound.
- The CP refused to attend the funeral of Miss Michiko Kanba, the Tokyo University student killed in this demonstration and, instead, criticized her for participating in the demonstration.

As a result of this policy, a great change occurred within the socialist movement in Japan. Revolutionary workers and intellectuals grasped the nature of this development and supported the Zengakuren and its criticism of the CP. Many members left the Party in groups; others were expelled. Not only intellectuals were the targets of this treatment. Many workers in key industries left or were expelled from the Party. The regional committee of Minalo Ward, Tokyo, one of the most important regions, declared that it would not approve the leadership of the Party and would go its own way to build a revolutionary party. The strong Communist cell within the labor movement at Nagasaki Shipping Company decided to leave the party. The cell at Taisho coal mine and the Atsumi village cell, one of the most famous in the agricultural area, also left the Party. Many intellectuals abandoned the Party, as well.

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WITHIN THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT IN JAPAN, a great number of independent Marxist groups appeared. These new groups were far from being politically identical, nor were they intimately related. However, each began to search for the course of revolution in Japan on its own initiative. They were called the "New Left" because they had the same aspiration for the reorganization of leftist ideas and the reconstruction of a revolutionary party. This "new left movement" is advancing, however slowly.

The future of the socialist movement in Japan depends on the "New Left" movement to a great degree. So far, this movement has not been entirely successful in overcoming its labor pains. No group has been able to establish itself as the leading organization and a number of small groups are repeating the process of division and fusion. What is vitally important at the present, in order to overcome this deplorable situation, is the ability to overcome Stalinist habits and formulate new ideas. Through conflict with the Party, these groups have already deepened their criticism of Stalin. However, their weak point is that generally they do no more than criticize Stalinist tactics and strategy. The dispute has remained abstract, over such formulations as: socialism in one country or world revolution, class struggle or national struggle, democratic or socialist revolution? They have not yet come to grips with the problems brought about by the stagnation of Marxism during the Stalinist era. They are behind the developing class struggle in formulating new ideas, and they have found no new theory of organization which overcomes vulgar materialism.

The most important task ahead for the "New Left" is the formulation of new ideas while leading actual class struggles. In this process, the "New Left" can succeed in forming a strongly unified front. But the remnants of Stalinist thought which remain unnoticed within the "New Left" prevent this work. There is something of the tragi-comedy in the fact that many of those who cry for de-Stalinization have not been able to overcome Stalinism in their way of thinking.

THE FOLLOWING, IN MY OPINION, is necessary to formulate new revolutionary ideas:

It is not enough to say simply that Marxist philosophy is materialistic. The philosophy and thoughts which Marx developed were an attempt to resolve the opposition between materialism and idealism formulated in the process of criticizing the system of Hegelian philosophy. Marx put an end to the repeated confusions concerning the relations between existence and consciousness. He placed living human beings in the center of his philosophy instead of dissolving everything into material substance. Marx's human being was not Feuerbach's, but a human being of historical and social existence, living under certain relations of production. Therefore, the subject of history was a historically and socially living human being. Marx's philosophy was based on the understanding of active human processes, of men creating newer and greater objective existence without limit.

The failure to understand the role ascribed to consciousness in Marxist thought caused an underestimation of the role of human initiative. And this gave rise to a dogmatized, crude materialism which never looked beyond

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formulas; which took into account only material, objective reality, but never the nature of human consciousness at any given moment.

Marx never intended to elaborate a fixed system of philosophy. Actually, the last philosophical judgment that Marx made was to "aufheben," to transcend and abolish, philosophy.

Marx wrote in *The German Ideology* that:

> where speculation stops real and actual science starts in actual life. Philosophy, which is independent, loses the means of its existence, as soon as the description of reality begins. What can replace this philosophy is nothing but mere summarization of the most general conclusions **which are abstracted from observations of historical development of human beings. Even that which can be obtained as a result of this abstraction, in itself, has no value, if it is cut off from actual history.**

The same idea is repeatedly found in other works of Marx and Engels including *Anti-Duhring* and *On Feuerbach.*

In this spirit, Engels mocked those who made a dogma of historical materialism. In a letter to Conrad Schmidt in 1890, he wrote: "I emphasize that the whole of history should be restudied." In this respect, it should be evident that the process whereby Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx formulated their ideas, particularly those which Marx went through in formulating his thoughts, should be restudied. It is especially necessary to understand how Marx proceeded from the criticism of philosophy to economics. It is necessary neither to deny any meaningful relation between the early Marx of the *Manuscripts of 1844* and the later Marx of *Capital,* nor to insist that the relationship is easy to comprehend because it is direct. In this connection, it is vitally important to study the process whereby Marx's thought went from the discussion of alienated labor in the *Manuscripts,* to labor power as a commodity in *Capital.* This would help to clarify the development of Marx's humanism through his study of economics.

Second, Marxist economics should be reorganized and developed. Under Stalinism, Marxist economics have been sterile. We failed to develop the theory of capitalism which Marx had established in *Capital.* As a result, we were unable to find the correct method for analyzing various stages of the historical development of capitalism and we could not correctly understand a particular stage, that of imperialism, in concrete detail. Moreover, this led us to errors in failing to make clear the nature of the period of the world revolution and its intimate relationship with the nature of world economy that began with the Russian Revolution.

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We must use the theory of capitalism which Marx elucidated by examining the prototypical form of the evolution of industrial capitalism in England in order to understand the various stages of historical development and in order to analyze specific situations.

In this respect, Marxist economics in Japan has achieved a great deal but it is urgently required that we deepen the analysis of problems such as the impact of capital accumulation in various countries and at various stages of the development of world economy in order to meet the Stalinist interpretation head-on. It may be impossible to establish a socialist theory of society without this fundamental approach to the problem. I think it is urgent to concentrate on analyzing the conditions of economic development in Japan, paying careful attention to the development of the world market.

Third, the history of the international and Japanese socialist movements should be re-examined. During the Stalinist period, history was systematically distorted. Historical writing emanating from the Soviet Union shows no fundamental improvement, even today. The "Party history" of the Khrushchev era should not be allowed to replace Stalin's *History of the CPSU*. Both are false. It is our feeling that the entire history of the Russian Revolution and subsequent developments in the Soviet Union should be rewritten, elaborating on the lessons of the October Revolution, the views of Trotsky, Stalin's mistakes, the historical and social background which makes it possible for Stalinism to dominate Russia and the international Communist movement, analyzing the popular front in Spain, German fascism, etc. Great efforts must be made to do serious research and produce noteworthy material.

Fourth, the theory of organization and of the Party should be re-examined. Stalin's errors cannot be attributed solely to faulty strategy and tactics but must be understood in relation to the theoretical problems we have raised. A theory of organization must emerge which relates theoretical principles to actual politics. Science must not be allowed to become the slave of politics. The vanguard party, the united front, the Chinese communes—these are some of the areas which must be examined and understood if we are seriously to discuss the future of human liberation.

We have only started our work. I am convinced that the socialist movement in Japan, in solidarity with our comrades throughout the world, will make slow but steady advances in the direction of human liberation, advances that will be filled with suffering and hope. When the revolutionary thought of the "New Left" begins to influence the mind of the Japanese working class, it will become a mighty power that will shake Japan and the world.

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KENICHI KOYAMA *is a graduate student in economics at Tokyo University. He was the General Secretary of Zengakuren from 1955-56, and President of the student organization from 1956-58.*

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HIROO WADA

The Socialist Party

A GLANCE AT THE MAIN EVENTS that have taken place in the space of the past year will suffice to make clear the central problems of Japanese politics. In June of last year there took place the large-scale mass demonstrations against the Japanese American security treaty. The treaty itself was concluded, but the invitation extended to U. S. President Eisenhower to visit Japan was withdrawn, and the Kishi government fell. The Diet was dissolved by the new Ikeda government and a general election held in November. Throughout the election campaign the greatest, indeed the only, point at issue was "neutrality." The principal questions confronting this year's Diet were the bill concerning the strengthening of Japan's defense force, the Agricultural Standards Act, and the bill for the prevention of political acts of violence (which, however, was not passed).

These are the main events to which I referred above. Before proceeding, let us first take up the results of the general election of November 1960.

Party	*No. of Seats Won*	*No. of Votes Polled*	*% of Votes Cast*
Liberal-Democratic	296	22,740,265	57.56
Socialist	145	10,887,137	27.56
Democratic Socialist	17	3,464,147	8.77
Communist	3	1,156,723	2.93
Independent	6	1,260,849	3.18
Total	467	39,509,121	100.00

Although Japan's socialist parties have a history of over sixty years, it is only since the Second World War that they have become a real political

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force. The number of seats in the House of Representatives won by them since the war is as follows:

Date of General Election	*Socialist Party Seats*	*Splinter Party Seats*	*Total*
April 1946	92		92
April 1947	147		147
January 1949	48		48
(October 1951, date of split, not of election)	16	30	46
October 1952	54	57	111
April 1953	72	66	138
February 1955	89	67	156
(October 1955, date of unity, not of election)	156		156
May 1958	166		166
(January 1960, date of founding of Democratic Socialist Party not of election)	122	40	162
November 1960	145	17	162

The tendency of these figures mirrors accurately the situation of our socialist movement. Let us single out three facts for explanation.

(1) The Miserable Defeat in the General Election of 1949.

In the general election of 1947 the Socialist Party became the first party of the land. The Socialist Party, being at the time under the leadership of the right wing, formed two coalition governments with one of the conservative parties over the strong objections of the left wing, the first of these two governments under its own leadership, the second under conservative leadership. Since this government was unable to implement a socialistic policy (a circumstance in which the pressure of the Army of Occupation played an important part), the Party dropped sharply to third place in the general election of 1949.

(2) The split of 1951.

Directly before the conclusion of the San Francisco treaty, the right wing supported the view that Japan should sign this treaty as a member of the "free world" camp and enter into full membership in it. The left wing opposed the treaty on the view that Japan should be "neutral." As a result the two wings split. At the time of the split the right wing was in the majority, but three general elections later the balance of forces was reversed. For this there are a number of important reasons, having to do both with policy and with organization, but the principal reason is generally recognized to have been popular support for the left wing's foreign policy, particularly its insistence on neutrality and a total treaty of peace and its opposition to the maintenance of military bases on Japanese soil and to the remilitarization of Japan.

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(3) The founding of the Democratic Socialist Party in 1960.

At the time of the conclusion of the new security pact there was a sharp clash between two opinions, the one that advocated military alliance with the United States and the one that proposed neutrality. Part of the right wing adopted a critical attitude toward neutrality. Under a variety of pretexts this group left the Party and formed the Democratic Socialist Party. However, in the subsequent general election it was subjected to a stinging rebuke on the part of the voters, and its membership in the Lower House dropped to less than half of what it had been at the time of the split.

Thus, one might say that the Socialist Party has grown together with its policy of neutrality. At this point it would be well to call attention to the place of foreign relations in Japanese politics. Each of our parties takes a clear stand in favor of a particular social system, the Liberal Democrats for capitalism, the Socialists for socialism, the Communists for communism, etc., as in any other country in the world. However, since the Second World War the central political issue has been foreign relations, and the political battles have been fought over the issue of the Japanese-American Security Treaty versus neutrality. Capitalism versus socialism never became an issue of direct conflict. This is one of the peculiarities of post-war Japanese politics.

IN THE CASE OF THE SOCIALISTS, the verdict of the public has proved that the policy of neutrality in foreign relations cannot be divorced from the question of socialism in internal politics. On the other hand, this fact has a strange corollary. That is to say, the Communist Party of Japan, which also advocates Japanese neutrality, is unable to win more than three seats in the House of Representatives. In 1949, when the Socialist Party took a sharp drop to one-third of its former strength in parliamentary representation, the Communist Party took forty-three seats, but since that time it has never been able to gain more than a handful. The biggest reason for this is the lack of independence in the Communist Party of Japan. This is particularly true of foreign policy, where it is constantly trailing in the wake of China and the Soviet Union.

At one time the Communist Party attacked the neutrality advocated by the Socialists in terms more violent than those used by the conservatives, labelling it a "fantasy" among other things. At the time neither China nor the Soviet Union was supporting the idea of neutrality for Japan. However, as soon as these two countries shifted their policy at the end of 1958 to one of support for Japan's neutrality, the Communist Party of Japan did a 180-degree turnabout and it too came out in support of neutrality. Given this lack in independence, it is scarcely any wonder that that Party gets no support from the public. Yet there is no denying that the Communist Party, in the area of mass movements, has an influence far beyond what would be expected from its small number of parliamentary seats, a fact of grave importance for all future mass movements in our country.

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HAVING REVIEWED THE PAST history of the Socialist Party's policies, it would be well to proceed to the matter of foreign relations themselves. Japan's release from military occupation and her return to the society of nations took place in 1951. However, the real purpose of the peace treaty signed in that year was not peace but the conclusion of a military alliance between Japan and the United States in connection with the total Far Eastern situation created by the Korean War. What Japan did was to sign treaties with the nations of the Western bloc on condition that she join that bloc. Since that time she has restored diplomatic relations with the neutral countries and those of the Communist bloc, but as yet she has no formal diplomatic relations with the Chinese People's Republic.

In contrast to the conservatives' "Free - World - ism," the Socialist Party advocates "neutrality." By "neutrality" is meant "the maintenance of military alliance with no country and of friendly relations with all countries," a position analogous to that openly taken by such countries as India and Yugoslavia. The ultimate goal is the achievement of such neutrality, and the Party calls for the adoption of foreign policy measures in the present situation that are in keeping with that goal. Japan's present foreign policy, hinging on a military alliance with the United States, may conceivably be a guarantee of security as far as the U. S. is concerned, but as far as Japan is concerned, far from giving her a feeling of security, it can provide nothing but trouble, by stirring up Japan's neighbors, China and the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, if Japan is to cooperate, as the leading industrial country in Asia, in the development of other countries in Asia, the best thing she can do is to remain unbound by any political strings to either power bloc, East or West.

Not only does the Socialist Party demand that Japan stand outside the field of rivalry between the Eastern and Western blocs. She also appeals to all the nations in the world to dissolve these military blocs. We neither believe that international Communism alone is the cause of the present international tension, nor do we proceed on the assumption that the American bloc is a force for war while the Soviet bloc is a force for peace. We are of the opinion that the root cause of the present international tension is the power struggle of the forces attempting to divide the world into military blocs. Consequently it is desirable that as many nations as possible, be their

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number small or great, stand outside of the system of power blocs, and Japan must strengthen her ties with such neutral nations.

For Japan, to join the "Free World" bloc, rather than tread the path of neutrality, means inevitably to take the course of strengthening her armed forces. This cannot but revive the corpse of militarism in Japan. In the past two or three years right-wing movements of the old militarist type have gradually been becoming more aggressive. The Socialist Party can point to examples of this very near at hand, since Asanuma, the former Chairman of our Party's Central Executive Committee, was assassinated by a right-wing terrorist, and Kawakami, the present Chairman, was attacked and wounded by another rightist some time before assuming his present post.

From the economic point of view as well, if we are to achieve a wholesome life for our people, Japan cannot bear the high cost of large-scale military expenditures. The Conservative government is stressing the fact that the Japanese economy is booming. It is indeed true that the Japanese economy has revived, but there is as yet no resolution of the fundamental contradiction posed by our dual economy. A task of extreme urgency is to find a solution to such problems as those of the innumerable small enterprises and their almost totally non-unionized employees, which exist side by side with the modern factory, of low-income groups whose members number in the tens of millions, etc.

Thus our particular stress on peace and democracy for Japan is due to the fact that these are indispensable preconditions for socialism anywhere. Our Party's constitution says, "Japan, being in a position similar to that of advanced capitalism, has reached a point at which she must change capitalism democratically and peacefully and achieve socialism in its stead." Our position is completely different from that of the Communist Party, whose method is the revolutionary one of proletarian dictatorship.

OUR PRINCIPAL POINT OF THEORETICAL dispute with the Communist Party today concerns the question of what rules Japan, i.e., what is our principal adversary. The Socialist Party posits unequivocally that the principal contradiction confronting Japan now is that of Japanese monopoly capital, consequently that the revolution which we must carry out is a socialist revolution. In contrast to this, the Communist Party holds that the revolution facing Japan is a new democratic revolution against "the two enemies, American imperialism and Japanese monopoly capital," and that for the achievement of socialism a second revolution will be needed. From this fundamental difference in outlook stems the Communist Party's policy of treating the anti-American struggle as the main struggle of the masses and of advocating, but only as the mouthpiece of the Communist bloc, Japan's neutrality.

In the political map of Japan outlined above, it is no easy matter to find the distinct position of the Democratic Socialist Party. It has a history of having stood (in 1951) on the side of those who advocated a treaty of peace only with the "Free World" camp against those who advocated one with all of Japan's former enemies, and of having withdrawn from the

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Socialist Party (in 1959) when Japan's masses arose in protest against a new military alliance with the United States. Again, in 1961, it found itself opposed to the Socialist Party when it joined the conservatives in sponsoring a bill aimed ostensibly at curbing political violence but designed actually to repress mass movements. These facts speak for themselves in characterizing that Party as belonging to the conservative side. It is no wonder that that Party's professions of the ideology of the British Labor Party and its aping of the constitution of the German Social Democratic Party are branded as mere disguises. It has become quite open in using Zenro (the Trade Union Congress, national membership about one million) to split the labor movement, an action that can only accrue to the advantage of the ruling class.

THE SOCIALIST PARTY, AT A MEETING of the Central Committee held in June, adopted certain resolutions concerning what must be done in the immediate future. The first of these was to strengthen the Party organization. The Party is often accused of being unable to break through the "one-third wall," i.e., of increasing its parliamentary representation beyond one-third of the total membership of the Lower House. Unfortunately, the criticism is just. In spite of our increase in Diet seats in the recent general elections, our proportion of the total number of seats has been constantly hovering at about one-third or less. Also, our Party membership is extremely small. The ratio of party members to the total number of votes we poll nationally, namely 0.5%, is absurdly small when compared with the figures for the British Labor Party (43.1%), the Swedish Social Democratic Party, (44.9%), and the German Social Democratic Party (9.1%). We have made the strengthening of our Party organization the first order of business for the current year, in full knowledge that the only way to increase our votes is to expand our membership, and that without that we shall never be able to assume the role of leadership of a stable political party. A special feature of this resolution is our determination to seek new members mainly in the agricultural communities. Since the Socialist Party already has a parliamentary representation from the big cities close to a majority (e.g., 11 out of 27 seats from Tokyo), the key to "breaking through the one-third wall" is the question of whether or not we win over the farming population. The Party is appealing to the farming population principally on two issues, the movement toward agricultural cooperatives and the protection of Japanese agriculture from the consequences of free trade (particularly with the

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United States). By contrast, the conservatives are in favor of individually operated farms.

The Central Committee has decided to organize the fight for a popularly determined budget through the Party's central and local agencies. This will be a mass movement to organize the demands of the masses upon the government in such a way as to incorporate them in budgets at all levels, rather than to leave these budgets in the hands of the ruling party and the bureaucracy. The aim of this movement is to force the adoption of a budget closely bound to the interests of the masses themselves, but it does not stop at that. Given the necessity for sources of income, it cannot but eventuate in a reduction of military expenditures, and it will also turn into a struggle for the full realization of the spirit of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which stipulates abstention from arms, and of the disarmament resolutions of the United Nations.

Our third resolution, in view of the situation created by conservative foreign policy, which is moving more and more in the direction of strengthening military ties with the United States, is to appeal more strongly yet to the public for a policy of positive neutrality, while organizing a nationwide movement the mere strength of which will compel the government to modify its foreign policy. Our appeal will be essentially along the following lines:

(1) Removal of all restraints imposed by the Security Pact, opposition to the maintenance of military bases, eventual abolition of these bases.

(2) Conclusion of a treaty of mutual trade between our government and that of the Chinese People's Republic, restoration of normal diplomatic relations, support for its right of representation in the United Nations.

(3) Prevention of restoration of diplomatic relations between our government and the South Korean military junta, cooperation in the reunification of Korea.

(4) Restoration of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands to Japan.

(5) Opposition to nuclear weapons.

(6) Strengthening of ties with neutral nations.

The Socialist Party holds the following views about the development of the domestic and international situations, provided we make the efforts we have outlined for ourselves. As I have already stated, we are of the opinion that the basic cause of the present international tension is that both the United States and the Soviet Union are creating mutually hostile military power blocs. However, the frightening development of nuclear weapons has created a balance of fear, so that another world war seems quite unlikely. In the course of the struggle between the two blocs, at times the United States has had the upper hand, at times the Soviet Union. This imbalance takes the form of local upheavals and tensions. As the launching of a Soviet space ship has demonstrated, at present the Soviet Union has the upper hand. The United States, currently in second place, is at present concentrating all of its efforts on a restoration of the former balance by strengthening anti-Communist governments within its own camp.

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These efforts of the United States are not proceeding according to plan in Laos. On the contrary, the result has been civil war, the outcome of which will apparently be the neutralization of Laos. The United States is now concentrating its aid in South Vietnam, its second line of defense. In South Korea, the anti-Communist government has been strengthened by a military coup d'état, and the United States has found itself obliged to go along. As for the Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa, a plan to divorce it from the mainland and set it up as an independent state has already appeared before the United Nations Assembly. These are the principal evidences of an increasingly obvious state of tension. The West Irian question might be added to them as a sort of latent crisis.

The governments enjoying American support in these areas of tension are unfortunately in every case governments which it would be difficult to characterize as democratic. Rather, they are closer to dictatorship, and none of them could stay in power without American military assistance. Here, we believe, is a problem that Americans might do well to reflect on before talking about the threat of international Communism. For governments that have no roots among their own masses cannot be expected to be stable, and unless the internal political situation is stable it is impossible to resist Communism.

In the midst of all this, Japan's conservative government, in its extreme anti-Communism, does not take a back seat to any dictatorship, yet it is an extraordinarily stable government. It is only natural for the United States to rely on West Germany in Europe and once again on Japan in the Far East as the pivots of its anti-Communist structure. The Ikeda government, feeling the strength of its economic prosperity, has begun to make an open display of its desire to make Japan the kernel of America's strategy in the Far East. Its cooperation with the backward countries of Asia is also based, for the most part, on similar motives.

The reason we are alarmed at this is not only that these actions will provoke our neighbors, the Communist countries, anew and heighten their uneasiness about Japan, but also that such a foreign policy will hasten the revival of militarism domestically. The fact that this is happening against a background of economic prosperity makes our feeling of alarm



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even greater. The tendency toward militarism has already taken the shape of increased armaments, the restoration of the pensions of former soldiers, the centralization of police training, the revival of war industries, a more vigorous repression of mass movements and trade unions, etc., and we believe that this tendency will be strengthened as time goes on.

On the other hand, these tendencies have not blinded us to everything else. Conditions favorable to the Socialist Party, which stands opposed to the conservatives, are also developing step by step within our country. These are the increased influence of our Party, the progress of trade union unification, and in connection with these the decline of the Democratic Socialist Party and the failure of the split movement inaugurated by the right-wing unions.

We are also aware of the steady advance in the authoritative position of the neutral nations on the international scene. These neutral nations, though weak both in military and economic power, are a force for the alleviation and eventual resolution of the rivalry between the blocs, and the fact that their arena is the United Nations has great significance for the prospects of peace. To expand the functions of the United Nations as an agency for peace it is necessary to nurture it with realistic policies. We cannot associate ourselves with the purely formal proposals for reform put forward by the Soviet Union.

If seen in this light, it is evident that the Socialist Party's fight on the domestic scene against militarism and for democracy and her struggle to separate Japan from the American bloc and make her neutral are but two sides of the same fight, the aim of which is the peace of the world and the independence of Japan. It is here that I see the great mission of the Socialist Party.

Translated from the Japanese by Leon Hurvitz

HIROO WADA *is a member of the House of Representatives in Japan. He is the head of the International Affairs Bureau of the Socialist Party of Japan and a member of the Party's Central Executive Committee.*

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The Democratic Socialist Party

YOSHIHIKO SEKI

THOSE PEOPLE ABROAD who desire the healthy development of democracy in Japan look hopefully upon the recently created Democratic Socialist Party.

However, the democratic socialist movement neither started with the formation of this Party nor necessarily shares its fate. But it was only after the Party was organized that the term "democratic socialism" was popularized and its meaning made known, though vaguely, among the people. Therefore it might be appropriate to let the status of the Democratic Socialist Party speak for the condition of Japanese democratic socialism today.

IN 1901 THE FIRST Japanese socialist political party, called the Social Democratic Party, was organized. Many of its leaders were Christians, and the Party's ideology resembled what is called democratic socialism today. But no sooner was it organized than the Meiji government took repressive measures against the party. It also suffered for lack of a trade union movement in Japan. The party failed, as a result, to become an active part of Japanese political life. Moreover, the Russian Revolution of 1917 adversely affected the Japanese socialist movement in its infancy. The Japanese Communist Party, created as a response, in part, to the Revolution, was declared illegal but, despite this, continued its activities. This fortitude won great admiration for the Communists from intellectuals and labor, and most socialists who were not Communists suffered, morally and intellectually, from an inferiority complex toward the Communist Party.

The non-Communist socialist political parties of the post-World War I period were divided into three groups: 1) on the right stood the Socialist Peoples Party (Shakai Minshuto) organized by such intellectuals as Isoo Abe and Sakuzo Yoshino and such union activists as Bunji Suzuki, Komakichi Matsuoka and Suchiro Nishio. They upheld views akin to Fabianism, i.e., to democratic socialism; 2) further left stood the Japanese Labor Party (Nichi Ro) organized by such intellectuals as Hisashi Asabu, Najiro Asanuma and Jotaro Kawakami together with men active in the labor and peasant movements. Although their ideology was not quite clear, their objective seems to have been to achieve a form of socialism based upon parliamentary democracy and a Marxism of the post-World War I Kautskyian tradition. 3) The furthest left socialists were those who separated themselves from the Communist Party but basically favored

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Marxism-Leninism. Among them were Mosaburo Suzuki and his Labor Peasant Party (Ronoto) and such intellectuals as Hitoshi Yamakawa and his group.

The non-Communist socialists who belonged to these three major groupings joined forces to organize the Japanese Socialist Party after the Second World War. From the outset, the Party was riven by ideological differences and personal conflicts. Disagreement over the San Francisco Peace Treaty split the Party into left and right wing factions. Though the Party officially reunited in 1955, antagonisms continued. The left wing, ideologically close to Marxism-Leninism, differed from the Communists only on the question of revolutionary methods while the right regarded political democracy as inherent in socialism. Left and right held roughly the same number of seats in the Diet, although the majority of the Party inclined toward the left. The people, however, supported many of the right wing representatives.

The Party membership amounted to less than 50,000 in all, which evidenced its lack of firm roots among the people or even labor. The Party was overweighted with functionaries who, in the overwhelming majority, favored Marxism, and enthusiastically trained themselves in theory to oppose the right wingers. Consequently, the Japanese Socialist Party, under pressure from left wing Party functionaries, often put emphasis on a strategy which by-passed the Diet and disregarded the rules of parliamentarism.

In 1959, Suehiro Nishio, an influential right winger, was acquitted of an indictment arising from a graft scandal. Nevertheless, the left wing chose to make him a cause célèbre. Nishio happened to publish an article in which he stated that the world conflict today is not between capitalism and socialism but rather between democracy and Communism. Displeased by this, the left, at the Party convention in the Fall of 1959, publicly pilloried him for violating the law. Through this tactic the left hoped either to force him out of the Party or to discourage him from voicing his opinions in it.

Nishio and his faction—those who inherited the tradition of the prewar Socialist Peoples Party—bolted. Also, about half of those who were in the Kawakami faction—the tendency in the tradition of the leftist Japanese Labor Party—supported Nishio at the convention and left the Party with him. Personal differences were more responsible for this than ideological ones. The leadership of the Kawakami faction remained in the Socialist Party. Only about forty Diet members left the Socialist Party while 122 remained.

In January 1960, those who split organized the Democratic Socialist Party. Among the labor unions, Zenro Kaigi (the All Japan Labor Congress) gave the new Party all-out support. As expected, the aggressively Marxist Sohyo (General Council of Japanese Trade Unions) continued to support the Socialist Party. In academic circles those who had been engaged in educational activities to promote a democratic socialist movement after the war also supported the new Party. But Zenro Kaigi represents a minority of organized labor and among Japanese intellectuals the number who are democratic socialists is small.

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As mentioned, some Japanese intellectuals held a democratic socialist ideology even before the war. After the Second World War some scholars under their influence continued to study and disseminate socialist ideas. When the Democratic Socialist Party was organized its leadership requested a group of these scholars to draft the Party's provisional platform. One of them, the writer of this article, wrote the draft. Democratic socialist ideology assumed new political meaning and relevance. A number of editorials in the press favoring the development of a healthy Japanese socialist movement welcomed the formation of the new party.

II.

WHAT, THEN, ARE THE VIEWS of the Democratic Socialist Party, and how does the Party differ from the Japanese Socialist Party?

First, the Democratic Socialist Party advocates socialism based on ethical humanism in the terms set forth by the Socialist International in 1951 in its "Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism," and as stated by several European socialist parties in their post-war platforms. The platform states:

> **We place emphasis on the dignity of individuals. It is neither national sovereignty, nor class profit, let alone material wealth, but rather the free development of the individual personality itself that we regard as the highest standard of value judgment.**

The socialist movement has its origin in this humanist protest against capitalist injustice. But with Marxism-Leninism gaining the upper hand, Japanese socialists lost sight of their original ideals. They emphasized strategic and tactical devices solely as a means of achieving power. Democratic socialism must restore the original ideals of socialism, and for this reason it rejects Marxist historical materialism and places primary emphasis on ethical idealism.

Second, democratic socialism values civil liberty and, to guarantee civil liberty, it insists upon the importance of parliamentary democracy. True, the Japanese Socialist Party also emphasizes peaceful revolution as a means for obtaining political power, but it relies more upon extra-parliamentary mass movements than upon efforts to obtain a majority in the Diet. Even when in power, the Socialist Party had an ambiguous attitude toward parliamentarism. This caused the general public to grow suspicious that the Japanese Socialist Party aimed at a one party dictatorship. By

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contrast, the Democratic Socialist Party proclaims its aim to defend liberty and democracy and makes it clear that it opposes totalitarianism either left or right.

Third, the Democratic Socialist Party views capitalism differently than either the Socialist or Communist Party. No doubt, Japanese capitalism, in many respects, lags behind Western capitalism. Nevertheless, the Democratic Socialist Party believes that the separation of ownership and management, the development of labor unions and the intervention of government in the economy (though on a lesser scale than in the West), have brought about vast changes in Japanese society. It has become more difficult for owners of capital to exercise sole control over the economy; the classic evils of capitalism, an impoverished working class and recurrent major depressions, no longer exist. These changes are due to democratic upheavals and the development of the labor movement in post-war Japan. They reveal the possibility of changing capitalism gradually through democratic means.

Fourth, the Democratic Socialist Party does not look upon the nationalization of industry as the panacea of all ills. Planned economy in Japan requires greater government intervention than in the Western countries. The Party insists on nationalizing such basic industries as atomic energy, transportation and power. As far as consumer luxury goods are concerned, however, the Party believes that in view of Japan's high standard of living consumers could best benefit by competition between private industries whose capital resources are subject to government control. Since it is against that kind of planned economy which disregards the price mechanism, and since it is also against the capitalist principle of unlimited pursuit of profits, the Party insists upon a mixed economy. It is aware that a planned economy which does not allow the free play of the price mechanism falls prey to totalitarianism.

Fifth, the ideal of the Party is the establishment of a World Government to solve international conflicts. Toward this end, it favors strengthening the United Nations. The Party is aware, however, that at present the United Nations is inadequate. Accordingly, the Party favors equipping our country with the means of self defense until the day a World Government is established and complete disarmament is assured by effective police control. The rival Japanese Socialist Party is for disarmed neutralism, while the Democratic Socialist Party would prepare for self defense in the belief that the people must be responsible for defending their country. As will be made clear, there are disagreements within the Party on this point.

Sixth, the Party's attitude toward the nature of world conflicts today differs from that of both the Communist and Socialist parties. The Japanese Communist Party, of course, looks upon the present Cold War as a conflict between capitalist imperialism and socialism. The Japanese Socialist Party considers the United States basically imperialist and the USSR socialist; but while, ideologically, it defends the USSR, politically, it is neutralist. Contrary to both parties, the Democratic Socialist Party regards the United States as a democratic force (although it is critical of the United

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States-aided Cuban invasion, and U.S. policies toward Korea and Formosa) and the USSR as a totalitarian one. The conclusion is obvious. Japan should side with the democratic camp in the Cold War. On the question of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States, the Party calls for amending it to the benefit of Japan, and looks forward to invalidating it altogether as an international situation develops which will obviate its necessity. The Party believes, however, that the time is premature for abolishing it.



Seventh, the Democratic Socialist Party does not hold the view that capitalism must evolve into socialism. It is aware that in Japan the danger exists of an extreme rightist uprising, and also of an increase in Communist power. Should the Communists become more active, it fears that the ultra-nationalists might revolt. However, should Japan succeed in further developing its economy and remain free of international conflicts, the democratic way of life may gradually take root. This depends upon the extent to which democratic socialism gains favor among the people.

III.

MANY OF THOSE WHO WISH TO SEE DEMOCRACY established in Japan welcomed the publication of the Party platform as outlined above. But in the general election for the House, in the Fall of 1960, the Democratic Socialist Party suffered a sharp loss, dropping from 40 to 17 Representatives, despite the fact that it received three and a half million votes. Although it may not be exactly a defeat for the Party to have obtained 8.8% of the total votes cast in its first general election, its loss of 23 seats came as a disappointment.

The Party failed in the election partly because it had been in existence only a short while and was not fully organized. Also, it suffered from a lack of suitable candidates as well as campaign funds. Basically, however, it failed because many of its members themselves fell short of fully understanding democratic socialism and its political policy. This is a fact, difficult as it is to believe. Since before the war, right wing socialists felt intellectually inferior to Marxists; very few attempted to take issue with them on theoretical grounds. After the war, the leaders of right wing socialism were content to hold their powerful positions which they acquired as members of personal cliques. They never interested themselves in theoretical studies. At the time of the Nishio incident which split the Party in two, those who joined the Democratic Socialist Party, with the excep-

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tion of the leadership, did not necessarily believe in democratic socialism. Quite a few of them joined only because they were members of a clique, or because they thought the public would favor it, or because an opposing candidate from the same constituency remained in the Japanese Socialist Party. Consequently, they only repeated their old ideas or campaigned on a watered down version of the Socialist Party position, incapable of making an enthusiastic democratic socialist appeal to the people. In other words, they gave the people an impression of being another Socialist Party. These, then, were the causes for the defeat of the Democratic Socialist Party. Unfortunately, no adequate attempts have been made, thus far, to cope with them.

Since the Party's defeat in the election, conflicts within it have developed between those who remained in the tradition of the former Japanese Labor Party (Nichiro) and those of the right wing Nishio faction. The Party is divided over national defense and foreign policy. The main body of opinion in the present Executive Committee approves of Japan creating her own national defense and favors cooperating with Western democratic forces; it thus basically sanctions the Japanese-American Security Treaty. But quite a few members of the Party support disarmed neutralism of the sort advocated by the Socialist Party. Some also call for armed neutralism, that is, for a neutralist policy with a proviso which acknowledges the necessity of maintaining a defense force. This disagreement could bring about a split in the Party.

Under these conditions, it is difficult to hope for a rapid growth of the Democratic Socialist Party. Though it claims a membership of 40,000, its actual strength falls short of that. The Democratic Socialist Party probably will fail to secure even its present number of seats in the House in the forthcoming general election of July 1962. In the event of a serious defeat in the coming election, even the worst possibility, the Party's dissolution, is conceivable.

But the decline of the Democratic Socialist Party would not necessarily mean the defeat of democratic socialism in Japan. At present, there exists, apart from the political movement, the Democratic Socialist Workshop (Minshu Shakaishugi Kenkyu Kaigi) organized by intellectuals. Under its guidance democratic socialist groups, formed among students and labor movement members, are increasing in strength. Within the Japanese Socialist Party itself, and within Sohyo, its supporting organization, members in search of new theories to replace the Marxist dogmas have recently been making themselves heard. Although these people still basically follow the Marxist way of reasoning, some are attempting to reevaluate democracy.

IT IS DANGEROUSLY OPTIMISTIC to believe in progress as a historical necessity. In Japan we still see outmoded social patterns in labor management relations and in local communities which retain the residues of feudalism. Japanese capitalists still have far more power and are more reactionary than their Western counterparts. Many rural areas still hope for a return of ultra-nationalism. In the cities, on the other hand, we see the

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atomized masses, the lonely crowds, to which industrialized society gives rise. It would be too optimistic to think that democracy will develop in Japan without obstacles. It would be just as one sided, however, to think that Japan is incapable of democracy. True, some among the youth who received their education in the post-war period incline toward hedonistic, undisciplined selfishness. But others among them think independently and are aware of the value of individuals. Above all, the Japanese people have not fallen behind the West in their education and technology, in their diligence and their ability to assimilate imported culture. In her social structure Japan is closer to the West than to other Asian countries. This makes it difficult to impose totalitarianism upon Japanese society. Probably, then, Japanese socialism will follow a direction similar to that of the West. Moreover, as the Communist movement becomes more active, the Japanese Socialist Party, which now displays an ambivalent attitude toward both the Communist Party and the Democratic Socialist Party, will necessarily have to clarify its ideology. In that event, the non-Communist elements within the Japanese Socialist Party will choose the Democratic Socialists. In the final analysis, however, everything depends upon the degree of enthusiasm of those who now believe in democratic socialism for studying and disseminating its ideology.

Translated from the Japanese by Masako I. Yamada

YOSHIHIKO SEKI *is a professor at Tokyo Metropolitan University and one of the leading theoreticians of the Democratic Socialist Party.*

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IKUTARO SHIMIZU

The Intellectuals

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DO NOT discriminate between bourgeois and proletarian. This simple fact has led many among the Japanese people, the first and sole victims of nuclear weapons, to adopt politics that seek to unite all opponents of war regardless of their attitude toward socialism, even at the cost of giving up for the moment a socialist analysis. Although immediately after the war there was a strong current which recognized that the struggle for lasting peace hinged on the realization of the socialist revolution, this is no longer the case. The fear of nuclear weapons has obscured the understanding that war is rooted in the capitalist system; the simple wish for peace has become the dominating idea, taking the place of class struggle, revolution and socialism.

This has been the case particularly among left-wing Japanese intellectuals. While those who form the core of the intelligentsia—the students and professors—sometimes write abstract academic theses and articles for those monthly magazines which function as *ersatz* leftist party organs, they never openly advocate or defend policies instrumental in the struggle for socialism.

But while the socialist intellectuals never speak for socialism or discuss socialist politics they do speak for peace. And in doing so they abdicate their true responsibility, that of seriously involving themselves in the complex and pressing questions related to the struggle for a socialist transformation of society. Paradoxically, both the impact of war and militarism prior to 1945 and the impact of peace and pacifism since then have had the identical effect: preventing the intellectuals from doing genuine and necessary creative work toward the transformation of society. This article will attempt to demonstrate the truth of the contention and to show the consequences of its reality.

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JAPANESE INTELLECTUALS HAVE a deep feeling of guilt because of their failure to prevent the disastrous war. Because they had, at best, submitted to the militarists and imperialists and, at worst, actually served them, they look at their past with despair and regret. This feeling has been a major factor in establishing the idea of peace as *the paramount value.*

Thus, Japanese socialist intellectuals have made the idea of peace all embracing. Ideology as such has been held in great disrepute. The slogan of cooperation for peace "beyond the differences of ideologies" has fascinated the intellectuals; everyone talks eloquently about the "peaceful coexistence of ideologies." Those who were to coexist were the Marxists (more correctly, the Stalinists), the pragmatists, as I am called, and the existentialists. The precise meaning of "coexistence" has been the freezing of ideologies, the placing of one's ideology in parenthesis, so to speak, in order "to work together for peace." It has become wise to avoid all talk of socialism, and ideological discussion in general has been taboo. The phrase of Louis Aragon, the French Communist writer, *"Ceux qui croyaient et ceux qui ne croyaient pas . . ."* was often quoted by the intellectuals as the motto for the peace movement.

This ideological armistice corresponded perfectly with the "united front" tactics of the Communists and their allies. It combined the jargon of the left with the tactics of right-wing opportunism. The left-wing movement has been captivated by this approach: the effect has been to augment the size of the movement at the expense of its aims.

Let me make this concrete. I am convinced that just as the Mutual Security Pact, concluded in the autumn of 1951, was a symbol of the resurrection of that Japanese capitalism which had received a nearly fatal blow by its defeat in the Second World War, the recent New Pact with the United States symbolizes the development of capitalism into a new phase of imperialism. If this is true, a meaningful movement against the New Pact would have to have been inseperable from the miltant waging of the class war in Japan. But the inherent significance of the Pact was successfully concealed and the movement was directed as if it were "beyond all class differences." Here,

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the declared armistice in the class war corresponded with the ideological armistice. Thus, those of the left who advocated this dual armistice have hurt both the cause of peace and of socialism. Let us look at this.

ONE OF THE HIGH POINTS in the struggle against the New Pact was reached on November 27, 1959 when eighty thousand workers and students in Tokyo marched on the Diet to present a petition against the Pact. Thirty thousand entered the courtyard. While it is perfectly understandable that this episode threw the Liberal-Democratic Party and its government into a state of confusion, it is more difficult to account for the perplexity of the leadership of *Sohyo,* the trade union movement, and of the Socialist and Communist Parties. Their immediate reaction was to exert all possible effort to disperse the demonstrators instead of providing the leadership to advance their demands upon the government. The usual Communist epithets were hurled at demonstrators: "Trotskyites," "provocateur," "agents of American imperialism", etc. In the course of these events one striking characteristic of the official left leadership stood out clearly—contempt for the masses.

Due to this contempt for the masses, the leadership of all the organizations involved in the anti-Pact movement, men who had declared their intention to fight "resolutely," ended up fighting against the demonstrators instead of against their enemies in the Diet. They assumed that the battle was lost because the idea of "political apathy", common to various American theories about mass society, had unconsciously captivated them; they developed a persistent conviction that the masses were concerned solely with everyday economic problems. As a meeting held in the summer of 1959, a leader of the Communist Party made a speech in which he said, "The mission of the intellectuals is ingeniously to explain how the New Pact will have a direct effect on the kitchens of the masses." From the outset, the leadership was seized by a kind of defeatism, considering the New Pact a problem too highly political to be grasped by the masses.

One would expect that despite this defeatism they would be delighted at the unexpected turn of events when the masses showed more vigor and intelligence than they had hoped for. But the situation was not so simple. The reaction of the bureaucrat with a deeply rooted contempt for the masses to an unexpected upsurge of mass action is one of fear. His security and position of leadership is immediately challenged. As the masses aspire toward a new leadership and even create one of their own, the bureaucrat finds it necessary to exile those who cause his disquietude. Thus, the militant student organization, Zengakuren, and a goodly number of sympathetic workers, suffered a fate similar to that of the POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificaçion Marxista) during the Spanish Civil War—expelled from the cosy arms of the "Mass Front," persecuted as "Trotskyites" and provacateurs," defamed by the Communist bureaucrats, the "progressive" intellectuals, and the official Socialist leadership.

Rather than turning to the masses, the leadership of the Japanese left found comfort in the high-level negotiations between the Russian and

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American leaders. I recall the words of a Communist Party leader in October 1959, immediately after Khrushchev's visit to the United States during which the latter had made his proposal for disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The CP leader said, "Now the history of humanity has entered a new stage. We will no longer have an armed world. Colonial revolution will henceforth be an unarmed battle of natives without rifles and knives against imperialists without machine guns and revolvers. Now we have entered this new era." One of the intellectuals present questioned, "Then a peace movement is no longer necessary?" "Yes, one is necessary," answered the Communist, "but only for two or three years." Having such an optimistic perspective, based upon their belief in the bureaucratic infallibility of Khrushchev, it was natural for such leaders to treat as insignificant both the revision of the Pact and the probable defeat of the movement against it.

The question, therefore, became how to continue what, to them, was a pointless movement without endangering their leadership. Thus, among the leadership, defeatism, fear of being replaced, and false optimism were merged into a remarkable complex. The apolitical pacifism of the intellectuals and the sanctification of the Communist Party also tended to reenforce this same tendency. The treatment accorded a statement that I issued after the official left had condemned the demonstrators at the Haneda Airport on January 16, 1960, who had arrived to protest Prime Minister Kishi's departure for the United States to sign the New Pact, is a good example of the results of this amalgam of depoliticizing tendencies.

AFTER THE HANEDA events, I drafted a statement entitled *Appeal to the Organizations*: "We heartily hope that the leaders of the [left] organizations will provide unity for the political energy of the masses and will organize them into a strong and aggressive force against our enemy. If this is not achieved, we will lose the battle." With approval of several friends, I sent the statement to leaders of the various organizations. Except for one, the leaders in question treated it with silence.

On the other hand, the statement won general applause among rank and file trade unionists and students who had devoted themselves with absolute sincerity to the movement. Although it was sent only to the leadership, the

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existence of the statement was widely known by virtue of its detailed refutation of the Communist Party organ. Meanwhile, someone had reprinted it and, unknown to me, it had been widely circulated.

Although many of the intellectuals agreed with me to one degree or another, an overwhelming majority attacked the statement on the ground that any criticism of the leadership would lead to demoralization. The implicit assumption was that my declaration had been addressed to the Communist Party, which, among the intellectuals is sanctified. There is, in fact, a peculiar relationship between the Emperor System and the Communist Party. Prior to Japan's defeat in the war, the Emperor was represented as an infallible demi-god and the Communist Party was illegal. During this period of repression, the underground and secret activities of the Party were invested with a mysterious aura. The mind of the intellectual, largely shaped by the ideas of absolutism and infallibility, is apt to retain these ideas and apply them to the Communist Party. My rather moderate declaration seemed to them a profanation of a sacred institution. At most these intellectuals will admit that the Communist Party has made some trivial tactical errors; the general strategy of the Party is, however, always found correct.

IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND the impact of the leadership of the Communist Party upon the movement against the New Pact we must go back to the history of the Japanese Communist Party. In 1932, the Comintern in its *Thesis on Japan* propounded the theory of a "two stage revolution": since Japan is a feudal country, the bourgeois democratic revolution must be accomplished first with the proletarian revolution to follow.

After the second World War this thesis was somewhat altered. According to the Communist theoreticians, Japan had become a colony of the United States, like many other Afro-Asian countries, and the first stage of the struggle was to be a colonial revolution for national independence which would be connected with the bourgeois revolution. This alteration in the theory served to postpone further the possibility of a proletarian revolution. So long as the Communist Pary supports this theory and so long as the intellectuals continue to regard this Party as infallible, the problem of the socialist revolution in Japan will remain blurred.

The Communists' view that Japan is a colony of the United States necessarily conditions their attitude toward the anti-Pact movement. To them the movement must be transformed into a struggle for national independence, requiring a national solidarity which bridges class differences. The main enemy is not the imperialist and capitalist government of Japan but the United States. The Pact must be opposed because it deepens the subordination of Japan to the United States; the movement against the Pact must not be allowed to develop into a movement against the capitalist government of Japan. In this way, the movement against the Pact can be used to support Russian foreign policy without running the danger of a proletarian revolution that might well be independent of Stalinist domination.

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Thus, when in the middle of the night of May 9, 1960, the Liberal Democratic Party pushed the New Pact through the Diet, using police force and completely ignoring all democratic procedures, and in response a political upsurge of the masses swept Japan with a strength mighty enough to crash through the narrow framework which the "left leadership" had placed on the movement, the left bureaucrats were threatened by the so-called "apathetic" masses and had to find a new goal to deflect the mass upsurge which threatened their position.

"The period of the fight against revision of the Pact is over," they asserted at quickly organized mass meetings. "Now we confront a new and more fundamental problem—defense of democracy. Now we must establish a "mass front" for the defense of democracy which will include many people who supported the Pact revision but do not approve of the methods of the Kishi Cabinet."

While it is perfectly true that the defense of democracy is more fundamental than any pact, this pedantic and academic separation of the defense of democracy from the anti-Pact movement served the purpose of deflecting the only genuine movement for democracy—the mass upsurge of the people. The arid dogmatism of the Communists and their allies once again became the instrument through which the most hopeful and living signs of the mass movement for democracy were suppressed.

"Citizens," "civic consciousness," "civil spirit" became the catchphrases of the period. All this fits perfectly into the scheme of the "democratic revolution." The "mass front" was finally accomplished. Everyone was an active friend of democracy. The anti-Pact movement was to become a happy band of democratic brothers. The intellectuals united with everyone for everyone was an active friend of democracy. Thus, by verbal sleight of hand the intellectuals no longer had an enemy inside Japan. In this way, defeat was called victory.

The movement to prevent Pact revision had been definitely defeated when the New Pact was approved by the House of Councillors on June 30, 1960. However, the intellectuals and the left wing leadership declared that the movement had ended in glorious victory, victory for democracy. And this verbal mystification was necessary, for while the Party and its allies had been able to attribute previous political defeats to the famous "apathy of the masses," it was not possible to so explain a defeat created by the intellectuals and the Communists confusing and deflecting the most important mass uprising of the Japanese people in history. Thus, in typical Stalinist fashion, where black is white and down is up, a time to rue became a time to cheer.

IN A CERTAIN SENSE, the movement against the New Pact has acquired the same meaning for a group of Japanese intellectuals as the Spanish Revolution, the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Hungarian Revolt have for the intellectuals of the Western world. A not inconsiderable number of active intellectuals resigned from the Communist Party and have since organized several groups of the New Left. A number of previously unaffiliated intellectuals participate in these groups of which our own "Association of

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Contemporaneous Thought" is one. At present, these groups are primarily involved in theoretical rather than political struggles. Although the overwhelming majority of intellectuals remained convinced of the infalliability of the Communist Party, the birth of the New Left is a remarkable symptom of the beginnings of the decomposition of the united front of the post-war intellectuals.

All of the groups have been dubbed "Trotskyite" by the Stalinists although, with the exception of a few, they do not consider themselves adherents of Trotsky's doctrines. There is a recognition that Trotsky was the first and greatest critic of Stalinism, and although the groups have ideological differences they share a common conviction that a rigorous and radical criticism of Stalinism must be undertaken in order to dissolve the sacrosanct aura in which the Communist Party is shrouded.

The criticism of the New Left must not only be directed at Stalin's abnormal character nor even at his multitude of political errors. The entire Stalinist philosophy which continues to dominate left-wing intellectuals in many countries must come under close and continuous scrutiny. The "Association of Contemporaneous Thought" and the other groups of the New Left are also concerned with a reevaluation of Marxist thought. We want to remain independent of all the existing political organizations, free from bureaucracy, so that we may behave as truly free intellectuals. We want, in short, to create an arena for the free and honest development and exchange of ideas. And this begins with a very basic concept: the corruption of Stalinism.

As a result of the defeat of the anti-pact movement, one fact has emerged very clearly: the ideology which artificially separates the struggle for peace from the class struggle is simply a variation of the Stalinist conception of "Socialism in one country," a conception which serves nothing but the Soviet Union's immediate role in the "jungle" of international power politics. The view of the Soviet Union as the wisest and most selfless leader

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of the world revolution is a thoroughgoing illusion of the Japanese intellectuals. Only the youth among Japanese intellectuals are able to overcome this incubus.

While many deplore the fact that the rising generation, the youth, lack the historical experience of war and militarism, they fail to recognize that this carries with it a great virtue: they have no illusions about the Emperor System nor the Communist Party. They are not imbued with the dogmatic Stalinist mentality. In this sense, they are realists. As the history of Zengakuren shows, realistic students were the first who bravely chose the road to the New Left. The young people received their education in the new schools of the post-war period. From the beginning they have lived intimately with the words "peace" and "democracy." They are neither innocent enough to be fascinated by them nor modest enough to be content with them. Courageous and ambitious, they are going to prepare the way to the socialist revolution. Only among this generation will we find the people who truly deserve the name of socialist intellectuals.

April 1961

IKUTARO SHIMIZU *was born in Tokyo in 1907. He is a graduate of the Tokyo Imperial University (1931), was a lecturer at Tohuku University (1947-49), and has been a professor of sociology at Gakushuin University since 1949. He is the author of* Critique of Sociology (1933), Individual and Society (1935), Social Psychology (1951) *and other books.*

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Notes From Abroad

Algerian Demonstrations

francis roy

THERE ARE MORE THAN four hundred thousand Algerians living in France today. These people are concentrated largely in the mining centers of the East, in the coal fields of the North, and especially around and in Paris. Here some two hundred and fifty thousand of them are to be found. Two thirds of these colonials are industrial workers, employed in the most difficult and painful occupations provided by the metallurgical industry and its many tributary firms. The Algerians occupy several miserable sections of Paris ("The Golden Drop" in the eighteenth arrondissement, The South in the thirteenth arrondissement), in the westerly suburbs (Nanterre, Puteaux), in the North (Colombes, La Garenne), and in the East (Rosny, Montreuil). These people live under the most frightful conditions; a half hour's bus ride from the center of Paris brings one to barracks of planks and sheet iron which seem right out of some African village.

The two hundred and fifty thousand Algerians of Paris live in a ghetto of the sort not seen since the ghettoes of Poland, Rumania and Russia. The mere fact that they are recognizable as North Africans means that they can be hunted, beaten, arrested and tortured by a police force which permits the fascist bomb throwers to carry on undisturbed their projects of assassination. In sum, such is the legal situation of the Algerian for whom bourgeois rights are put in parentheses.

At the beginning of October, the prefecture of the Seine police consummated the segregation of the Algerians in Paris; a curfew was decreed after half past eight for all the Algerians in the Department of the Seine. The Minister of the Interior, Monsieur Frey, a former member of the "Resistance," to be sure, matched this decree with some good advice, telling the Algerians not to venture out after eight o'clock at night. The police of General de Gaulle again made use of the procedures of Marshall Petain's police. The measure meant in fact that the police had permission to consider any Algerian found in the streets after 8 PM an FLN* or MNA terrorist. The Algerians were sorely tried by this racist measure against which even the

*GLOSSARY
FLN: *Front Libération Nationale* (Algerian Front of National Liberation).
MNA: *Mouvement Algérienne Nationale* (Algerian National Movement).
MTLD: *Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques* (The Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties).
GPRA: *Gouvernment Provisionell de la Republique Algérienne* (The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic).
FO: *Force Ouvriere* (The Workers Force).
CFTC: *Confédération Française de Travailleurs Chrétiennes* (The French Confederation of Christian Workers).
CGT: *Confédération Générales des Travailleurs* (The General Confederation of Workers).

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formerly collaborationist deputies in the French parliament protested. The pro-fascist, Ahmed Djebbour raised his voice against "the Draconian measures taken against French Moslems . . . these discriminatory and injurious measures blindly directed against poor workers." Thirty Moslem members of the Parliament protested likewise "against these discriminatory measures, with a racist flavor, recalling those taken in another period of odious memory."

THE ALGERIAN PROLETARIAT living in France is the most advanced sector of the Algerian population. It was the base of the MTLD of Messali Hadj, then of MNA; it furnished and still furnishes the revolution with a goodly number of its trained personnel. The French Federation of the FLN which, little by little, replaced the French Federation of the MNA (except in the North), began to represent in 1958 "the most left wing" section of the coalition representing the FLN. In any case, its leaders responded more directly to the pressure of its lower echelons and of its base than did the GPRA, installed in Tunis. They had to do something to organize and calm the exasperation of the Algerian workers near and in Paris, to organize a struggle against the curfew. It was decided to hold a peaceful demonstration on the evening of October 17th.

The demonstration was organized at various points of Paris and its suburbs. The most important groupings took place on the big boulevards (from Boulevard de l'Opera to the Carrefour Saint Denis), that is to say, in one of the chic, bourgeois quarters of Paris. There was still another in the Latin Quarter, still another at Neuilly, and another at Courbevoie. The demonstrations began a little before 9 PM. The police, who had had advance warning of what was to take place, deployed their forces of repression. The demonstrators had been instructed to come to the place set for the demonstration in little groups by subway. But the police were massed at the subway exits and arrested all Algerians to "prevent" disorder. A powerful force composed mainly of harkis[1] was placed at the Bridge of Neuilly to prevent the demonstrators coming from Nanterre and from Puteaux from getting into Paris.

The police repression was frightful; on the empty streets—thronged on other days by people bent on expensive purchases—and on the great Bridge of Neuilly, the police and the *harkis* gave free rein to their hatred for the Algerians, emptying their guns on a crowd which included not only women but children and old men, all unarmed. The big boulevards and the Bridge of Neuilly were the theatre of a veritable slaughter; the demonstrators arrested were brutally beaten; some were shot on the spot with revolvers and machine guns. Dozens of Algerians were thrown off the bridge into the Seine, and some of these had been handcuffed. For days afterward their bodies were fished out of the Seine. It has been admitted officially that most of the corpses were of Algerians whose hands had been bound or handcuffed. . . . We know of course that the police have accused the FLN and MNA of summary executions of

[1] *Harkis* are Moslem militia working as auxiliaries of the French police in France and as auxiliaries of the French army in Algeria.

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this kind; what is one to think of the police brutality so directly expressed right in the capital of a so-called civilized country? Apparently, the bourgeoisie quickly forgets its sacred principles of civilization and of the rights of individuals when their interests are directly threatened.

Of the 25,000 demonstrators, 12,000 were arrested and sent off either to Vincennes or to the Sports Palace. There they were subjected to such brutality that journalists were denied permission to see them or question them. Close to 2,000 Algerians, regarded, and no doubt correctly, by the police as members of the FLN, were "deported to Algeria;" this really meant that nine out of ten were shot on their arrival there.[2]

It was said officially that two of the demonstrators had been killed. But a report sent by the Army Command to officers in Algeria gave a figure of 100 casualties. This last figure is certainly closer to the true one. But it does not include those who "disappeared," those who vanished mysteriously between the time they were arrested and expelled.

The following evening new demonstrations took place. They involved about five or six thousand Algerians who were easily dispersed; finally, on the nineteenth of October, there was a demonstration of women carrying their babies in their arms. The demonstration was held despite the prior arrest of hundreds by the police. A few days afterwards, the curfew imposed on the Algerians was set back two hours.

THE DEMONSTRATIONS WERE, first of all, organized as peacefully as possible. *Figaro* wrote (on October 23): "The Algerian demonstrators did not resist arrest. The police had said nothing so far of any arms seized by them. . . . But the number of wounded Moslems is very large." *L'Express* was able to say truthfully that the French Federation of the FLN had planned "what amounted to a non-violent demonstration, as dignified as possible." Hence the great number of women, children, and old men in the ranks of the demonstrators. The French Federation of the FLN knew well the racist spirit animating the Parisian police, and it had wanted a peaceful demonstration so as to emphasize the fact that the Algerians wanted no more than respect for their elementary rights. But why had they sent women, children, and old men to their death? Why had they repeated the maneuver of Bourguiba, hurling women and boys, quite unarmed, against the French paratroopers in Bizerte?

In the second place, these peaceful demonstrations were held at the worst time, and in the worst possible places. Why were they held at nine o'clock at night in the empty business section of the city and on the big boulevards where the police could fire at their victims without being observed? Why was the demonstration not held at three or four o'clock in the afternoon, after an appeal for a sympathetic strike on the part of those Frenchmen who worked alongside the Algerians, and who, had they turned out, could have given a quite different meaning and character to the action?

As a result of these errors, tactical or strategic, the French Federation of the FLN lost 2,000 active members through death or arrest. According to the Ministery of the Interior, a terrible blow was dealt to the morale of the Algerian population of Paris. But all this, doubtless, was to the profit of the GPRA, which was able to show the world new proofs of the ferocity of French repression. It is to be noted that General de Gaulle had said in his speech of September 5 that he could not negotiate with any Algerian organ-

2. I have confirmation of this fact from soldiers returned from Algeria. Why doubt it? It goes without saying that in a country where men are tortured and killed on the mere suspicion that they belong to the FLN, or have aided it, life and liberty can hardly be expected to be granted to persons expelled from France for really belonging to the FLN.

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ization which was unable to establish order, that is to say, which could not win approval for the concessions De Gaulle wants made to French imperialism; now, by organizing a peaceful demonstration of an exasperated people, the FLN had shown De Gaulle that it was quite capable of controlling the Algerian proletariat. The price of this proof was the bodies of dead Algerians and a considerable weakening of the combative spirit of the Algerian proletariat of Paris.

IN EVERY TRAGEDY there is, doubtless, a farcical moment. The French unions took it upon themselves to contribute such a moment of farce. On October 30, thirteen days after the first demonstration of the Algerian workers, the Departmental Union of the FO, CFTC, CGT, and the UNEF unions published separately an identical statement, protesting the discriminatory measures against which the Algerian workers of the Parisian region had demonstrated peacefully on October 17.

The Organization of Unions of the Seine wanted it made known that an analogous police repression, a new stage in the installation of a fascist regime in France, would be likely to set in motion an immediate reaction of all the workers of the Parisian region.

What a sad mockery of the Algerian workers!

Thirteen days after the Algerians of Paris had been beaten, politically decapitated, and calmed down for a while, the union leaders, having done nothing at all for two weeks, suddenly took up the attitude of Tartarin de Tarascon . . . promising the great things they would accomplish—next time. They had not waited so long after the abortive fascist putsch of January 24, 1960, or after that of April 24, 1961; in both cases, with little delay, they called on the French workers to meet the fascist danger by ranging themselves behind De Gaulle. Was it not possible to mobilize the Parisian working class with similar alacrity in an action showing their solidarity with the Algerian workers? And if the unions thought such an action impossible what was the point of emphasizing the weakness of the left by making threats . . . for the future? This is not the first time that the cowardice and buffoonery of tired bureaucrats appeared in sharp contrast to the heroic action of the people.

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The British Scene

Eric Heffer

THE RECENT PERIOD IN BRITAIN has been the political party and trade union conference season. The first major conference was held by the Trades Union Congress, quickly followed by the Liberal Party, then the Labor Party and, at the moment of writing, the Conservatives have just ended their annual parade of Government personalities. (The Conservative Party Conference does not decide policy, it advises the leadership which can and usually does ignore the advice given. Conservative policy is made by the Prime Minister or Parliamentary Leader, something which certain Labor people would like to see copied in the Labor Party.) All the conferences have discussed in varying ways similar problems, the Conservatives deviating a little, with the Tory women howling like dervishes to bring back various forms of corporal and capital punishment. (It should be said, without a great deal of success.)

One fact emerges from all the discussions: never again will Britain be the workshop of the world, owning a vast colonial Empire and controlling its domains by gun-boats and bayonets. British imperialism is a declining force, and no matter what Tory backwoodsmen may say, or chauvinistic Laborites feel, the facts are there for all to see; and all parties, classes and interests, in determining their future attitude, must accept them or, like King Canute, be overwhelmed by a rising tide they could not or would not understand.

It is no less obvious that Britain faces a serious economic crisis. Imports are greater than exports, and there is an adverse balance of payments problem. The Government is determined to restrict internal expenditure. The bank rate at 7½% is the highest ever. Installment buying restriction exists on many goods, such as motor cars, refrigerators, washing machines and other household commodities etc. Strenuous efforts are being made to pursue a policy of wage restraint, with direct Government interference in wage negotiation for nationalized industries and Government servants. Even private industry has not been exempted, the Government advising employers to resist wage claims. Municipal authorities are urged to cut expenditures, and school building programs, slum clearance, new housing projects, hospitals and other national and local expenditures are being severely curtailed. The Government election slogan of *"You've never had it so good"* is now reduced to *"You've had it."*

The Government is seeking to solve its problems in traditional Tory style. The burden must be placed on the people in the form of new health charges, higher rents and fares, with old age pensions and other state benefits kept down to a minimum, while prices rise and wages are held at present levels. It has belatedly recognized

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that some form of economic planning is essential and, trying to steal Labor's clothes, now proposes an economic planning committee on which it hopes to get not only the employers and government representatives, but the Trades Union Congress as well. Its aim, not specifically stated, is a subtle national front with the unions disciplining the workers, the employers expanding production, and the Government co-ordinating overall policy. Needless to say, the basic structure of the economy is not to be changed.

APART FROM OTHER QUESTIONS, three major issues were spotlighted at the Annual Trades Union Congress (T. U. C.). First, the expulsion of the Electrical Trades Union; second, the Trades Union attitude in relation to the Government's wages restraint; and third, the question of Britain's entry into the European Common Market. The question of unilateral nuclear disarmament was again discussed, but a negative decision was a foregone conclusion with the T. U. C.-Labor Party Executive statement overwhelmingly carried despite continued opposition by the Transport and General Workers Union, led by Frank Cousins.

This year's T. U. C. has been hailed by most serious commentators as a turning point in trade union history in Britain. They may well be right. The new General Secretary, George Woodcock (personal friend of George Meany), is almost imperceptibly guiding the great T. U. C. ship along new channels. Woodcock's philosophy appears to be greatly influenced by the outlook of Gompers and his living American disciples. "More now" is his theme, using business methods with American know-how. Power must be concentrated to a greater degree in the hands of the General Council of Trades Union Congress. Coupled with this is a suggestion for looser links with the Labor Party, ostensibly to attract those unions catering to white-collar workers not affiliated to the T. U. C. and those white-coated and white collar workers, not yet members of any union.

Woodcock put the General Council case against the Electrical Trades Union (E. T. U.) leadership. The E. T. U. leaders were being castigated, he said, not because they were Communists, but because of fraud.

They had delayed and maneuvered when asked by the General Council to meet them and the General Council had finally decided, that in the interests of all, including the E. T. U. members, the union must be expelled. However, if a change of E. T. U. leadership took place, then the union would be welcomed back.

The position of the E. T. U. leaders was stated by the National President, Frank Foulkes, who is a Communist. He rightly argued that there had been undue press interference in the internal affairs of the E. T. U. In his opinion, expulsion from the T. U. C. would weaken union solidarity at a time when unity was urgently needed, particularly in the face of the Government onslaught on wages. He quoted at length from Catholic newspapers endeavoring to prove that opposition to himself and his colleagues was due to the activities of The Association of Catholic Trade Unionists.

Despite Foulkes' efforts, the E.T.U. was expelled from the T. U.C. Nonetheless, the T. U. C. General Council immediately took steps to ensure that E. T. U. branches were not expelled from Trades Councils, or the union cold-shouldered on national negotiating committees. In fact its position as a bona fide trade union is fully protected. Since Congress met, Woodcock has written to every E. T. U. branch explaining T. U. C. policy. Right now the press is carrying reports that the Communist members of the Executive Committee of the E. T. U. have been defeated in the union elections, and that Communist influence has been reduced to very small proportions. This undoubtedly

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should mean a quick return of the E. T. U. to the T. U. C. (It ought to be said, many non-Communist trade unionists were unhappy at the decision to expel the E. T. U., not because they condoned the ballot rigging, but because they felt it was not the best way to deal with the situation, a position I personally hold.)

THE T. U. C. ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, submitted to Congress a document on the European Common Market which agreed with Britain's entry "in principle" but subject to conditions. In this they went much further than the Labor Party which firmly sat on the fence. Sir Alan Birch, speaking at the T. U. C., built a case for entry, but his counterpart, George Brown, M. P., at the Labor Party Conference, while giving the positive side of entry, urged extreme caution. Most of the Left, and much of the Center and Right of the Labor Party are strongly opposed to the Common Market. This springs from the fear that if Britain accepts the Rome Treaty, future nationalization would be jeopardized. Direction of labor, it is also believed, could flood Britain with masses of unorganized workers which would constitute a threat to cherished rights and conditions. The main consideration is that it would perpetuate the cold war. It is argued that a permanent division of Europe would be the U. S. A.'s outpost not only against Communism but also against the spread of democratic socialism. Naturally, De Gaulle and Adenauer are regarded with extreme suspicion. They stand for everything reactionary, and European Unity from their viewpoint is based upon capitalist concepts.

Another fear, is that Britain would lose her chance to play an independent role in securing neutralist opinions against both power blocs.

Are these fears correct? Personally, I think they have some substance, but are overplayed. Britain cannot afford not to enter E. C. M. and the British Government, again with its usual astuteness, is determined to go in. What Labor really must do, then, is to work out a policy and strategy which can unite European labor, offer a socialist perspective, and seek to gain for the Common Market, a policy of disengagement from the Cold War. Undoubtedly, the policies of the U. S. Government are not those of the British labor movement (although Gaitskell seems to think a similarity exists) and in its endeavors to strengthen the E. C. M. with Britain in, Washington may find its protegée unmanageable.

Many socialists in Britain have long argued that the ultimate solution to Europe's problems is the creation of a United Socialist States of Europe. The E. C. M. could well be the first step towards that objective.

THE LABOR PARTY CONEFRENCE went as I predicted it would in an earlier issue of NEW POLITICS. The vote against unilateral nuclear disarmament was overwhelming, even greater than that registered at the T. U. C. The Left, however, received some encouragement from the fact that resolutions were passed against the Polaris Base in Scotland and against the training of West German

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troops in South Wales. It would be wrong, however, to interpret these decisions as a great victory for Labor's Left. Hugh Gaitskell, in his speech on foreign policy and defense anticipating the vote, said it was possible to oppose certain bases within Britain, without in any way opposing the overall policy of the Executive Committee of the Party. And the German troops issue is largely academic because their period of training is shortlived and soon they will be moving out.

Demands are already heard in certain Left quarters for a withdrawal from the Labor Party. They should go unheeded. Although I remain a convinced unilateralist, I recognize that to the mass of the people and to European socialists, unilateralism is regarded as romanticism and not practical politics. Therefore, the Left must work within the agreed Conference policy and raise to new levels the campaign for disengagement, a policy clearly accepted in the official statement. This is something that the people can understand. It is something that European socialists can accept, and in no way cuts across the ideas of neutralism or a third-force. Disengagement can be the answer to the two great military blocs, it can equally appeal to the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe, and is in line with the Rapacki Plan put forward by Poland to the United Nations. Disengagement of Europe does not play into the hands of the Soviet Union as, unfortunately, unilateralism appears to do. It would mean a simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. troops and bases.

Will the unilateralist argument cease now that the Party has reverted to a multilateralist position? I think not. To echo the words of John Horner, General Secretary of the Fire Brigades Union, the question of nuclear war is not the property of the Labor Party, it is the concern of the whole world and, in any case, many of the most active anti-nuclear campaigners are not in the Labor Party. Echoes of the struggle have been heard in the Liberal Party, and in extremely muted form even within Tory ranks. Unfortunately, the logical arguments have appeared to come from the Right Wing of the Labor Party. The Left has failed lamentably to present a serious alternative case, explaining what a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament really would mean.

ALL SECTIONS OF THE PARTY have an eye on the forthcoming General Election and no one wants to be responsible for a possible defeat. Labor's chances of forming the next Government in Britain have improved beyond all hopes a year ago. This is not due so much to the internal Party situation, but because of the policies pursued by the Conservative Government. The increased health charges, the introduction of the Rent Act, the economic policy of wage restraint and tax relief for the rich, etc., have alienated wide sections of the people, among them traditional Tory supporters like school teachers and civil servants. Undoubtedly, the Government's reshuffle, (just announced by Macmillan) and Conference promises are designed to repair the damage by creating a reburnished image. Actually, it can and most probably will have the opposite effect. The Government's reshuffle has strengthened the

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Right Wing of the Conservative Party, the "get tough with the workers" brigade.

What then of the future?

The coming months will see bitter industrial struggles. All unions are determined, despite some hesitation on the part of some of the trade union establishment, to seek and fight for wage increases. The Government wage policy is condemned on all fronts. The Right Wing Sir Thomas Williamson and the Left Wing Frank Cousins, on behalf of their two giant organizations, are seeking an interview with Government leaders. They jointly will tell them that if need be the two unions will combine in joint struggle to defeat Government policy on wages.

Once again, the class struggle is flaring up all over Britain. Even people like Cyril Osborne, Conservative M. P., recognize that the economic crisis is creating hardship for the workers, while capital goes scot-free. At the Conservative Conference he proposed measures to restrict profits, to control employers as well as the workers. His efforts fell on deaf ears, in fact he was accused of socialism by fellow delegates.

Finally, neither the T. U. C. nor the Labor Party Conference have determined completely the basic issues facing the movement. Naturally, some critics will see the new "Signposts for the Sixties" carried at the Labor Party Conference as embodying revisionist ideas. A minority of the Left are already saying the Labor Party is a spent force. These people, I believe, are false prophets and politically unrealistic. The hard solid core of the British Trade Unionists and Labor Party members are cautious, but socialist (center-left in position). Marxism has never become their acknowledged philosophy. They have practised it, without preaching it.

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Correspondence

DEMOCRACY AND SUFFRAGE

Dear Sir,

Mr. Lionel Abel, at the conclusion of his astonishingly philistine assault on Hannah Arendt, spares a shot for me. I am described as being "openly conservative," as a man "who has even committed himself to the view that universal suffrage was a mistake which should perhaps be corrected . . ."

Mr. Abel is in error: I have never committed myself to any such view on universal suffrage. What he may have in mind is an exchange between Richard Wollheim and myself in *Encounter*, in the course of which Mr. Wollheim argued that universal suffrage is a necessary precondition for democracy, which I denied. My point was that it was quite proper to call the United States a democracy in 1917, before women received the vote, or even in 1817, before all adult white males had the vote. The term itself, "universal suffrage," is ambiguous: what seems like universal suffrage in one society, at a certain period, might not seem so to another society at another period. Is a regime that grants the vote to all those over 18 years of age "more democratic" than one which grants it to all over 25? Obviously, it all depends on the status and role of young people in the particular society, at the particular time. Is a regime that *forces* people to vote "more democratic" than one that allows them to remain passively a-political? There are some people who think so; but their argument falls short of being self-evident. It is all considerably more complicated than Mr. Abel seems to think.

I do believe it might have been a good idea for some of the newer nations of Asia and Africa to commence their political careers with a limited suffrage. But I certainly have no desire to restrict the suffrage in those countries, new or old, where it is already "universal." It would be politically imprudent; and sofar as concerns a country like the United States, nothing would horrify me more than the prospect of a government of men of property in alliance with the men of letters, among whom Mr. Abel must be included.

As for my being a "conservative," open or covert, I am not aware of it. Perhaps what Mr. Abel means to say is merely that I have no sympathy with the kind of doctrinaire and sullen egalitarianism that now passes for radicalism in America.

Irving Kristol

Mr. Abel Replies

Mr. Irving Kristol calls my criticism of Hannah Arendt (NEW POLITICS, Autumn, 1961) "astonishingly philistine" and then goes on to argue that he himself is not "openly conservative" as I called him in my piece. Perhaps I was wrong to designate him thus. Let me say at once I did not intend the designation abusively. But Mr. Kristol now denies being conservative; hence, if conservative, he assuredly is not "openly" so. To start with, then, I must make this concession: "open" was not the right word to use about him. I am glad, though, that I was not as wrong as I might have been. I recollect that when his views came up for mention in my piece, I hesitated between two terms: "openly conservative," and "candidly conservative," finally opting for the former. Some intuition must have told me that "candid" would not truly qualify Mr. Kristol's politics, which most certainly are not crystal clear.

Should I have called him a conservative? Perhaps not. Conservatives in modern times do not raise questions, as Mr. Kristol does, about the utility

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or applicability of universal suffrage. Modern conservatives are characterized rather by the desire to prevent the state from intruding on sectors of society it has not so far controlled. Such is the substance of modern, as distinct from nineteenth century conservatism, for which last, the limitation of the vote was an important issue. But I shall not call Mr. Kristol a nineteenth century conservative either. No one in this century could make a career out of nineteenth century conservatism. I suspect that I did Mr. Kristol rather too much credit in calling him a conservative; I am inclined to think that he has taken up seemingly conservative positions—modern or outmoded—just in order to play the *enfant terrible* in liberal circles.

Mr. Kristol says that he never committed himself to the view that universal suffrage was a mistake which perhaps might be corrected. Didn't he? Now, of course, in charging him with that view, I did not mean that he was foolish enough to think universal suffrage could be corrected in those advanced countries which long ago adopted it. I meant—though perhaps I should have crossed my t's and dotted my i's—that he was interested in arguing against the adoption of universal suffrage where it has not yet been tried, and where to try it, in Mr. Kristol's own words, "can have the most disastrous consequences" (see his piece in *Encounter*, March, 1960). It is to be noted that in the very same piece Mr. Kristol endorsed past restrictions of the vote, maintaining that "restriction of vote to property owners to those that paid a certain minimum in rent or taxes" was justified, since the "assumption that the others [the propertyless—L. A.] were too inadequately informed of, too remote from, political problems to have opinions worth considering" was not "undemocratic . . . at that time under those circumstances." Now, to have been without property at that time was a very bad thing; it was the very essence of social misfortune. But since when did social misfortune make one remote from political problems?

Mr. Kristol's response to my piece seems to me extremely confused. He says that universal suffrage is ambiguous because the voting age may vary in different countries. But to my logic, variations in the voting age indicate nothing ambiguous about universal suffrage, and demonstrate merely that the age of political maturity is defined differently in different places. Mr. Kristol asks whether the United States was a democracy before women had the vote, and he thinks the fact that we can call it a democracy in that period renders the notion of universal suffrage ambiguous. Once again he is trying to make a puzzle out of something perfectly clear. Democracy is a matter of degree; certainly the United States is a more democratic state since women got the vote. And it is more democratic today because suffrage is more nearly universal.

In his letter Mr. Kristol assails "the sullen and doctrinaire equalitarianism that passes for radicalism in this country." How are we to understand this? Are we to understand that Mr. Kristol is in favor of a blithe and undoctrinaire equalitarianism, and that if something of the sort were available for adoption, he would be prepared to call himself a radical? It is to be noted, though, that in the famous piece Mr. Kristol wrote on McCarthyism, he characterized the late Senator's assaults on liberals and radicals as "blithe." Certainly McCarthy's assaults were undoctrinaire. They even bespoke a certain equalitarianism, since the Senator, lacking respect for any kind of personal accomplishment, was ready to put everybody he opposed in the same sack. I should add, here, that the radicals Mr. Kristol stigmatizes as "sullen" and "doctrinaire," are blamed by him for having these characteristics. But when it came to Senator McCarthy's "blithe"—I would call them ferocious—assaults on radicals and liberals, Mr. Kristol blamed not the Senator, but the radicals and liberals, not the execu-

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tioner but his victims. I had assumed that such past behavior on the part of Mr. Kristol could be designated as "openly conservative." But he has convinced me I was in error about my nomenclature; I shall from now on designate it, along with recent performances of Mr. Kristol, as "astonishingly philistine."

ZEN AND POLITICS

To the Editor:

The title of Mr. Braun's article "The Politics of Zen" contains in itself the whole fallacy upon which his diatribe is based, for it is almost as if one were to speak of "the politics of physics" or of "the ethical implications of sight." It is perhaps natural for us to think of Zen as a religion, and thus as a way of life having the same function in the cultures of the Far East as Christianity and Judaism in our own. Though the political records of the latter are none too clean, these religions have an avowedly ethical function: they believe alike that salvation comes by virtue of membership in a loving community—the Church, or the People of God. By deliberate intention, then, such religions are politically and morally normative.

But this is not the function of such disciplines as physics or even medicine. Perfectly sound physical or medical knowledge may be used for good or evil ends. Western physics made possible the unimaginable tortures of Hiroshima, and the healing of a lame man may enable him to kick his children. Would Mr. Braun suggest, then, that physics and medicine be abandoned? Or would he suggest that clear eyesight is a menace because it enables us to aim rifles?

Now Zen is somewhat like a science and somewhat like a highly sensitized faculty of perception, the combination of a certain kind of knowledge and skill. As knowledge, it is the direct (almost sensory) experience of a state of affairs which some scientists describe theoretically as the reciprocal or "transactional" behavior of an organism and its environment. It enables one not only to think but also to feel that organism/environment or man/universe is a unified field of behavior —as is, indeed, known to be the case in such sciences as ecology and biology. I have sometimes called Zen the immediate perception of relativity, or of the inseparable relatedness of all things and events. As skill, Zen comprises an art of freeing thought and action from what psychologists call "blocking" or from being nonplussed by certain types of dilemma. These dilemmas are approximately what some modern philosophers would term psuedo-problems or pseudo-alternatives. For example, "Where was your fist before you closed your hand?" is analogous to the Zen *koan* "Who were you before your father and mother conceived you?"

It is perfectly obvious that knowledge and skill of these kinds can be used in any form of action, and that they are as ethically neutral as electronics. Just as it is quite proper for us to question the political and ethical principles of men who employ the sciences, not the ethics of physics but of physicists, so it would have been quite proper for Mr. Braun to question the political intentions of various individuals who employ Zen. He would then have to direct his criticism to the philosophies or ideologies which do in fact provide the moral and political values of Far Eastern cultures—e.g., Confucianism and Shinto, and their derivatives.

Zen is concerned with the basic characteristics of life and the universe, but, unlike Christianity (which is similarly concerned), it does not seek in this realm for ethical directives. Christianity does so because of its belief in a personal God who is the guarantor of a supernatural and absolute moral order, but I doubt whether Mr. Braun would want to invoke this type of sanction for political ethics, for in its own way it is as

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dangerous as none at all. It is not subject to critical analysis, experiment, and change. As I see it and, as I am sure, many Zen Buddhists see it, the foundation for ethics is not to be found in science, metaphysics, or mysticism, but in mutual agreement between human beings as to how they want to behave. Ethically, we are not so much trains in search of rails as pilots in search of agreement as to schedules and air-lanes.

Mr. Braun, in common with many others, has of course been influenced by Arthur Koestler's astonishingly poor piece of reporting, *The Lotus and the Robot,* especially the incident in the book where a Zen abbot refuses "to pass ethical judgement on Hitler's murder of the Jews." Readers of Koestler will remember that on this occasion the abbot characterized Hitler's behavior as "foolish" rather than "sinful." I do not know what sort of interpreter was present at this interview, so I can only guess that the abbot attributed Hitler's action, as would any Buddhist, to *mu-myo* which is roughly translatable as "ignorance" or "unconsciousness." The abbot would have had no word for "sin" because he had no theology in which sin is the transgression of a supernatural moral order. Perhaps Koestler was offended because the abbot expressed no human horror. But I would suggest that a surgeon who gives way to human horror before a cancer operation may cut with an unsteady hand. The legitimate moral charge is that the Japanese did not act as surgeons in identifying Nazism and their own militarism as diseases, and this was the defect not of their Zen-vision but of their value-judgments and the ethical systems underlying them. If all this made Koestler lose his interest in Oriental art, did it, I wonder, destroy his interest in Goethe and Schiller, Rilke and Bach?

In short, Mr. Braun has directed a very proper criticism of Japanese political ethics to the wrong address. His mistake, which I do not believe he would have made if he had read my own work carefully, was to identify Zen as a religious phenomenon from which one should expect judgments of value. This is simply not its sphere, just as it is not the sphere of medicine or logic as such. These deplorable cruelties and injustices are the faults neither of Zen in the East nor of nuclear physics in the West, but of our human cultures as wholes. It is, of course, quite understandable that Zen should be confused with a religion, that is, with something of the same order as Christianity or Judaism. After all, it is a form of Buddhism, which is normally treated as a religion by many of its students and interpreters, inappropriately in my own view. (Shared by such other scholars as A. K. Coomaraswamy and René Guenon.) But Buddhism is a phenomenon with many levels and departments, reaching out with many different lines of inquiry. Zen is but one of these, and it happens to be concerned with the nature of man and the universe at a level which lies beyond good and evil. I see no way of denying the existence or validity of this level without absolutizing the standards of good and evil in some such form as the personal God.

To conclude with three points of detail: (1) Dr. Fujisawa's book, *Zen and Shinto,* is about as representative of Zen as Edgar Guest of American poetry. (2) My own social philosophy has changed considerably since I wrote *The Supreme Identity* in 1949, and I have tried to express some part of it in the final chapter of *Psychotherapy East and West,* written in 1960. (3) Mr. Braun says that I have written "reams of pure unmitigated nonsense on the healthy sexual attitudes . . . in the rustic paradise of the Asiatic village." I do not remember having written a single line, let alone reams, on the sexual life of the Asian village. In so far as I have discussed Asian sexual practices at all, I have been concerned with the rarely used and even quite esoteric sexual disciplines of

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Hindu and Buddhist Tantra. I wonder if Mr. Braun is *really* concerned with ethics. Alan Watts

Mr. Braun Replies

1. In the introductory chapter of *Nature, Man and Woman* (page 21) Alan Watts writes:

> **Furthermore, even at the mass level sexual love in the Far Eastern cultures appears to be far less problematic than with us, for there is no doubt that the Taoist feeling of the naturalness of the human state, has,, however indirectly, had a wide influence upon the everyday life of the people.**

The subsequent development of this theme in Watts' discussion of "traditional" and "progressive" societies may fall well short of a ream—I suffer from the bad habits of a socialist polemist. Alan Watts' only failing is that of a bad memory.

2. When I am informed that the Zen of Mr. Watts is somewhere between being a science and a highly sensitized faculty of perception, I am forced in all humility to ask myself: "Can it be that I have mistaken an oculist for an occult philosopher?"

3. But on re-reading the opening paragraphs of Watts' comment, I think of his lucid, concluding paragraphs that confess that a "social philosophy" was indeed present in *The Supreme Identity* and that Mr. Watts has attempted to express, in part, his latest social views in the final chapter of *Psychotherapy East and West.*

4. But what exactly is the social philosophy of this ethically-neutral-as-electronics-Zen? The change of social views is difficult to ascertain since in those editions of *The Supreme Identity* that have appeared *since* 1949, Mr. Watts has forgotten to inform his readers of the abandonment of his old political dogmas. And when we turn to consideration of the social values of the latest scientific monograph of Alan Watts there is a great deal that is not clear.

In *Psychotherapy East and West,* we learn that the "tyranny of civilized masochism" cannot be overthrown by the violence of armed revolution. On the other hand we are informed that the social idealism of the Quakers, *"like all social idealisms"* [emphasis added] is "also a way of violence, of spiritual violence against the body, making its appeal to the masochism of 'self sacrifice'." The "new" social affirmation of Alan Watts is the need for a "mature version of primal narcissism" or Norman Brown's "polymorphous eroticism." What remains unclear is what possible criterion could be applied to any social ideal to ascertain whether it is "reason informed by Eros." All that we know for certain is that Alan Watts is opposed to the violence of social idealism be it Marxist or Quaker—and that covers a lot of ground.

5. What is really involved in this confrontation between Mr. Watts and myself? At the bottom is a clash of world views, the historical, metaphysical and psychological roots of which are barely visible to the combatants. It is an ancient polemic that reappears in every period of social crisis, albeit with a dialectical twist: the unitive monists in each historical engagement are forced to fall back closer to their beginnings (now it is the Wisdom of the East—a mature narcissism) while the opposition is forced by every counter revolution to advance their first truth beyond past errors in a developmental manner. For the humanists of the West (no matter what their name) the ever new beginning point is the contradiction between the world of fact and the world of value. And dogmatists that we are, we refuse to deny the reality of that contradiction; for every resolution by philosophical angels violates some intuition at the heart of our humanity and denies that love that stands opposed to the status quo of human societies.

To hold that the foundation of ethics is nothing more than the mutual agreement of human beings as to how they

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want to behave does not make Mr. Watts ethically neutral. Pilots guided by the revelations of polymorphous eroticism or inevitable one-way tracks and schedules—the result is the same: a deadening of the sense of moral responsibility, be it Sartre's newly discovered monistic necessity or Alan Watts' detachment from the "absurdity of value choices."

East or West, the history of the struggle against the Janus-headed beyond good and evil camp has been an informative one. True, as a socialist, I am neurotically obsessed with the nightmare of history and am plagued by the intellectual and ethical problems posed by our Kronstadts, Madrids, and Hiroshimas, while Mr. Watts suffers from only . . . a bad memory.

NEGROES AND LABOR

To the Editor:

Tom Kahn's perceptive article on "The New Negro and the New Moderation" criticizes Herbert Hill, Labor Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, for "not strengthening the Negro community's identification with the labor movement," and gives me credit for pledging N.A.A.C.P. support for labor's efforts for social reform.

I believe that both criticism and credit are undeserved.

Hill's job as Labor Secretary is to try to end discrimination in the labor movement. His reports therefore deal with such discrimination. The N.A.A.C.P. resolutions adopted at its conventions have supported collective bargaining and democratic trade unionism for a good many years. It is unnecessary for Hill in his reports to emphasize this stand just as it is unnecessary for our Church Secretary, Rev. Odom, to emphasize his belief in God every time he makes a report. If Hill were making a report for totally uninformed people he would give credit to organized labor for the help it has given to many Negro workers, and for its help in the Northern and Western states and in Washington in supporting civil rights legislation. Actually, Hill, personally, and the N.A.A.C.P. branches helped to defeat "right to work" laws in California, and Ohio, and this is a good example of the alliance that ought to be strengthened between the N.A.A.C.P. and organized labor.

In giving me credit for supporting labor's efforts for social reform, such as raising minimum wages and widening their coverage, improving old age benefits and winning government health insurance, Mr. Kahn implies that that is my position and not Hill's. It is Hill's position and it is the official position of the N.A.A.C.P. expressed for over a decade in resolutions adopted at its annual conventions.

I would also like to correct Mr. Kahn's impression that the sit-ins against lunch counter segregation began in Feb. 1960. Actually, Youth Councils of the N.A.A.C.P. used sit-ins successfully against lunch counter discrimination in Oklahoma City, in St. Louis, and in Kansas in 1958 and 1959.

Mr. Kahn also states the Montgomery bus boycott was effective, which it certainly was, and implies that it was responsible for ending bus segregation in Montgomery, which is not correct. The bus boycott came to a successful end when the N.A.A.C.P. won a law suit carried to the United States Supreme Court, declaring that such segregation was unconstitutional. Promptly then and not before was segregation ended on the Montgomery buses.

Alfred Baker Lewis

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Booknotes . . .

NORMAN THOMAS, *Respectable Rebel*, by Murray B. Seidler, Syracuse University Press, 1961. (Men and Movements series.) 368 pp. $5.50.

This is the first book presenting the story of Norman Thomas' political career, and as such it fills a vacuum. As the author states, it is not exactly a biography, but it is a chronologically organized account of Thomas' political life, activity and ideas, on the background of the history of the American socialist movement. Seidler, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Wayne, notes in his preface that he has sought objectivity about his subject in spite of the fact that "I have known him since my childhood, when he first became my hero." Besides Thomas' published books, speeches and articles, he has also used extensively the Norman Thomas Papers at the New York Public Library (including a large mass of correspondence), Thomas' unpublished autobiography, Columbia's Oral History Project material, the Socialist Party Collection at Duke, and personal talks with and observation of Thomas.

The first chapter summarizes, rather quickly, Thomas's "Christian road to socialism," ending with his joining the Socialist Party in 1918 at the age of about 34. The last two chapters present a summary of his philosophy and ideas, and an evaluation of his career. There is a considerable bibliography, an index, and an interesting group of photographs.

Professor Seidler's problem of maintaining objectivity in spite of his admiration has apparently been substantially eased by his dim view of some phases of Thomas' political opinions, notably his criticisms of Roosevelt and the New Deal. (Roosevelt's emphasis on "opportunism and compromise seems to have grated on the nerves of this socialist puritan," says Seidler.) His last word on Thomas' political ideas is that: "In thought and action, he has bridged the worlds of liberalism and radicalism."

A. A.

M-26: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A REVOLUTION, by Robert Taber. Lyle Stuart, New York, 1961. $4.95.

Subtitled, "The Biography of a Revolution," **M-26** is nothing of the kind. It is primarily of interest because Robert Taber, as a CBS newsman, interviewed Castro in Oriente and then became Castro's representative as chairman of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Chief interest centers on what Taber does not report and his forthright treatment of political questions. For example, how to deal with the Cuban Communists' opposition to Castro until the eve of his victory? The uninformed reader will have difficulty in discovering the existence of the Cuban Communist Party—the PSP. The tragic General Strike of April 1958 is reported without a hint by Taber that the Communists opposed it. After accounting the failure and the bloody repression, he concludes that "no real purpose is served in seeking to analyse the causes of the failure." A neat way out.

However, Taber feels he must discuss the imprisonment of Hubert Matos, one of the leaders of the Sierra Maestra guerillas. First Matos is accused of being a malcontent; next, inferred (but not directly accused) to be supporting cattlemen resisting land reform; and finally, involved in a "plot" for which he was sentenced to 30 years for treason. The "plot" was the act of resigning from the government and criticism of growing

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Communist influence.

Taber is equally incisive on other questions. Whether Cuba has "gone Communist" is dismissed as a "pointless semantic exercise." Likewise, "the question whether Cuba is a dictatorship is also academic."

After the exclusions, the facile explanation of "plots," the dismissal of academic questions and semantic exercises, the rest of the biography is devoted to a straightforward account of Castro's wisdom and genius.

S. B.

THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA: Business and Diplomacy, 1917-1960, by Robert F. Smith, Bookman Associates, New York, 1960. $5.00

Although Dr. Smith's study carries through the first year and a half of Castro's regime, the greater part of this concise study deals with events up to 1959. While somewhat limited in scope, it does draw upon State Department archives and comes up with a damning indictment of U.S. exploitation and domination of Cuban political and economic life. If a brief survey of the reasons for Cuban hostility toward Washington is wanted, this is a good place to start.

Going back no further than the beginning of Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, Dr. Smith shows how Sumner Welles, then Ambassador to Cuba, developed the policy of "watchful waiting." After the overthrow of the Machado dictatorship by Sergeant Batista, Roosevelt refused to recognize the somewhat radical (for 1933) regime of Grau San Martin on Welles' opinion that it was "ultra-radical" with "frankly communistic" theories. Batista was more to the liking of American business interests.

The Castro regime is then examined against this history-protection of U.S. investments and opposition to reforms endangering these interests. Before and after the revolution, U.S. policy played into the hands of Cuban extremists, enabled the Communists to exploit Cuban nationalism although originally opposing Castro, and undercut the moderates still in control during 1959. Dr. Smith quotes with approval Theodore Draper's May 1960 appraisal that Castro believes he is playing the local Communists and the Russians against the Americans, a widely held opinion at that time. Unfortunately the self-assigned limits excluded an evaluation of the political character of the internal economic reform.

S. B.

HOUSE WITHOUT A ROOF, by Maurice Hindus. Double Day & Co., New York, 1961.

THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE. Documented and Analyzed by G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar. Fredrick A. Praeger, New York, 1961.

THE RED PHOENIX, by Harry Schwartz, Fredrick A. Praeger, New York, 1961.

For the student the most useful of these books is *The Sino-Soviet Dispute,* consisting mainly of original Soviet and Chinese documents relevant to the conflict within this "unshakable alliance." A reading of the Sino-Soviet-Albanian discussion at the 22nd Soviet Communist Party congress adds an enthralling post-publication chapter to the book.

A good deal, certainly not all, of the dervish-like whirling of Soviet foreign policy between "soft" and "hard" is better understood with the knowledge one can derive from this record. Lowenthal notes that: "while failing to impose on the Kremlin a policy made in Peking, the Chinese forced it to deviate from its own concepts to a significant extent." And it's hard to quarrel with Lowenthal's conclusion that: "The victory of Communism in China, and the subsequent growth of Communist China into a great power,

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thus appears in retrospect as the beginning of the end of the single-centered Communist movement that Lenin created, and the single-centered Soviet *bloc* that Stalin built."

Maurice Hindus is an able reporter, a native of Russia, who has returned many times to the Soviet Union, twice since the death of Stalin. Like almost all old "Soviet hands" Hindus is impressed by the improvements that took place after Stalin died. But he holds out little hope of political rebellion against continuing totalitarianism. For one thing Hindus despairs of the possibility that Soviet citizens in the mass can ever find out what is happening in the Western world.

Hindus scatters hundreds of fascinating facts and observations throughout the book. For example, it may come as a surprise to many that "in the country that has internationalized the word 'kasha', the ingredients for it, even in Moscow, are rarely available." But he warns that those who judge these shortcomings as signs of universal poverty are mistaken and points out that "the periodic famines that scourged the Russian countryside for centuries have been conquered."

The book by Harry Schwartz is a collection of articles reprinted from the *New York Times*. However, the introduction and the concluding chapter were written especially for this book. These two are by far the most interesting chapters in the entire compilation. The statistical appendix on the growth of Soviet production is also extremely useful.

Schwartz deals with almost all aspects of Soviet domestic and external affairs in these articles covering the post World-War II period. Those in the section on Soviet Economic Growth stand up best. In his conclusion the author makes a candid acknowledgment, to wit: "Much of the growth in relative Soviet power and prestige as against the United States since 1945 has basically been the product of superior Soviet leadership."

Since history is made not only by "great men" it might not be amiss to consider the social—economic factors and political pressures that prevent our country from presenting a more dynamic and forward-looking policy in the face of the Soviet challenge. As Walter Lippmann has emphasized, only liberal, progressive initiatives on our part can meet this challenge.

J. C.

THE BURDEN OF SOUTHERN HISTORY by C. Vann Woodward, Louisana State University Press, 1960, 205 pp., $3.50

C. Vann Woodward is one of America's most outstanding scholars and one of her more prominent thinkers. Anyone who has read his *Origins of the New South* or *The Strange Career of Jim Crow* can fully attest to the above statement. In his latest book, actually a compilation of essays, he ranges farther afield than in his past efforts. *The Burden of Southern History* is as much a commentary upon the whole nation as it is upon the South.

Woodward's central thesis in this book is disarmingly simple: the South is different from the rest of the nation —and this separate identity is worth preserving. Southern intellectuals have a difficulty however, in defining just what the difference is and should be. The homogenizing effects of the expanding industrial economy are having a deep impact upon Dixie—virtually changing the entire landscape and mode of living. No longer can agrarianism identify the South. The terrible institution of segregation is doomed and will no longer serve as a symbol. What is left and endurable is the history of the South . . . a vastly different history from that of the rest of the country, Woodward indicates.

Southern history is not the story of an advancing capitalist economy; it is a story filled with poverty, the experience of defeat and submission. In

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these and other ways the history of the South has been distinct from that of the North, but it is really the North that is peculiar. The South is the culmination of a history which has more resemblance to the past of most areas of the world—especially the crucial "underdeveloped" lands.

The existence of a distinct South is important for its own sake; but also as a barrier to complete national conformity. Also, because of its historical similarity to other areas of the world, it can teach America valuable lessons in the Cold War, Woodward believes.

In the compass of this short review it is impossible to explore very much of the Woodward's thesis or fascinating insights. There is however one point that should at least be alluded to.

One of the most important essays in the book contains a notable defense of Populism against the recent and burgeoning attacks by various intellectuals. He criticizes those who wish to alienate themselves from all popular movements because some were clearly retrograde while others produced horrible epigones or had their "illiberal" and "irrational" portions. Reform will be necessary in the future and intellectuals cannot afford to disassociate themselves from the sources of revolt, he maintains.

While much of this essay is refreshing and insightful, there is one question—which is actually at the center of the discussion—which Woodward does not explore. Basic to his thesis is that it is of paramount importance to both the populistic movements and to the "national interest" that these elements have the support of the liberal intelligentsia, or the "Sage of Monticello and the aristocrat of Hyde Park." While dissecting the Populists to see if they merit intellectual support, is it not necessary to examine the intellectual "ally" as well? The Populists (and "populistic" groups) were motivated by special interest. The intellectual believes that he represents the "national interest" and in his humanitarian commitment to reform has the best interests of the nation at heart. Is this really true or does the intellectual, too, have a bias which arises from his position in society? S. L.

THE LONG REVOLUTION by Raymond Williams. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1961. 369 pp. $5.00.

When Raymond Williams' *Culture and Society* appeared several years ago it was a major event in the British "New Left," the impact of which was felt by isolated individuals throughout the English-speaking world. Now he has returned to his themes in *The Long Revolution*. In it he has captured the essence of Marx without clearly meaning to: the profound understanding that the revolution which began in 1789 will transform every aspect of our society and, most particularly, the way man looks at and thinks about the world. The subtitle of the book expresses it directly: *An Analysis of the Democratic, Industrial and Cultural Changes Transforming Our Society*.

Williams cogently argues that a good deal of current intellectual life is designed in one way or another to respond to this threefold revolution and much of what he has to say is directed most explicitly to those radicals who are unable to accept the total nature of the revolution. As Williams puts it:

> **A very large part of our intellectual life, to say nothing of our social practice, is . . . devoted to criticizing the long revolution, in this or that aspect, by many powerful selective techniques. But as the revolution itself extends, until nobody can escape it, this whole drift seems increasingly irrelevant. In naming the great process of change the long revolution, I am trying to learn assent to it, an adequate assent of mind and spirit. I find increasingly that the values and meanings I need are all in this process of change. If it is pointed out, in traditional terms, that democracy, industry, and extend-**

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ed communication are all means rather than ends, I reply that this, precisely, is their revolutionary character, and that to realize and accept this requires new ways of thinking and feeling, new conceptions of relationships, which we must try to explore.

The centrality of Williams' work cannot be analyzed in a brief review. What must be said is that Raymond Williams is not only required but highly recommended reading.

G.R.

Books Received

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, by Raymond Aron. Beacon Press, Boston, 1961. $7.50.

MODERN FORMS OF GOVERNMENT, by Michael Stewart. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961. $2.25 (paper), $5.75 cloth.

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THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM, by Henry S. Kariel, Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 1961. $6.75.

INDIA: A MODERN HISTORY, by Percival Spear, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961. $10.00.

THE SOVIET BLOC, by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961. $2.75 (paper).

CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHARACTER, Edited by S. Martin Lipset & Leo Lowenthal. The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1961. $7.50.

MAY MAN PREVAIL? by Erich Fromm, Doubleday, New York, 1961. $4.50.

REBEL IN PARADISE, by Richard Drinnon, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961. $5.95.

THE POLITICS OF OIL, by Robert Engler. Macmillan, New York, 1961. $7.50.

MOSCOW JOURNAL, by Harrison E. Salisbury. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1961. $6.95.

COMMUNIST TOTALITARIANISM: Keys to the Soviet System, by Bertram D. Wolfe. Beacon Press, Boston, 1961. $4.95.

ON SOCIALIST REALISM, by Abram Tertz. Pantheon Books, New York, 1961. $2.95.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, by Nicolas Berdyaev. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961. $1.75 (paper).

TERRORISM & COMMUNISM, by Leon Trotsky. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961. $1.95 (paper).

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION and LENINISM OR MARXISM?, by Rosa Luxemburg. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961. $1.65 (paper).

GREAT DISSENTERS, by Norman Thomas, W. W. Norton, New York, 1961. $4.00.

CRUSADERS FOR AMERICAN LIBERALISM: The Story of The Muckrakers, by Louis Filler. Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio. 1961. $4.00.

THE MUCKRAKERS: 1902-1912, Edited and with Notes by Arthur & Lila Weinberg. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1961. $7.50.

THE NEW GERMANY AND THE OLD NAZIS, by T. H. Tetens. Random House, New York, 1961. $4.95.

SOUTHEAST ASIA TODAY — AND TOMORROW: A Political Analysis, by Richard Butwell. Frederick Praeger, New York, 1961. $1.75 (paper), $4.25 cloth).

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ERRATA

We regret two typographical errors affecting Hal Draper's article in the last issue. (1) The title should have been: "Neo-Corporatists and Neo-Reformists." (2) On page 96, first line above the illustration, a "not" was left out of the sentence quoting Berle: "Conventional stereotypes of 'democratic procedure' are not particularly useful in dealing with this problem."

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Our sincere apologies to our readers and to Desmond Donnelly, M.P. for the scrambled lines on page 79 of his article on British Socialism. The second, third, fourth and fifth paragraphs on that page should have read:

Gaitskell, on the other hand, as the current exponent of Bevinism, had been the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1951 whose decision it was to impose minor Health Service charges; and he became to be regarded and personalized as their chief enemy by the Bevanites. In addition, Gaitskell, who had been in charge of several nationalized industries as Minister of Fuel and Power from 1947-50 (practical experience that Bevan never had), clearly learned from some of Labor's administrative mistakes and wished to avoid repeating them.

Thus he stood openly for a more flexible, less bureaucratic approach to public ownership—and again he was regarded as suspect by the Bevanites. Although he was at pains to make his position clear, that he was still pro-public ownership wherever it served a valuable and relevant purpose, it made no difference. He was—and is—the enemy.

Thus, in summary, 1961 Bevanism stands broadly for neutralism, overriding priorities for the social services and a general extension of monopoly public ownership. Some of its followers take the view that Russia is possibly less of a danger than America; certainly there is little point to Britain giving priority to the Western alliance in programs and alignments. It is also against Gaitskell, the man.

Now let us look at Bevinism. It also goes back to the 1930's to the point when Ernest Bevin lectured the Labor party on standing up to the tyranny and the need to adopt practical measures to implement collective security aspirations embodied in the resolutions.

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